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EXTRADITION OF FRG TERRORIST FROM SWITZERLAND REPORTED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 10 Aug 79 p 15

[Text] German national Gabriele Kroeher-Tiedemann, currently serving a 15-year term in Switzerland for having, together with Christian Moeller, fired on two border guards near Delsberg, may at some later date be extradited to the Federal Republic, to serve an 8-year sentence imposed in that country. She had only served a very short time of the German sentence, the result of attempted murder, when she was "freed by blackmail" in March 1975, in exchange for kidnaped Berlin politician Peter Lorenz.

Reservation by the Confederate Court

Last Wednesday the second public-law section of the Confederate Court rejected Kroeher's appeal against the Federal Republic's extradition request and approved extradition with one reservation. However, extradition will have to wait for completion of Kroeher's Swiss sentence.

The proviso of the Confederate Court refers to one point in the Federal German accusation: Unauthorized possession of arms. In Switzerland this is a cantonal, not a confederate offense, and neither counts among the crimes subject to extradition nor sufficiently meets the requirement of penal liability in the two countries. It is left to the German judicial authorities, however, to decide whether ruling out this offense would influence the term of the penalty.

It must be noted that no other reservation was mentioned in regard to the German sentence, especially with respect to resistance to judicial agents. Violence and threats against officials represent punishable offenses in Confederate law also, but are not among the crimes subject to extradition as listed in the Swiss extradition law. Yet, when Switzerland adopted the European Council resolutions dealing with extradition, it raised two objections: Penal liability for a crime in the applicant and extraditing country does not suffice to justify extradition. The offense must be subject to extradition according to the Swiss list. In the Kroeher case this requirement is met. At the same time Switzerland has reserved the right in such a case to

extend extradition also to offenses punishable in both countries but which are not listed in the Swiss catalog of crimes subject to extradition. That is why nothing prevents extradition also for resistance to officials.

Rejected Objections

The candidate for extradition had raised three objections to her extradition. First she wanted to have the extradition procedure stayed until settlement of the question of a possible Austrian extradition request in connection with the attack on the OPEC ministers in Vienna on 21 December 1975. As Swiss extradition to the Federal Republic is restricted to the execution of the sentence there pronounced, and Gabriele Kroeher, a German national, would not be further extradited, the verdict was that she had no reason to ask for a stay. Secondly she asserted that her life would be in immediate danger in a German jail, and her attorney believed to have proved this assertion by the production of left extremist pamphlets. The Confederate Court denied this danger; special security measures are geared solely to the special security risk of terrorists. Finally it was claimed that Gabriele Kroeher's release in 1975 signified that the Federal Republic had yielded its penalty claim. This, however, was ruled not to have been proved at all, even disregarding the fact that such yielding could not be considered valid because it was the consequence of blackmail. In fact the Federal Republic soon after restored Kroeher's name to the list of wanted criminals.

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CSO: 3103

IMPACT OF SPOe VICTORY ON FUTURE POLITICS

Vienna EUROPÄISCHE RUNDschau in German No 3, 1979 pp 2-10

[Article by Helmut Fischer: "After the SPOe Victory"]

[Text] On 6 May 1979 92.21 percent of Austrian voters went to the polls to elect their parliament for the coming 4 years. Of the 4,729,251 votes cast, 51.03 percent went to the SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria], 41.9 percent to the OeVP [Austrian People's Party], 6.06 percent to the FPÖe [Austrian Liberal Party] and .96 percent to the KPÖe [Communist Party of Austria]. If we compare this result with the political structures in other West European countries, the preeminence of the SPOe emerges very clearly.

At the June 1970 elections to the EC Parliament socialists and social democrats attracted a total of about 28 percent of the vote cast. In the countries represented in the Council of Europe socialists and social democrats dispose of, on the average, about 34 percent of the votes. If we scrutinize some European democracies, in England the socialists account for 37 percent, in Germany for 42.6 percent, in France for 28.3 percent, in Italy for 10 percent, in Sweden for 42.8 percent and in Switzerland for 24.9 percent.

With the exception of Malta, Austria--with a 51.03 percent socialist vote--has achieved the largest percentage of socialist votes in parliamentary elections held by European democracies.

When, though, we consider the Austrian political structure over a longer period, the election result of 6 May appears far less extraordinary; in fact it fits more or less "logically" into the results of recent years and decades. A table of election results since 1945 presents the following picture:

National Council Elections in the Second Republic (percentages)

	SPOe	OeVP	FPÖe	KPOe
1945	44.6	49.8	-	5.41
1949	38.7	44.9	11.6	5.0
1953	42.1	41.2	10.9	5.2
1956	43.0	45.9	6.5	4.4
1959	44.7	44.1	7.7	3.2
1962	44.0	45.4	7.1	3.0
1966	42.5	48.3	5.3	.4
1970	48.4	44.6	5.5	.9
1971	50.04	43.1	5.5	1.4
1975	50.4	43.0	5.4	1.2
1979	51.03	41.9	6.06	.9

Obviously, therefore, the Austrian political scenery after the 6 May 1979 elections is not the result of a political landslide but of a long-range development. Any analysis must take this point into account and, for that purpose, we will break the development down as follows:

1. Factors which have exerted a long-term influence on the development of the Second Republic (and will probably continue to do so), and which represent features particular to Austria;
2. Factors which are relevant particularly to the present time and also helped determine the election result;
3. Aspects of future developments.

Special Features of Development in Austria

It seems that, in the long-term development of a country, there is a kind of "higher justice." Many circumstances which exerted an extraordinarily adverse effect on the development of Austria in the era of the First Republic, have changed into beneficial factors for the Second Republic:

-- While the collapse of the Austrian monarchy imposed a serious political, economic and psychological strain on the amputated successor nation Austria, the Second Republic has seen the shedding of all this ballast become a definite asset for the small but homogenous, evolutionary and self-confident Austrian Republic.

- While the violent class conflicts of the First Republic, culminating in the February 1934 civil war, ultimately provided the decisive contribution to the submergence of Austria, the Second Republic drew on this experience to develop a readiness for cooperation which is so highly respected in the political thought of our country that it has survived all types of government and coalitions.

-- While the Church was not content in the First Republic to be a spiritual and moral factor but actively interfered in political life by means of clerical deputies and, at one time, even a cleric as Federal Chancellor, the Church in the Second Republic assimilated the lessons of the past and retired from day-to-day politics, thereby largely contributing to that ideological pluralism which is of the utmost importance for the intellectual climate of Austria.

Not the least of the structural elements in Austrian politics favorable to social democracy is the fact that the communist party--never very significant in Austria--declined to total impotence in recent years, not least due to the effects of the Soviet occupation of Austria. Consequently the SPOe may be said to be the "sole representative" of the left in the Austrian political spectrum.

The nationalization of large sections of the raw material and other key industries in Austria, including the major banks, still exercises an influence far exceeding the circumstance that 20 percent of gross output values and 21 percent of exports originate with the nationalized industries. Though it is true that the nationalized industries tend to differ less from private industrial firms in the matter of business policy, management or the extent of codetermination than the proposers of the nationalization law may have envisioned, the shift in the balance of power between employees and employers brought about by the "neutralization" of the nationalized industries must be accounted crucial. I am persuaded that the so-called social partnership could not possibly operate in the specifically Austrian mode if the nationalized industries were not available as buffers for the ranks of the employers.

Finally Austria's neutrality, though voluntary but--if we wish to define this term--a "price voluntarily paid" for the achievement of the state treaty, does have effects on the further development of our country: Our neutrality has set certain limits to the powerful undertow of the EEC countries; the distribution of Austrian foreign trade is somewhat better balanced, and Austria's role as the meeting point of East and West can be shaped more meaningfully and constructively.

Causes of the Election Result

All the points listed are factors contributing to the sociopolitical development of Austria and the evolution of its political scenery. This scenery is characterized (among other features) by the fact that the two major parties, the SPOe and the OeVP have nearly always in the past decades drawn between 40-51 percent of the votes; the SPOe steadily approached the upper limit, the OeVP increasingly the lower limit of this span. To get at the causes of the 6 May 1979 election results, however, we need to go into greater detail:

In 1970 the Socialist Party of Austria, led by Bruno Kreisky, managed for the first time to obtain a majority in parliament and form a government--initially a minority government. At that time it took over from a People's Party which

25 years of government had drained, exhausted and deprived of all imagination, leaving it without strength to reform vital areas of our society, though the years following 1968 supported a European mental climate characterized by a thrust toward reform. It was therefore relatively easy for the SPÖ to make the 1970's a period for implementing many long overdue reforms in the area of the penal code, the civil code, consumer protection, university and general education, conscription, family affairs, labor law, and so on. To this mix was added a progressive social policy and a modern economic policy.

The results of this policy were definitely impressive, especially in social affairs and economics:

Employment rose from 2.39 million in 1970 to 2.75 million in 1979. The unemployment rate in the entire period from 1970 to 1979 was always below 2.1 percent (annual average).

The real incomes of gainfully employed persons rose from 36.8 percent per capita in the years 1970-1978.

Minimum retirement pensions increased from 1,782 schillings in 1970 to 4,731 schillings nominally in 1979.

In the same period expenditure on education and research rose from 10.2 billion to 33.5 schillings.

As for economic growth, full employment and price stability, Austria achieved outstanding values even in international comparison. In the following a survey of employment:

Average Unemployment Rates (percentages)

	1960/1969	1970/1978
Switzerland	0.0	0.2
Austria	2.9	1.9
Sweden	1.7	2.4
Federal Republic of Germany	1.0	2.8
France	2.0	3.1
The Netherlands	1.0	3.4
Britain	1.9	4.0
Italy	3.4	4.2
Denmark	3.5	4.8
Belgium	3.2	5.8

With regard to the rate of inflation Austria managed the third best result in the same period; in addition we must remember that the current rate of inflation (third quarter of 1979) is actually lower in Austria than in the Federal Republic:

Average Annual Inflation Rate (percentages)

	1960/1969	1970/1978
Federal Republic of Germany	2.4	4.5
Switzerland	3.1	4.6
Austria	3.3	5.7
Belgium	2.7	6.6
The Netherlands	4.1	6.7
Sweden	3.7	7.8
France	3.9	7.8
Denmark	5.3	8.3
Italy	3.6	10.7
Britain	3.5	11.1

In the matter of economic growth Austria had to be content in the 1960's with taking seventh place in the European rankings; this decade it managed the highest rates of growth:

Annual Economic Growth (percentages)

	1960/1969	1970/1978
Austria	4.8	3.8
France	5.9	3.7
The Netherlands	5.5	3.3
Belgium	4.9	2.9
Federal Republic of Germany	5.2	2.7
Italy	5.7	2.6
Denmark	5.1	2.1
Britain	3.0	1.9
Sweden	4.5	1.8
Switzerland	4.4	1.1

It goes without saying that the SPÖe focused its electioneering propaganda in the 6 May 1979 elections on continuing this policy as the pursuit of the "Austrian approach."

The outcome of the National Council elections was no doubt profoundly influenced by the fact that the ÖVP accepted the challenge of the socialists precisely in the areas where the SPÖe was strongest, denied the successes scored since 1970 and called for a "radical change of line," thereby making the election a plebiscite on the continued pursuit or abandonment of the approach of the 1970's.

Kreisky and the Fifth ÖVP Chairman

In addition there was the personality of Federal Chancellor Dr Kreisky who has an immensely strong lead over the chairmen of the two opposition parties,

both in popularity and confidence enjoyed, as well as the structural shifts in the Austrian population by which just the source groups of the OeVP's traditional strength, that is farmers and small businessmen, are numerically declining.

All the same, the socialists gain of two seats and the increase from 50.4 percent to 51.03 percent of the vote would not have appeared so sensational or dramatic if the OeVP had not been in what amounted to a positively euphoric mood before the elections, even trying to arouse the impression that the SPÖ's loss of the absolute majority was a preordained fact, and that the elections were really concerned only with establishing the full extent of OeVP gains.

The greater was the OeVP's disappointment and shock at the actual outcome of the election, and the ensuing crisis—once again—brought about the resignation of the major opposition party's chairman. In succession to Klaus, Withalm, Schleinzner and Taus, the new OeVP chairman will be the fifth such to sit across from SPÖ chairman Dr Kreisky.

Austria After the Elections

I have a strong and empirically justified distrust of predictions of future political trends. The following remarks should therefore not be interpreted as forecasts, only as the attempt to clarify some more factors which might be important for the future development of our country:

The election result of 6 May certainly means that Austria will have a SPÖ led government until 1983. Moreover it guarantees the stable and smooth co-operation of government and parliament as well as (insofar as the SPÖ can help it) the continued pursuit of social partnership and the maintenance of the many informal "cooperative contacts" which not only round off the Austrian political system but in some areas in fact decisively influence it.

The government program submitted by Federal Chancellor Dr Kreisky to the Austrian National Council on 19 July demonstrates that the foreign policy line will also feature the consistent pursuit of the line adopted in the 1970's.

As for economic policy, the SPÖ remains wedded to priority for full employment. Corrections of this policy may be needed insofar as the rise in the budget deficit consciously accepted in recent years cannot continue unchanged -- unless the government's scope for economic policy decisions is to be unduly restricted. Although, or possibly just because, Austria's borrowing is not particularly great in the international context, we will want to avoid joining the front rank of Europe in this area.

Gradual Rethinking of Social Policy

In the field of social policy it is the SPÖ's assumption that the socio-political achievements are inviolate, but that it will be necessary gradually

to rethink the future shape of social policy. This is due not only to the necessity for observing the limits of our financial elbowroom but also to distributive considerations: The denser the sociopolitical net of a country and the higher the standard of living there, the more is it necessary to examine the distributive effects of new sociopolitical measures. In the result it will probably be felt that sociopolitical services must increasingly adopt strata rather than general specifics, in order to benefit those who are actually in the greatest need and at the same time retain distributive efficacy.

The Situation of the Parties

As the political scenery of our country continues largely to be shaped by the parties, let us attempt a survey of them:

After the elections the SPOe is doubtlessly at the peak of its nearly 100 years of progress. It enjoys a well organized party apparatus and a stable majority in parliament, the utmost solidarity and a party chairman with a reputation far exceeding Austrian borders; it has a new and interesting party program which will provide many years of valuable impetus. It also maintains a constructive and unemotional relation to the major religious communities in Austria, especially the Catholic Church, and now has no more problems in defining itself on the left, because there is actually no longer any serious political group to the left of the SPOe.

At the same time it would be wrong to close our eyes to the fact that "life's undivided joy" does not bless "any mortal"--nor, therefore, any party. The SPOe's operation of the government implies identification with the state, society and, occasionally, aspects of our system, from which it would be better to keep a critical distance. All this may well tend to push to the fore pragmatic thought while leading to the neglect of principle unless conscious efforts are made to the contrary. And the decisionmaking process in the SPOe is certainly not unaffected by the fact that party and government must be directed simultaneously. The new SPOe party program certainly requires us to turn our attention to these aspects also.

In the OeVP the fourth election defeat in an unbroken sequence since 1970 led to the resignation of party chairman Dr Taus and a profound crisis. As parliamentary democracy is built on the ability of both government and opposition to function properly, nobody can seriously welcome a prolonged crisis in the OeVP. It will not be easy, though, for the OeVP to get over the crisis on a permanent basis, because it has so far always insisted on considering the SPOe's successes mere "misunderstandings" by the voters, which were facilitated by organizational, media-related or personal defects in the OeVP, and which must be removed as quickly as possible. The OeVP thereby refuses to accept the certainly painful appreciation that the SPOe's successes are ultimately due to the fact that Austrian policy in the 1970's has been sensible, well balanced and beneficial for the large majority of the public, and that, in all probability, the SPOe has every chance of maintaining its leading role in Austria as long as it solidly continues this policy and neither internal nor external circumstances serve to end it.

Admittedly, the FPÖe was able to record a gain in seats at the last elections --from 10 to 11--, because it profited from the process of attrition in the ÖeVP. Nevertheless I feel that it is currently a rather shapeless party in which the political spectrum ranges from the extreme right to a more or less liberal center. The FPÖe allegedly aims to hold the center between the SPÖe and the ÖeVP. That is certainly out of the question as long as its current chairman persists in his current policies.

All Signals Set to Green

Austria has changed a great deal from 1970-1979--largely to its advantage. That is confirmed by people who have lived abroad for some time and returned to Austria: It has become more modern and self-confident; there is much stability but also much liberalism and, especially, there is a growing identification of the Austrian with his government and growing awareness of Austria's role in Europe.

The National Council election of 6 May has left the signals for this development at green.

We are therefore justified in assuming that this development is likely to continue, and that the Austrians will be able in the coming year also to be pleased with the main trends of development--without lapsing into complacency.

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CSO: 3103

SURVIVAL CHANCES OF GOVERNMENT ASSESSED

Martens' First Hundred Days

Brussels LE SOIR in French 8/9 Jul 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Mr Martens: One Hundred Days in Power and the Intention to Go On..." passages enclosed in slantlines are published in italics]

[Text] The time has come to bring to a close a year of work. Everyone is looking forward to a few weeks of a sunny and carefree vacation.

One hundred days have also passed for the government, and as is customary in many countries, I would like to give you an evaluation of the work done by the government in these first hundred days.

Topical preamble. Then, in the address he gave on radio Friday night, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens goes on to serious matters.

He spoke of community problems, of employment, of social dialog, and of energy.

Here are the main points of his speech: "Most Belgians want an end to community conflicts, and they want that a balanced and fair solution to the problem be found.

"Now, in barely 3 months, and with the close collaboration of Parliament, we have completed the first phase of the /reform of the state/. Proceeding in this manner, the government wants to give the communities and regions the power to make independent decisions. It does not want the country to explode, and that is why it will not listen to those acting along such lines (...) Even in a profoundly reformed state, a national parliament and a national government are indispensable. From then on it is of vital importance that our country have national cohesion in which the head of state plays an irreplaceable role.

"The government has succeeded in resuming /a true social dialog/, which had been missing for a long time. There is a real possibility that the negotiations

which will be resumed in September will successfully bring about a new agreement between the leaders of the different social groups. This is of primary importance for our country's economy and its prestige in the world. In any case, the government is ready to use important measures for an effective plan to fight unemployment. For example, to put a sum of money, an employment subsidy, at the disposal of firms that hire people.

"For its /energy policy/ the government has prepared new options. These will be definitely set and passed on to parliament during the coming week.

"Finally, our main concern is the /stabilization of finances/. During last winter's political crisis, from October to April, it was practically impossible to make any decisions. As soon as it was formed, the government submitted this year's budget to parliament, while at the same time stringently controlling the budget. For 1979 it has asked for almost no supplementary credit. By the end of this month we will establish the budget for 1980. We must take stringent measures, and we will do it."

The conclusion: "The government is determined to follow through with its assignment, and to defend all aspects of its policies, namely in Parliament."

Cabinet Evaluated

Brussels LE SOIR in French 8/9 Jul 79 p 2

[Editorial: "A Reprieve for the Government?"]

[Text] An odd atmosphere prevailed at the end of the session of parliament. In fact, one question haunts everyone and is in all the commentaries: how much longer will the present government stay in power? Suddenly everyone is talking about Mr Leo Tindemans' more or less set intention to replace Mr Wilfried Martens before the year is out.

Must one conclude that the team in power is only a government that got a reprieve? As we will see, the answer that the facts can give to this question is not a simple one. As yet, to say the least, the dice have not been cast.

A Seminar in Malines

A first subject is of the kind that will most certainly be of concern to Mr Martens and his fellow tenants in Loi Street. This weekend the CVP [Social Christian Party] is supposed to assemble its specialists in Malines, and devote a seminar to the thought of state reform. All proceedings to be held in camera. If one is to believe the "De Standaard," there is danger for the coalition in this meeting. In fact, at first it would deal with regionalization in groups of two or three, a burning question if there is one, and then with severe criticism of the government's intention regarding regional allocations and taxation for both the transitional and permanent stages of the state reform.

The most suspicious elements will say that there is enough in it to thoroughly flatter the Flemish partisans, including their monetary interests. It is true that without waiting for the outcome of these considerations, last Thursday, in the Senate Finance Committee, the senators of the CVP already launched a strong attack against the Walloon regional budget of 1979. According to the evidence, an offensive has become apparent in this area.

However, the government did react. This week it set in motion the first phase of institutional reform. After the last meeting of the Council of Ministers, Mr Martens did not hide his satisfaction regarding this matter. His team can now proceed at leisure with its regionalization of the administration and of the budgets of 1980.

The prime minister knows [words illegible] and states that one cannot reproach him that his other reform projects are unconstitutional, a problem encountered by the Egmont Pact, since the basic charter can now be amended. With regard to the Malines conclave, the fact that parliament will soon be on vacation could leave him without an echo. No doubt that is why Friday morning the "De Standaard" stressed in a headline the fact that this is only the first in a series of meetings. Hence, it is a matter to be continued.

A Twofold Attack on the Economic Plan

In the meantime, the controversy has reached another area, that of social and economic issues. One remembers that last week Mr Tindemans caused a stir by declaring that the programs of the government did not take adequately into account the aspirations of his party. He then set forth a series of demands that the PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] could approve without reservations.

Mr Martens replied a first time, stating that he also had in his bag something that would interest the employers. Besides, Mr Roger De Wulf, minister of Employment and Labor, right away published a new program of governmental proposals, which restored the 38-hour work week, up from 36 hours. Monday, the government obtained a promise from the social representatives to begin negotiations in the fall.

Matters did not rest there. On the same day, the Flemish employers, united within the VEV [Flemish Economic Association], attacked the economic and monetary policy of the government in an open letter to the prime minister. Like Mr Tindemans, the VEV was worried about a shorter work week, and asked for financial help for business.

This time, armed with a statement of intent which the national employers' group, the unions, and the government had virtually approved that same morning, Mr Martens had no difficulty in giving an answer. Had he not succeeded in getting in motion again the essential mechanism of the Belgian State, which is the social dialog; a mechanism which had, in fact, come to a halt during Mr Tindemans' mandate in Loi Street? And the prime minister could see in this renewal of social confidence the surest way to reestablish the economic prestige of Belgium abroad, thus giving support to its franc.

When Mr Martens Is Attacked Through Mr Outers

In short, up to this time, the government faced the problem. One would even be tempted to say that it did so successfully. However, suddenly the attacks moved to another target and concentrated on another point: The action of the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] in power, and especially the policies of Mr Lucien Outers in the Department of Foreign Trade.

In certain Flemish circles, in the press, and in Parliament, the reactions to his decision to replace a high-ranking civil servant--Mr Maurice Scholaert, director general of the OBCE [Belgian office of foreign trade], whose nomination had been annulled by the Council of State--were so strong and loud that it was difficult to imagine an absence of political ulterior motives. It is not necessary to be a great strategist in order to guess that the FDF is the coalition party most likely to walk out, and to imagine that its departure would be a big blow, if not a fatal one, to the majority. Besides, the observers are not mistaken. They say the attacks on Mr Outers are actually aimed at Mr Martens.

No doubt it is this observation that led Mr Jean Gayetot, president of the Walloon interregional of the FGTB [Belgian workers' federation], to jump into the arena. One must admit that it is unusual to see a labor leader run to the aid of a minister in a matter of nomination. However, that is what Mr. Gayetot did in defending Mr Outers, not only before the administrative council of the OBCE but also in newspaper articles. Yet one would be less surprised when one thinks that the head of the socialist Walloon union must be interested in the renewal of a social dialog, and that, no doubt, he prefers harvesting its fruits to sending his troops against a less conciliatory government.

Mr Gayetot Up Against Double Pressure

Besides, oddly enough, the action he took with regard to Mr Outers was accompanied by another step. Mr Gayetot also felt the need to give a press conference before the people in politics went on vacation, in order to complain about the slowness and timidity with which regionalization is progressing. In asking that regionalization be firmly applied in the case of credit, energy, foreign trade, or to industrial redeployment, he suddenly brought to light again some of the well-known structural reforms so important to the left wing of the Walloon federalist movement.

In so doing, Mr Gayetot's organization faced two kinds of pressure. The one that the unitarian and conservative elements of the CVP exert on the majority, and the one which Mr Edmond Leburton represents in the socialist movement when he pleads for greater moderation in institutional and economic matters.

As can be seen, though he may rarely speak, Mr Gayetot does not speak aimlessly.

Convergence of Ideas on Federalism for Two

In order to finish with the events of this past week, let us note that it is certainly not just a simple coincidence that in the senate debate on the present stage of institutional reform, the only intervention of the CVP consisted in advocating federalism for two. Mr Leo Tindemans, spokesman for the group, in fact made it clear to the French-speaking group that if his friends accepted the first stage of regionalization, it would not bind them in any way for future action, and that in this respect it would be best to adopt in the south the same unique institutional structure as in the north.

It is known that Mr Francois Perris is also a strong supporter of this argument, and has the backing of the new PRLW [Party of Liberty and Walloon Reform] of Mr Jean [word illigible]. Moreover, he has used it as an asset in trying to return to power. What is new and interesting here is the extent to which this idea has permeated the French-speaking social-christian circles. Mr Jean-Louis Thys, representative of the PSC [Christian Social Party] of Brussels, had already shown his support in an interview he gave last June to the newspaper LA CITE. This week, the Young Christian Socialists have taken their turn to defend a "symmetrical" type of regionalization.

Certainly, these points of view have more nuances when applied to Brussels than the theory of federalism for two advocated by the hard liners of the CVP. However, they are of a nature to favor a rapprochement between the two groups, something that had already started through the friendship of Hanin and Tindemans.

A rapprochement that one guesses would be very important in case of a crisis in the government.

All the same, we are not yet at that point. Certainly, the opponents and defenders of the present coalition do not miss an opportunity to lash out at each other. The outcome of the fight remains uncertain. Besides, what is at stake goes beyond knowing who will be the head of state at the end of the year. It is not without a reason that on the one hand the VEV and on the other hand Mr Gayetot decided to join the political game at the very moment when social dialog got off to a new start and regionalization cleared a critical hurdle. It is evident that, behind the scenes in Loi Street, the two concepts dealing with institutional social and economic aspects of Belgium are in confrontation. The antagonism attributed to Tindemans and Martens are always only the unimportant parts of the conflict.

9465

CSO: 3100

SIUMUT SEEKS COOPERATION WITH COMMUNIST EUROPARIAMENT BLOC

Party Not Bound in All Issues

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 14-15 Jul 79 p 5

[Commentary by Philip Lauritzen]

[Text] After negotiating with several groups within the EEC Parliament, Greenland's Siumut Party has opted for technical voting cooperation with the communist bloc, of which the Socialist People's (SF) is also a member.

Some time ago the communist bloc offered Siumut's Europarlament member Finn Lyngé a seat on the Agriculture and Fishing Committee and, in a press release Friday, Siumut Party Chairman Lars Emil Johansen pointed out that this is just a technical voting cooperation.

INFORMATION received confirmation of this offer by SF's Gert Petersen, who arranged for the seat on the committee.

"Siumut, like SF, is not bound to the communist bloc on all issues," he said. As an example, he mentioned that, as a member of the Budget Committee, he had voted for Amnesty International, which was opposed by the communist bloc.

"Thus, Siumut can negotiate with different groups and vote with other blocs, for example, if the party decides that is the right thing to do," said Petersen.

The Fishing Committee

During the election campaign prior to the EEC election, Siumut seemed undecided as to which bloc they wanted to seek cooperation with should the Greenlandic party gain representation in the EEC Parliament.

However, Siumut has pointed out that since it wanted to protect Greenland's interest with respect to EEC policies, it preferred a seat on the Agriculture and Fishing Committee. That would allow the party to closely follow EEC fishing policy developments, which would be very important to Greenland's industry and economy as long as Greenland was a member of the EEC.

Siumut Party Chairman Lars Emil Johansen, who is also the Minister of Industry on Greenland, emphasized in his press release Friday that the offer of the committee post played an important role in Siumut's decision to join the Communist bloc.

The Social Democrats

According to what INFORMATION has learned, the reason Siumut did not immediately accept the offer was the psychological reaction on Greenland to joining a group labeled communist. The party also wanted to make sure it had investigated all the conditions relevant to cooperation.

The party has been negotiating with the socialist bloc, which includes the Social Democratic Party, among others. However, the three Danish Social Democrats who belong to the approximately 100-person bloc have been unsuccessful in their efforts to get Siumut the desired committee post.

For a time there was also hope of establishing a politically independent opposition group within the EEC, but, as you know, this group did not meet with success.

In his press release Lars Emil Johansen pointed out that Siumut is a socialist party, positioned between the Socialist People's Party and the left wing of the Social Democratic Party in Denmark and thus, joining either the communist or the socialist bloc would be in complete accord with the party line. The party may still have to explain to Greenlanders that the communist bloc covers a very wide political spectrum, that Siumut remains independent and that, not least due to the disagreement between Italian and French communists, this bloc would probably have dissolved a long time ago if each party were not allowed to vote independently.

The so-called communist bloc consists of just over 40 members, of which, besides Siumut now, SF is also a member. The bloc has three seats on the 20-man Agriculture and Fishing Committee and Siumut has now gained one of these seats. Besides the committee post, the technical voting cooperation means that the one Siumut party member will also take part in the secretariat work of the bloc.

Atassut, Greenland's opposition party, consequently wanted to align itself with the Socialist bloc during the election campaign. We were not able to obtain a statement from Social Democrat Kjeld Olesen yesterday as to why the Social Democratic Party could not secure the Greenlandic representative a seat on the Agriculture and Fishing Committee.

Lynge To Join Social Democrats

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 17 Jul 79 p 1

[Commentary by Philip Lauritzen]

[Text] After the Siumut Party administration decided last Friday that Finn Lynge, the party's Europarlament member, should join the communist bloc, Finn Lynge himself decided to join the socialist bloc Monday evening.

Finn Lynge confirmed this for INFORMATION after his 1800 meeting, French time, with the socialist bloc, which is dominated by Social Democrats.

"It is true that I have decided to join the socialist bloc after the communist bloc offered me a seat on the Agriculture and Fishing Committee as well as a supplementary seat on the Regional Committee," said Finn Lynge.

The communist bloc also offered him an assistant chairmanship in Parliament, but Finn Lynge told INFORMATION that he, nevertheless, chose to become a member of the socialist bloc. There are 12 assistant chairmen in the EEC Parliament.

Assistant Chairman

"I have received rather conflicting reports concerning the importance of an assistant chairmanship," said Finn Lynge. "SF's Gert Petersen told me it was very important and that it provides a better perspective on other parliamentarians as well as the Danish Government. On the other hand, Erik Holst from the Social Democratic Party, who has served as assistant chairman, told me that it is indeed important, but not compared to being part of a bloc which includes representatives from all the EEC member countries."

It was Gert Petersen who arranged the communist bloc's offer and now Social Democrats have arranged the socialist bloc's offer.

"Things have been happening every hour down here," said Finn Lynge, "but I believe my decision is in Greenland's best interest."

New Offer

Finn Lynge does not think there is any disparity between his decision on Monday and that of the Siumut Party administration last Friday (discussed in INFORMATION last Saturday).

"The party administration made its decision based on circumstances that prevailed last Friday," said Finn Lynge. "At that time only the communist bloc could offer us the committee seats. Last weekend the socialist bloc made its offer and that naturally changed the circumstances."

In answer to the question why he chose the socialist bloc, Finn Lynge said: "While the communist bloc only represents three countries, i.e. Italy, France and Denmark's SF, the socialist bloc includes all nine member countries and that is important. I will have direct contact with a large area, representing a variety of opinions."

Finn Lynge emphasized that he has freedom within the socialist bloc.

"I cut the Gordian knot this evening when I said I was elected on the basis of an opposition policy and that I would work for an EEC election before the end of 1981 and for alternatives to Greenland's membership. My statement was applauded and there was no opposition."

Finn Lynge made the decision without having an opportunity to discuss it with Siumut party chairman Lars Emil Johansen. Johansen is now in Godthab, following the party administration's unanimous decision to join the communist bloc. He told INFORMATION he would discuss the new situation with Finn Lynge. He stressed it is a new situation since the Social Democrats suddenly made an offer similar to that of the communists.

8952

CS0: 3106

HANDELSBANK CALLS FOR NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Jul 79 p 15

[Commentary by Frank Dahlgaard: "New Economic Policies Necessary"]

[Text] Present economic policies are no longer adequate. Denmark's balance-of-payment deficit will be 11 to 12 billion kroner this year and, without any changes in economic policy, the deficit will be 14 billion kroner in 1980.

Denmark's Handelsbank made these projections in its economic report for July, which was just issued. Handelsbank openly states that if we continue the economic policies we have pursued in the last few years, including successive crises proposals, we can maximally only prevent an increase in the balance-of-payment deficit, but that these policies will also give rise to renewed wage and cost pressures, which, in turn, would reduce Denmark's competitiveness internationally.

New Policies This Fall

This economic report confirms what has been said during the last few weeks about an ever worsening economy in Denmark. Handelsbank economists foresee new economic policies already this fall: "Right now it appears that the June Compromise will not be able to remedy the growing balance-of-payment deficit. Therefore, we can expect that the tightening of fiscal policies in June will be followed by new economic policies some time this fall."

In view of Handelsbank's projection of an 11 to 12 billion kroner balance-of-payment deficit in 1979, it is obvious that the Social Democrat-Liberal (SV) government's original goal of a maximum deficit of 6.5 billion kroner this year will be exceeded by almost 100 percent.

Handelsbank economists estimate that the average registered unemployment this year will be 175,000 (compared to over 190,000 last year), but that it will be higher next year, estimated at 180,000 in 1980.

Inflation

Cost-of-living estimates for this year will be 9 percent higher than last year, provided that new taxes or a devaluation will not further increase prices. Next year consumer expenditures will be 10.5 percent higher than this year--again provided that economic policies remain unchanged (which bank economists themselves doubt).

Private consumer spending is expected to increase by 1 to 1.5 percent from 1978 to 1979, but next year the estimated increase will only be between 0 and 0.5 percent. However, new economic policies could quickly change this estimate and we could have reduced consumer spending.

High Cost-of-Living Wave

Housing construction is expected to stagnate and there will be no appreciable growth in industrial investments either. Economic growth in Denmark this year will be 2.5 percent, but only 1.5 to 2 percent next year.

Interest on foreign loans is expected to total 6 billion kroner this year and 7 billion kroner next year.

According to Handelsbank's report, wages will go up by more than 10 percent this year, while next year's increase may be somewhat higher. That would depend on the number of cost-of-living allowances granted.

It is thought that the July price index will release two cost-of-living allowance payments, while the January 1980 price index will grant all of three cost-of-living allowance payments.

8952

CO: 3106

AMERICAN DEBATE ON SALT II NOTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Aug 79 p 1

[Text] The other American government has spoken: Henry Kissinger took a stand regarding the strategic arms limitations treaty (SALT II). Suddenly, SALT II has once again become the focal point in political discussions. Because the allegedly most important topic of American politics had been relegated to a position of secondary importance. The nation and the world at large were interested only in the spectacular events surrounding the leadership crisis in the White House. Carter's cabinet upheaval, the assault of Georgia's Mafia on sensitive positions, the scarcity of oil, were understandably more exciting to the average TV viewer than the technical language of the strategic experts. But with Henry Kissinger, the backfire and cruise missiles have once again firmly taken their place in the American security consciousness.

It is Kissinger who called attention to the fact that strategy can be more than a national pastime. The crisis which America is undergoing is not only a Carter crisis; it is not only American self-confidence that is beginning to falter, but also the external security of the colossus is threatened. If there is a mood in the country today which can be compared to the dramatic summer of 1914, then the reason for such a sinister evaluation of the situation stems from the decline of American military power. Kissinger, graphic as always, sees America as facing a challenge in the 1980's which this superpower can meet only with striking forces from the 1960's. He therefore recommends to the senate to ratify SALT II only if the government spends more on defense. He also accuses the Soviet Union of paying hypocritical lip service to the support of detente while in fact stirring up tension on a world-wide basis. One cannot want to have both, the pretense of detente and the reality of disturbing the geopolitical balance.

In the skeptical triangle of strategic analysts of the SALT treaties, Henry Kissinger is the most lucid, General Haig the most expert, and Senator Nunn the most obliging. If seen as a unit, one thing becomes clear: this treaty cannot be rushed.

9328

CSO: 3103

PAPER SEES EUROPEAN TRUST IN AMERICA SHAKEN

Bonn DIE WELT in German 30 Jul 79 p 6

[Article by Friedhelm Kemna]

[Text] The last unprecedented attempt at purging by an American president has perplexed friends and allies in Europe. If the drama of Carter's spiritualization shows essential features about this man and about his hard-to-define system of governing, then the constituent important for Europe must be seen in a new light: the dependability of the president of the United States, that is to say the constancy and the continuity of his ideas and decisions, are decisive for common European-American security. That is the nature of the alliance.

Leadership quality and dependability, especially in the area of security, are required. The assurance that foreign and defense policy personnel will be spared the great massacre will give only superficial assurance; if there can at present be any kind of assurance at all for America's friends, considering the troublesome Africa- and Near East policy. But the expectation of presidential management as the final word in American politics, dominated, now more clearly than ever, by the (certainly 'impressive) Atlanta, Georgia skyline, certainly cannot relieve the anxieties of the allies.

Only cynics maintain that character is detrimental to politics. But the preacher qualities of the good man from Georgia, which often seem unfortunately close to public relations, are actually no more than the latest step in the decline of American politics in the world. What spectacularly turned into the sudden revision of the White House started with the vehement attempt at an inner moral rearmament--much desired by Americans--combined with a political and geostrategical disarmament process. The Good American was to appear in a new light in Europe, Asia, and to the black man in Africa, and Washington recognized only late, in some places too late, that a good American is always also a strong American in the eyes of friends as well as enemies in a worldwide commitment by the United States.

Where America showed weakness, which was by no means only Carter's weakness, the West lost terrain which is difficult to regain; this was true in Angola and at the African Horn, in Afghanistan and finally even in Iran. The shadows of Vietnam and Watergate followed Jimmy Carter when he took his first groping steps in global politics: when giving the order--now partially revised--for U.S. troops to pull out of South Korea, when canceling the American B 1 bomber and the neutron bomb. The rigorous military degradation is already noticeable in the number and the quality of new recruits to the military.

In Europe, beyond Georgia's horizons, the dependability of those making such decisions became questionable; especially for those who consider the support of a strong America for joint defense indispensable and who oppose all developments which might aid in the military and political withdrawal of America from Europe in the joint deterrence effort.

When CDU representative Alois Mertes, in a provocatively formulated speech, speaks of the "calculability" of Soviet policy as opposed to the relative "uncalculability" of the United States policy, then this must be interpreted as a distress call of a fervent European reacting to dangerous psychological withdrawal symptoms. And when NATO's former commander in chief, General Alexander Haig, points out to his fellow Americans the "considerable" decline of European trust in America, then this is the competent warning by one of the last "European" Americans of a development, the questionable nature of which he had to live with for years while he served.

SALT II, the treaty which deprives America temporarily and possibly forever of its leadership position in the strategic nuclear race, will be able to guide this development only under two decisive conditions:

1. If Europe feels the impulse of America's leadership clearly and unambiguously, that means also the will to convincingly oppose any threat to Western positions anywhere in the world;
2. If Europe is unconditionally prepared to play its part in the joint security mission according to the necessary strategic conditions.

These two conditions are not met at present, and if this remains so this coming winter, then even NATO's decision regarding the modernization of its weapons in Europe's strategical regions is up in the air. President Carter, by changing the style of his presidency in such an obvious way, has created additional skepticism rather than constructive expectations regarding the will and, above all, the capability of the United States to lead. And the Federal Republic as the most potent partner in the alliance plays the part of the midget politically and militarily. It has its strategic position in the alliance, its willingness to bear the brunt in the European equilization of burdens for defense in the 1980's and 1990's, surrounded by a forest of conditions. The "midget" does not want to get stuck with a "singular" role; the neutron bomb was discussed right out of existence this way, too.

It is therefore meaningless to merely point to Washington, according to the motto: It serves Carter right if Europe catches pneumonia, why... etc. To be sure, the decisive move can only come from the most powerful nation in the West. But signals from the Old World, especially from the FRG, could help it in turning around the plight of the leadership crisis in the Western World.

9328

CSO: 3103

TERRORIST PLANS FOR SABOTAGE OF POWER PLANTS REPORTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Aug 79 pp 1-2

[Text] Acts of sabotage against the electricity supply are causing the Lower Saxon security agencies to fear another escalation of violence in the anti-nuclear movement. This concern seems well founded in view of the fact that, despite the appointment of a special commission, the police have not yet succeeded in clearing up these crimes: Eight attacks on high-tension poles, power plant buildings and a guard post, all carried out in Lower Saxony since mid-1977, three of them this year.

The Land criminal police office in Hannover suspects the unknown offenders of membership in a criminal or even terrorist group. In the meantime the criminals are boasting of their "successes" in handling explosives and time fuses. At the same time they are encouraging nuclear power opponents to follow their example. Consequently they have published, from the underground a "Handbuch zur Selbsthilfe" [Do-It-Yourself Manual]. There they report their "experiences gained in resistance actions" and give "hints for practical resistance to nuclear installations."

The police think that the loose leaves of the "Manual," which may well originate from a copier at Hamburg University, represent a document of anticonstitutional ravings, promoting the commission of crimes. In its own justification the book says "we think that it is important by practical means to fight nuclear installations." This "practical resistance" should not, however, be considered a "matter for just a few specialists." On the contrary, the struggle which only marginally represents a technical problem, should be jointly organized. That is why it is important to exchange experiences and suggest "new ideas."

As becomes apparent from the "Manual," the saboteurs gained experience, for example, in the course of an attempt to explode a power pole in the line from the Unterweser-Esenshamm nuclear power plant at Struckhausen, west of Brake. On the occasion of this attack, on 7 April last, only two of the four explosive packages attached to the pole and equipped with time fuses actually exploded, so that damage was slight. The "Manual" assumes a faulty detonator

to have caused the failure, and this meant "that we have not yet been able to harvest the fruit of our anger." The saboteurs add this assertion: "Still, we will continue to work on it and assume that others will also soon decide and apply their own ideas... If we call for the closure of the Esensham AKW [nuclear power plant] and all other AKW's, we must make sure that it happens."

The "Manual" provides many details of the production of explosives, pipe bombs and time fuses. It also publishes a blueprint of the Unterweser AKW "to give everybody a better bird's eye view of the total complex." In their explanations the authors explicitly point out that they "do not consider it sensible to sabotage the AKW's operation at the AKW itself." In their opinion no foe of nuclear power should risk the radioactive contamination of the public. That, the authors assert, should be the exclusive privilege of the power plant operators.

In the "Manual" the invitation to sabotage is also coupled with a report on an explosive attack on a power pole in the line near Elsfleth, carried out on 5/6 June 1978. "We believe," it says, "that we can prevent the operation of the AKW (Unterweser) only by constant sabotage. One attack will not accomplish that. Therefore: Let many more poles be disabled; their lines are long indeed." "The 'movement' needs movement," the "Manual" postulates elsewhere, and continues: "We must at last act ourselves."

The authors advise the greatest caution in mixing the explosives: "Mixing must proceed by very cautious stirring. Unduly violent movement, beating, pressure and heat may result in an untimely explosion." Caution is also advised elsewhere: "Do not ever touch anything with your bare hands. Always wear gloves. Even paper should be touched with gloves only, and so should letters claiming responsibility." They counsel that the fear experienced in climbing the power poles may be overcome "by practice and strict safety precautions." Here also advice is offered: "If you climb poles you must realize, as in every other action, that outside events (may) interfere, which you had never even thought of. That means we must be fully alert at all times, sensitive to any possible vagaries... After a lot of climbing we feel fairly secure on the pole--and we tend to think of other possibilities for destroying them."

The "Manual" also provides technical drawings to demonstrate the structure and organization of the electricity industry, the grid, types of structures and types of power poles and insulators, wires, cables and lines. Diagrams show the means by which the line may be attacked by shorting--without the use of explosives--, "sabotage of power lines," --or with the use of explosives--"attack on the grid." Nor is instruction lacking on how to attach explosive charges to iron sections.

One of the reports in the "Manual" describes how, in the night of 20 May, nuclear power foes managed to stop up the drill holes of the shallow drillings done by the Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Wiederaufbereitung von

Kernbrennstoffen [German Corporation for the Recovery of Nuclear Fuels] at the location of the planned nuclear disposal center near Gorleben. "Such small actions," the comment runs, "make the investigations carried out by the builders and operators of nuclear installations far more difficult. We consider these and similar actions necessary and encourage others to join us." The security agencies in the Gorleben region are bound to assume that "similar actions" will erupt no later than September, when deep drilling is to begin there to explore the interior of the salt core.

When submitting the latest report of the constitutional defense agency for Lower Saxony Interior Minister Moecklinghoff emphasized that the authorities are bound to continue fearing that militant left extremists are aiming to fight the "decisive battle" with the constitutional state on the site of the Gorleben project. In the meantime it is beginning to look as if the security agencies who consider the many citizen initiatives for environmental control infiltrated and even controlled by enemies of the constitution, may no longer restrict their precautionary defensive measures to the Gorleben-Luechow Rural District-Dannenberg area.

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CSO: 3103

MEMBERSHIP, MORALE PROBLEMS IN CDU YOUTH WING DISCUSSED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Aug 79 p 8

[Article by Joerg Bremer: "The Young Union on the Search for Topics"]

[Text] It is all rather sad, a young Christian Democratic local leader summarizes the situation: "The leadership of the Young Union fears not to be able to persuade us to campaign for Strauss; we on the other hand are hard put to it to keep the shop open at all." Even when summer vacations do not paralyze all activity, members of the CDU/CSU wing complain about lack of morale and apathy. Similar to the Young Socialists and Young Democrats but possibly even more so, Christian Democrat oriented youth suffers from the fact that politics have ceased to arouse much enthusiasm.

Only 3 years ago secondary school students and apprentices aged 14-18 hurried to join the Young Union. Most of them came from the Secondary School Student Union. Enthused by the educational reforms they joined in study groups at the schools. The Young Union exploited this trend and also fired up interest in extracurricular topics, thereby providing itself with a rich reservoir of newcomers. Nowadays the pressure for achievement in view of the quota system for university admission and the maintenance of the status quo in educational policies tend to produce a rather apolitical type of secondary school pupil. University students also are inclined more toward a contemplative and phillistine life.

Late last month the Young Union counted 250,456 members, about 200 more than last year. However, even in 1976-1977 an increase from 234,000 to 250,000 members was recorded (compared to 213,000 the previous year and 191,000 in 1974). This year more than 45 percent of members are secondary school and university students, 20 percent white collar workers, 10 percent apprentices and slightly more than 9 percent manual workers. Some 40 percent of Young Union members also hold membership in the CDU/CSU.

Nearly 150,000 are aged 19-28. At this time only 40,500 are younger than 18. Those now working as kreis leaders and at district level are 25-30 years old and usually have a political background differing sharply from that of their

younger colleagues. The older ones might be described as converts. Most of them were brought to political reflection in the aftermath of the student revolt; their decision for the Young Union or the CDU was a decision against the prevailing trend. They stamped the image of a Young Union which refused to be a nursery, supervised by the old established CDU leaders, and instead aimed to be an independent, ideologically conscious but pragmatic group in political competition with Young Socialists and Young Democrats.

The Secondary School Student Union was the result of an initiative by Young Union chairman Wisemann. He is one of those self-confident pragmatists who are able to conduct an independent policy vis-a-vis the CDU without risking unnecessary conflicts with the establishment. Since 1973 he has also been involved in diplomatic attempts to keep the cohesion of the Young Union in Bavaria and the other federal Laender. He sits on the CDU federal executive board, has his electoral district in Ludwigsburg and, like every Bundestag deputy, is compelled to contribute his labors to the rather low-profile but strenuous and time consuming work of parliamentary committees. This sets him apart from the jobs of his "ordinary" friends in the regions. A representative of the Secondary School Student Union from northern Germany complained that the leadership of the Young Union was worrying about human rights in Chile, while youth unemployment, apprentice concerns or the needs of school students should be its overriding topics.

Deputy Land chairman of the Bavarian Young Union Walter Schoen has lately submitted a sociopolitical statement "From Quantity to Quality." According to this the Young Union is the outstanding representative of the interests of the young generation. "It does not, though, consider itself the lobby for those aged less than 35 years and against other age strata." After all, the interests of present-day young people would be the interests of pensioners in 2005. This wide political claim contrasts sharply with the "division of labor" which, 30 years ago, signaled the beginning of cooperation between the Young Union and the CDU. At that time the young people accepted the demand of their seniors to cooperate at local level in activities aimed at the young, and to provide suggestions on the economic and social situation of youth, on student politics. Whenever the Young Union devoted itself to this type of issue, it was assured of the party's applause. Only gradually did the Young Union manage to escape its leading strings.

In the later years of revolt and search for their own identity the political demeanor of the Young Union contributed to its growth. Opposition to the CDU strengthened it as an independent force; its criticism of issues rather than persons was destined to raise its prestige in the party. It recorded its greatest increase in membership from 1971 (when Echternach was once more elected, unopposed, federal chairman of the Young Union) to Wisemann's re-election in 1977. That was also the era of many programmatic drafts. At the same time, though, the image of the Young Union was determined to a steadily greater extent by its chairman in Bonn.

Yet, the Young Union can lend force to its concepts only if the rank and file remains actively involved. At the base, therefore, there is a painful groping for topics which may make the headlines in regional newspapers and thereby recruit new friends. When the torchlight procession in memory of 17 June had to be canceled due to lack of interest, other topics were taken up: The local bypass, apprentice housing, the youth center. "The Young Union executive should be less involved with Strauss than with youth and its own associations," comments a Bavarian member--for various reasons. Hardly anyone remembers that just over a year ago a congress discussed the likely future of our young people.

Possibly the Young Union has some trouble digesting the great intake of recent years and will now have to find itself again. It can keep its independence only if it is able to provide precise statements in those fields where it is strong. This involves primarily a youth policy. Success might smile on it if it manages to recruit new members by a policy designed to deal with the concerns of hitherto apolitical juveniles. Furthermore the Young Union cannot live only by its chairman, nor the chairmen of the land associations, who have on occasion wished for another chief in Bonn.

11698
CSO: 3103

LOWER SAXON SUPPORT FOR STRAUSS DISCUSSED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Aug 79 p 8

[Article by Wolfgang Tersteegen: "Lower Saxon 'Aid and Understanding'"]

[Text] "We have resigned ourselves to the inevitable; now we are looking ahead." Disappointment mingled with determined optimism sounds in these words by Wilfried Hasselmann. The Lower Saxon CDU chairman does not need to hide from the 96,000 members of the third strongest Land association of the CDU that he, like most of them, has not yet quite got over the defeat of his favorite Albrecht and Strauss' nomination as chancellor candidate of the Union parties. He must and certainly intends to motivate the membership to support the majority decision of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group.

In an interview with this newspaper Hasselmann said "it goes without saying that the top candidate from Bavaria will get the support which we in turn would have expected if the top candidate had come from Lower Saxony." In fact Hasselmann promised unreserved support to CSU general secretary Stoiber on the occasion of his visit to Munich, whence he returned last Wednesday. In a way supplementary to Albrecht's offer to speak now, in the pre-election period, at 10 public meetings in Bavaria, Hasselmann invited Strauss to speak at similar meetings in Lower Saxony. At the same time Hasselmann extended an invitation to Stoiber to come to Lower Saxony and offer "aid and understanding" in appreciation of Lower Saxon special features which, according to Hasselmann, consist mainly in the fact that the CDU is the sole governing party in that Land.

The Land chairman includes in the main special features the "liberal conservative" line of the Land government which is aware of its obligations to the democratic center. "We will maintain our line," Hasselmann and Albrecht just recently assured their members in a letter. According to Hasselmann who, together with Albrecht, must already bear in mind the 1982 provincial assembly elections, this design may not be touched upon in the Bundestag election campaign. It is therefore all the more urgent for the senior bodies of the two Union parties to meet and agree on the most "appropriate" form the election campaign is to take in the various federal Laender. Hasselmann

holds that, north of the Main, the election campaign must assume quite a different shape than in southern Germany; it is vital here to recruit swing voters and first-time voters for the Union policy, for a change from the Bonn SPD/FDP coalition.

True to its motto which is to remain "electible beyond its borders" the Lower Saxon CDU will fight the federal election campaign in such a manner that nobody will be able to accuse it of not having done its best, Hasselmann emphasizes. He rejects any insinuation that "Lower Saxon defeatism" after the Strauss nomination might endanger victory in the elections. Deputy chairman of the Bonn Union group Zimmermann had repeatedly suggested as much, to the great annoyance of the CDU leadership in Lower Saxony.

Concerning the issue of the "core crew," Hasselmann intends to make sure that Lower Saxony and northern Germany are represented. Hasselmann named no names --that, after all, is the privilege of the chancellor candidate--, but he repeated the Lower Saxon claim to membership in this core crew. Albrecht will not be that member because he--like all other Union minister presidents an ex-officio member of the election campaign committee--wishes to continue as head of government in Lower Saxony.

Hasselmann's reminder to Strauss is due doubtlessly to the fear that the former relative solidarity of the CDU rank and file in Lower Saxony might be jeopardized if the membership does not feel represented in the core group around the chancellor candidate by--preferably--Lower Saxon but at least north German politicians. As it is the Strauss nomination has already resulted in some 200 resignations in the three Land associations--Hannover, Braunschweig and Oldenburg--of the Lower Saxon CDU (at federal level roughly 1,000 resignations from the party). By contrast, Hasselmann said consolingly, 150 new recruits had joined the party--citizens who had become members of the local CDU "not for the sake of Strauss" but as a tribute to the political line adopted by the Albrecht Government. Furthermore, 7 of the 30 defectors to whom he had written personally, asking them to reconsider their resignations, had already returned to the fold.

11698
CSO: 3103

DREGGER PROPOSES CIVIL DEFENSE IMPROVEMENTS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Dregger Calls For Overall Defense Concept"]

[Text] Bonn, 8 Aug—Hesse CDU chairman Dregger, who has repeatedly complained in the lower house of the FRG parliament that there is neither civil defense or a concept for overall defense in the Federal Republic, called upon the federal government Wednesday to take steps to protect the civilian populace. In particular Dregger called for a health law to create the necessary prerequisites to make available doctors, medical care personnel and the equipment required for medical care in case of war. He also called for support measures, especially for establishing a food reserve and introducing mandatory shelter construction for all new private and public construction. Here Dregger criticized indirectly what was omitted under the leadership of the CDU in the first years of the Federal Republic.

"What was not done in the years of reconstruction can only be regarded as a burden on the conscience of those responsible. There is no justification for it," wrote Dregger. No one could guarantee that there would be no war-like actions in the future. "How can we morally justify having failed to do what is possible and will perhaps be necessary to protect the lives of our fellow citizens," asked the CDU politician. An attack on the Federal Republic would, after all, be directed not just against the army but rather at the entire populace. The present concentration of Federal Republic defense efforts on military defense alone was thus absurd. Whereas in Switzerland the ratio of expenditure for military and civil defense was 13 to 1 and 20 to 1 in the Soviet Union and Sweden, the ratio in the Federal Republic was 57 to 1. This had to be changed. An effective concept and organization of overall defense had to be established and its leadership assumed by a staff position in the office of the federal chancellor.

8373

CSO: 3103

BUNDESWEHR'S ACCEPTANCE OF ALPHA JET, TORNADO DISCUSSED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Aug 79 p 2

[Article: "Bonn Expecting the Alpha Jet — Procurement Decision on the Aircraft By October at the Earliest"]

[Text] Bonn, 8 Aug—The Luftwaffe [air force] commander, General Obleser, will be able to decide by October at the earliest if the Alpha Jet can be delivered as planned to the combat units of the Luftwaffe. Until then a troop test will be continued in Leipheim. It is intended to establish whether the defects detected in the engine and in parts of the cockpit at the end of last year can be remedied to the extent that unlimited operational capability of the aircraft is guaranteed. The Alpha Jet is intended to be the Luftwaffe's light combat aircraft of the 1980's. Its primary mission is battlefield support but it will also be operated as a training aircraft.

The Bundeswehr [federal armed forces] has ordered a total of 175 of these aircraft for more than DM 3.5 billion at a system price of more than DM 19 million. To date 19 aircraft have been delivered with 15 of these being used in the troop test at Leipheim. By the end of the year about 30 of the jointly produced Franco-German aircraft will have been delivered to the Luftwaffe, about 20 less than originally provided for in this year's planning. If the test proceeds satisfactorily to the extent that the Luftwaffe can give its agreement to Alpha Jet deliveries to combat units without any further loss of time, then a delay of about a quarter of a year against the original plan will result.

The Alpha Jet attracted attention at the end of last year when it became known that cockpit defects, which had been discovered during tests immediately before series production began, caused the then Luftwaffe commander General Limberg to forbid Luftwaffe pilots to fly this aircraft and to reject Luftwaffe acceptance, planned for February, of it if the defects could not be corrected. These included some difficulties with the engines of the Alpha Jet prototypes being tested. A decrease in power was noted under certain conditions. If the Luftwaffe is satisfied with the improvements made since then, 49 Fighter-Bomber Wing will be the first formation to be equipped with the Alpha Jet as a replacement for the obsolete Fiat G-91.

An indication that the Alpha Jet, despite the defects, has remarkable qualities as a trainer may be gained from the fact that it is now being considered as a trainer for American navy carrier pilots. According to a report in the authoritative American trade journal AVIATION WEEK, appropriate tests with apparently satisfactory results are now being made by the European manufacturers and an American aircraft firm. Consideration is being given to improving the aircraft's capability for carrier takeoffs and landings by a changed wing configuration.

On the other hand, another report from the magazine resulted in a denial from the defense ministry. [The report] stated that the British government was considering a partial abandonment of construction of the Tornado multi-role combat aircraft developed and financed jointly by the Federal Republic, Great Britain and Italy and procuring American aircraft instead of the 175 aircraft to be built as a special interceptor version. According to the defense ministry, the British had taken a clear position on the report. It confirmed that the English government was holding to its decision and its obligation to procure a total of 385 Tornados — 165 of these as air defense interceptors. The remaining 220 British Tornados would be, like the 320 ordered for the Luftwaffe and the 100 that the Italians want, equipped for attack against point targets behind the enemy lines and battlefield interdiction. The system price for the 320 aircraft ordered by the Luftwaffe amounted to DM 60.6 million per aircraft at the end of last year.

8373

CSO: 3103

VARYING ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS NOTED, ANALYZED

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 10 Aug 79 p 17

[Article by Jes Rau: "Up Or Down--the Economy in 1980: Rarely Have the Experts Been So Divided"]

[Text] The economic prophets are presently offering something for every taste. Some of them claim that a recession is imminent. According to others, the upswing will be continuing. And there are some who are so cautious that their forecast is neither fish nor fowl.

The employers associations are among the optimists. To Paul Broicher, the director of the Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce (DIHT), it is "perfectly clear" that the German economy is in a spontaneous upswing which will be continuing through 1980. The Federation of German Industries (BDI) is somewhat more cautious, but still optimistic; it foresees "good growth conditions, continuing well into 1980."

In view of the still continuing discussion about additional wage increases intended to compensate the increase in the price for gasoline and fuel oil, the confidence is surprising. After all, one has become accustomed to the fact that at every suitable opportunity the employers--in order to dampen the greed of the trade unions--voice the slogan: "The situation has never been so serious."

Apparently the employers' concern about wildcat strikes and wage increases has paled beside the fear that the precarious economic upswing could all too easily be "talked down" into a recession by pessimistic statements.

Justifying their optimism, the employers associations point to the new orders received, especially in the capital goods sector, and to the heavy demand on the part of other European countries. DIHT director Broicher points to polls conducted by the chambers of commerce, according to which a large number of enterprises will in the second half of 1979 increase their investments, with a lesser percentage investing less, while half

the companies polled will more or less maintain their previous investment volume.

Not even the Ifo Institute denies that the development in the investment sector is promising. According to the latest forecast by the Munich institute, in 1980 investments in equipment will increase sharply--by approximately 6.5 percent--and the 1980 investment increases in the commercial construction sector will markedly exceed this year's rise. Nevertheless, Ifo's economic weathermen are pessimistic, since they expect a falling off of consumer demand and of foreign orders, since they foresee a reduction of stock on the part of industry and commerce, and since in their opinion the financial policy pursued by the Federal Bank and the Federal Government is restrictive.

According to Ifo, the impending slowing of consumer demand is caused by the loss in purchasing power ensuing from the oil price increase and by the "cyclical slackening" in important sectors. Moreover, on account of the higher oil bills and the imminent trade balance deficits, foreign countries would be forced to adopt a more restrictive economic policy, which would ultimately result in a drop in German exports. Thus the Munich researchers predict that next year the growth rate of the real GNP will decline from its present 3.5 or 4 percent: The "leveling of the growth curve to the point of stagnation" will lead to a renewed rise in unemployment next year; if the workers succeed in obtaining a sizeable compensation for the oil price increase and if the Central Bank then adopts a more restrictive policy, the recession will be inevitable.

Thus the Ifo experts' outline of future developments is depressingly reminiscent of the situation in 1974, when the economy--in a 9-month delayed reaction to the "oil shock"--spun into the most serious recession since the end of the war. Is this transfer picture of 1974 realistic or is the image recognizable on the blueprint just a kind of "Ifo-UFO" to be relegated to the realm of nightmares?

In fact, at first glance it looks as though the waves produced by the present oil shock II parallel those of oil shock I of 1973/74. It is only upon closer examination that one notices differences.

--The first oil shock was caused by the abrupt increase (\$8) in the price of a barrel of OPEC oil. In the course of the last 12 months, the oil price increased still further: By \$12. However: In the light of the fact that the dollar has meanwhile depreciated by 40 percent and that the inflation in Germany has reduced the purchasing power of the deutsche mark by another 20 percent, the real oil price increase amounts to less than \$5. Consequently, the oil trauma is lessened accordingly.

--Since last December, the rate of inflation has increased from 2.5 to 4.5 percent and is likely to reach the 5-percent mark very soon. Otto Schlecht, State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Economics, even fears a rise to 6 percent. Never before has there been such a rapid rise in prices, not even in 1973/74. Nevertheless, the present accelerated price rise is not as dangerous as the high price level of 1972 which led to the trade unions' demanding and obtaining two-digit raises. Moreover, the inflation of that period was largely home-grown, whereas today at least half, if not two-thirds, is "imported" from the OPEC countries.

This imported inflation core will not be affected by a more restrictive course on the part of the Federal Bank; consequently, in contrast to 1973/74, the Federal Bank need not employ recession as an anti-inflation agent.

--In 1974, the OPEC states sent their customers an oil bill which exceeded by \$40 billion that of the proceeding year. This year, the tribute to the OPEC states will be at least twice as high as in 1978 and the payments balances of the OECD countries and developing countries will be deteriorating accordingly. However, due to inflation and the depreciation of the dollar, the deficits--if considered in real terms--are not quite so threatening. Moreover, the European industrial countries have learned that over the years the rising OPEC imports tend to make good the oil deficits in their payments balances. This is likely to encourage these countries to refrain from abruptly braking the economic upswing. That Japan and Germany, the notorious surplus countries, are now developing deficitary balances is among other things a reflection of structural economic changes caused by the revaluation of the mark and the yen. The expansive effect of these deficits serves to accelerate world economic activity.

--The oil shock of 1973 hit the world at a time when the favorable economic trends in Europe and the United States were connected: On both continents, the central banks were forced to fight rampant inflation through a policy of monetary restrictions. This alone was sufficient to drive the world economy into the recession. The effect of the oil shock was that of a massive amplifier.

In the meantime, the economic trends in Europe and the United States have again been disconnected. The U.S. economy appears to be sliding into a slight recession, while the "home-grown" part of the European economic trend is still characterized by upward movement, even though in the German automobile industry the end of the boom conditions is in sight and construction industry is in fear of a recession caused by the increase in interest rates. The present contrary course of economic trends is likely to lead to a certain stabilization of the world economic climate.

Thus the chances are quite good that we will be spared a recession a la 1974. In this regard, one must proceed from the assumption that the real oil price can no longer as smoothly be lowered through the depreciation of the dollar as in previous years: The OPEC can be expected to counter a depreciation of the dollar with corresponding price hikes. The Federal Republic cannot follow the American example and adopt a strategy of forced inflation to stop the transfer of wealth to the desert, as long as the oil bill is paid in dollars. Aside from that, inflation has proved a dangerous toxin for the internal mechanism of the domestic economy.

Thus there remains only the strategy of "carefully planned austerity." Among other things, this strategy must be concerned with distributing the material sacrifices as justly as possible among the various segments of the population. The "least unjust" way would be to let the oil price increase take effect first in the form of inflation and then gradually curb inflation by means of productivity increases.

This requires certain revisions in the Federal Bank's monetary policy. The bank's last monthly report still considered keeping the rise in the money supply at the lower margin of the 6- to 9-percent band. However, in the first half of the year alone, the money supply increased by almost 5 percent. Consequently, a money supply increase of less than 4 percent in the remaining months of the year is unrealistic--and dangerous.

At the same time, the Federal Bank must make it clear to industry and labor that there will be no margin for shifts of any kind, neither for oil price compensations nor for price hikes. Only in this way will it be possible to prevent the "carefully planned austerity" from degenerating into a struggle for the biggest share; for the weaker elements of the population, such a struggle can only result in "uncontrollable poverty."

8760

CSO: 3103

ESSER, VETTER COMMENT ON UNION-MANAGEMENT TALKS

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 3 Aug 79 p 19

[Interview with the president of the Federation of German Employers Associations, Otto Esser, by Heinz Michaels: "With Kid Gloves Into the Ring"]

[Text] Otto Esser, the president of the Federation of German Employers Associations, has made a clean break with the recent past, with the 2-year-old codetermination dispute between labor unions and employers.

"The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court has provided a great deal of legal clarity. And legal clarity and legal security are most certainly preconditions for social peace."

In his Cologne office with its view to the Rhine, in which his predecessor Hanns-Martin Schleyer--who lost his life under tragic circumstances--had formulated the employers' codetermination policy and their constitutional complaint--, Esser is now pleading--a few days after the top-level talks with the German Labor Union Federation (DGB)--for joint action and cooperation between industry and labor.

"It is precisely in economically difficult times such as the present period that the exchange of opinions and standpoints is of special importance." It was remarkable, Esser said, that in the talks the partners had "shown great respect for each other," differences of opinion notwithstanding.

Before the talks, DGB chairman Vetter had said one should examine whether in regard to their views on society and the economy the two sides still shared common assumptions that would enable them to tolerate a great deal of controversy.

Does such a common platform for the joint solution of sociopolitical problems still exist? The president of the employers associations answers in the affirmative. "Our talks were concerned with fundamentals. The very fact that the two parties will establish a joint study group which among other problems is to look for ways of reducing unemployment shows that there are common interests."

After all, the ice age that set in after the employers had lodged their complaint with the Constitutional Court had by no means frozen all relations. In the sociopolitical institutions, cooperation continued. Likewise, in the collective bargaining, it was technical problems that were predominant.

"We should realize that irrespective of the problems that are contested or unsettled it is the totality of the relations that determines their quality. In such a total context, the individual element does not assume the weight it has when it is taken for the whole. I am referring here to the character which these relations should have and I am not denying that there were disagreements and that in the future, too, there will be such disagreements. That is only natural."

But how about codetermination, the foremost controversy of the last few years? Otto Esser chooses his words slowly and carefully. He avoids any formulation that could give rise to new arguments--obviously taking pains to protect from frost the tender seedling of cooperation which was planted on 20 July in Duesseldorf. Other union functionaries still use harsher, more implacable words.

"We agreed," said Esser, "to set up a discussion circle which will deal with the practical experience gained in the field of codetermination. In this respect, we emphasized that both sides desire loyal implementation of this law."

After all, in principle the employers have all along affirmed codetermination as "important and essential for orderly relations in the enterprise." "What divides us, labor unions and employers, is the conception of how far codetermination extends."

Interpreting the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the president of the employers associations defines the boundary: It is a subparity law which does not stipulate compulsory agreement; the dual vote of the chairman of the supervisory board is formally recognized; it is by no means an exceptional provision not to be invoked; the position of the labor director is not modeled after that of the labor director in the European Coal and Steel Community; the importance of property, but also the social obligations resulting from it, were emphatically pointed out.

"It is necessary to recognize the legal significance of these criteria concerning corporate law and the codetermination law. For they form the basis of a cooperation which promises to turn into productive cooperation."

According to Esser, the Constitutional Court's opinion that the codetermination law is oriented toward cooperation has thus been taken into account. "On the whole, I feel that on both sides there is great willingness to cooperate."

Esser pointed out that in spite of the bitter disputes of the last few years it was not necessary to start from scratch; the Karlsruhe ruling--in combination with the text of the law--had essentially created all the conditions necessary for productive cooperation on the supervisory boards.

"That does not mean that there won't be differences of opinion. Such differences will have to be dealt with within the framework of the individual enterprise, for the enterprises are after all autonomous. And it remains to be seen what settlements can be attained. It is conceivable that certain individual problems may have to be settled by the courts."

Thus the BDA (Federation of German Employers Associations) president transfers the future codetermination discussion from the association level to the enterprises. Is this going to lead to a wave of court proceedings concerned with particular points of the law?

"I don't know whether court disputes will be a frequent occurrence." However, he was "convinced," said Esser, "that there will be friendly cooperation--on the basis of the secure foundation that has now been established." In this respect, could the unions and associations possibly render assistance? Is it not conceivable that employers and unions amicably agree on legal interpretations of individual provisions of the codetermination law?

Of course, Esser does not give up his reserve. He sidesteps the question and again points out that the enterprises are autonomous, which of course would not necessarily rule out counseling of the members by the employers associations. Could one possibly interpret the statement that he could "not anticipate the discussion with the DGB about the practical experience gained with codetermination" to mean that the matter will be discussed after all? At any rate, Esser emphasizes: "In the discussions, we won't sidestep any problem."

Outwardly obliging, the BDA president does not in any way reveal whether aside from the general atmosphere there will be changes in codetermination policy. However, one senses the desire to prevent this problem from overshadowing the relations with labor in their entirety.

In this respect, the economic development and the employment situation are Esser's primary concern. "We must refrain from doing anything that would be liable to jeopardize stability and adequate economic growth." He considers this the most important task to be tackled by industry and labor.

This task includes helping the troublesome groups among the unemployed and creating new jobs for the rising number of workers entering the job market in the next few years. "It is precisely in this field that we must pursue a long-term policy. We know that beginning approximately in the mid-1980's there will be a reversal of trends. And it is certainly one of the responsibilities of both industry and labor to find the best way of coping with this presently contradictory development: First an increase and then a decline in the labor force."

It also includes the social management of technological progress. In this respect, however, Otto Esser is not quite so pessimistic. "I don't think that in the future the technological changes will follow a course that is radically different from that of the past." Above all, one should realize "that it is difficult to gain clarity on future developments, clarity that would allow reliable forecasts."

There can be no doubt, however, that in dealing with the problems involved industry and labor must act in concert. But can they solve these problems without assistance? "No, definitely not. One must proceed from the assumption that this is a challenge to the state, that the collaboration must involve three parties." Esser said that a study group established at the Ministry for Research and Technology was already engaged in making the necessary preparations.

It is 3 and 1/2 years since the leading functionaries of industry and labor last met to discuss common problems. In Duesseldorf, a new beginning was made. But the blessings cannot come from on high alone. Otto Esser thinks it would be helpful if the parties actually involved in the wage agreements--the individual trade unions and the employers associations--engaged in some sort of "continuous talks."

And This Is What Vetter Said

In an interview with the DGB weekly DIE WELT DER ARBEIT, DGB Chairman Heinz Oskar Vetter, commented on the top-level talks:

[Question] Comrade Vetter, at this meeting--the first in a long time--, were you able to find out what position the employers intend to take in regard to codetermination?

[Answer] A few months ago, we fell out over the codetermination problem; for this reason, this issue was dealt with first, at the beginning of the talks. Against the background of the codetermination law and corporate law and of

the Constitutional Court ruling of 1 March, both sides want the codetermination law of 1976 to be implemented in a spirit of loyalty and cooperation. In a discussion group, the two parties will share their experience. Irrespective of the enterprises' autonomy, it is necessary to provide practical guidelines for the implementation of codetermination.

[Question] Both sides are concerned about the employment situation. Did you talk with the employers about this problem as well?

[Answer] We discussed practically everything that the two sides are concerned about. Peace among the economic partners and maintenance of economic growth are such big issues that it is impossible to come up with solutions at short notice. We will continue our discussion on these problems on 26 September. At any rate, a study group to be established by the two organizations will concern itself primarily with finding ways of reducing unemployment--especially among troublesome groups such as the young unemployed. In connection with the policy of promoting employment, it is also planned to study the effects of new technologies.

[Question] Did you discuss lockouts or the taboo catalog?

[Answer] We should not dig up issues that have caused so much controversy in the meantime. We should not start with the most difficult problems. It is necessary to establish a basis capable of supporting further development. Later on, we will be strong enough to discuss these problems as well.

[Question] During a conference break, you said that before the meeting a continuation of the talks could not reasonably be expected. What did you mean by that?

[Answer] One should not in retrospect play down the conflicts. If our views had not been so radically different, it would have been frivolous to let that much time pass between our talks. So one could not assume from the outset that we would be able today automatically to clear this hurdle. We have established such a sound basis that we can continue the work within the framework of the study group and the discussion circle.

8760
CS: 3103

ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MICROPROCESSORS STUDIED

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 18 Jun 79 pp 20, 22

[Text] In the 1980's, the dispute over microelectronics could become as bitter as today's controversy over nuclear energy. In order to meet this threat, a "technology-political working group" has been established by Volker Hauff, the Federal minister for research, to facilitate an open dialog among all concerned.

In conjunction with the release by the cabinet of the 6th research report of the Federal government at the beginning of June, Volker Hauff promised a "change in trend." The sum total of the declaration by the minister: In future research work, the "economically necessary and the sociopolitically desirable are to be reconciled."

Hauff's declaration of intent does not come out of the blue. Among ministry officials it has been an open secret for some time now that Volker Hauff is apprehensive that the dispute over microelectronics and its impact on the world of labor in the 1980's could be at least as bitter as today's controversy over nuclear energy.

As a first step in meeting such dismal prospects, Hauff has created the "technology-political working group," which recently met in Bonn at the initiative of the Federal minister.

The representatives of the labor unions (Heinz Kluncker, OeTV [Public Utilities, Transportation, and Trade], and Hans Mayr, IG Metall [Metals Industry Labor Union]), and the employer-industry associations (among others, Dr Rolf Rodenstock, BDI [Federal Association of German Industry], and Wolfram Thiele, BDA [Federal Alliance of German Employer Associations]), scientists, labor market experts, and representatives of the trade associations--a total of 15 participants--spent a whole day discussing the future role of micro-electronics.

Basis for the discussion was a previously unpublished working paper that leaves nothing to be desired as far as clarity is concerned. To quote:

"It turns out...that 2.5 million wage-earners are employed in professions that in the next 5 years will experience a rapid and substantial change." In the long term, it should be reckoned that "electronics will change professions in which about 50 percent of all wage-earners are employed"--this forecast is valid for the next 15 years.

Printers and typesetters, the metal-working trades, and skilled office workers (Table) are especially hard-hit even today. Many have either lost their jobs through microelectronics or have "skills gained through many years of experience and traditional jobs...that have lost in importance. This can be seen as a downgrading in qualification."

The position paper is silent on the subject of jobs lost due to improvements made by using the intelligent chips, whose utilization makes even cheaper the use of industrial robots and control automata, text-systems and office computers, and computer-based drawing and design machines.

However, such numbers are available. With the production processes in German industry having been made decisively more efficient in recent years, a "creeping and seemingly unnoticed" great wave of improving efficiency in offices and administrations is now starting, as is feared by the president of the German office workers' union (DAG), Hermann Brandt.

Until now, it was believed by labor and management that the jobs of about 1 million of the roughly 5 million clerical staff and case workers who work in some 300,000 German offices were threatened. New research by Siemens AG, the computer and chip manufacturer, now places the number of those threatened at at least 2 million. In this, Siemens freely hopes, however, that these 2 million who are sacrificed to the tiny, bedeviled element, which is seen as a job-killer, will be compensated for by a new demand for personnel (among others created by new products first made possible by the use of these chips).

Whether such an optimistic calculation will prove correct is more than questionable, because the demographic development of the next 5 to 7 years looks less favorable: Until 1986, the populous age groups (from the time before the Pill) reach employment age. Therefore, for the Siemens calculations to be correct, a minimum of 4 million new jobs have to be created during this time.

That this is particularly difficult to achieve in the sphere of office and administrative work even during times of business expansion can be seen in the example of the German banks: During the time that the business volume of banks has increased 5-fold since 1962, the number of employees just doubled and has stagnated for the last 5 years.

Thus, it is no wonder that the Hauff paper claims that enterprises prefer "to postpone for as long as possible the transition to new technologies, as long as the perceived near-term difficulties seem to be worse than the mid- or long-term threat of losing their competitive ability."

Such ostrich-like behavior, in the opinion of the Federal minister for research and technology, can be overcome only through a timely "open and fair dialog among labor and management, scientists, and politicians about technical change and its problems."

Of course, that this cannot be achieved with dialogs, such as those in the technology-political working group, alone there is no doubt even with computer manufacturers. Klaus Luft, the chairman of the Nixdorf Computer AG, however, believes "that in the long run, new jobs can be created through electronics and that the quality of existing jobs, as well, will be improved." But Luft is afraid that at least "one generation will have substantial difficulties in finding jobs in several fields."

Thus, there remains the suspicion that the main task for the technology-political working group (which is to meet again in the fall) will be to motivate labor and management to start a search for practical solutions for the directly-impacted labor force. Should this search not succeed, then there are "stormy crisis years in store."

(Resume by participant.)

Elektronik ersetzt Arbeitskräfte (1)

Die Beschäftigtenzahl (in Tausend)* dieser Berufsgruppen ist vom Einsatz der Elektronik kurz- bis mittelfristig betroffen (2)

	1970	1973	1976	1979
Drucker und Setzer (3)	177	167	140	150
Metallverbinder (Schweißer, Lötler, Nietler) (4)	136	120	95	98
Elektriker (5)	651	632	570	595
Technische Sonderfachkräfte (techn. und Bauzeichner, Laboranten) (6)	213	200	193	187
Datei-Verarbeitungsfachleute (7)	58	69	88	97
Techniker (8)	531	693	676	712
Ingenieure (9)	410	411	408	398
Maschinen- und Hilfskräfte (10)	3041	3348	3325	3485
Mittelverformner (11)	391	319	268	276

* Deutsche Arbeitskräfte ohne Ausländer Quelle: Statistisches Bundesamt (12)

- KEY:
1. Electronics replaces work force
 2. The number of employees (in thousands)* in the following occupations is affected over the mid- and long-term by the introduction of electronics
 3. Printers and typesetters
 4. Metal-joiners (welders, braziers, riveters)
 5. Electricians
 6. Skilled specialist workers (engineering and architectural draftsmen, laboratory technicians)
 7. Data processing specialists
 8. Technicians
 9. Engineers
 10. Skilled and unskilled office workers
 11. Metal shapers
 12. German labor force without foreigners. Source: Federal Office for Statistics

6948

CSO: 3103

VOLKSWAGEN NEGOTIATING DEALS WITH USSR, CSSR

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 6 Aug 79 p 36

[Text] Volkswagen is negotiating with Moscow: The Soviets want to build the Passat under license.

The two visitors to the 13th floor of the Wolfsburg Volkswagen Office wasted little time in pleasantries and came quickly to the point: They were interested in a cooperation between Volkswagen and the Moscow auto export company AZLK, said the Soviet guests in mid-March.

"They definitely want to get into business with us," said Volkswagen head Toni Schmuecker after the visit of the Russian automobile officials.

Two and a half months later the VW company sent a detailed offer to Moscow. The Wolfsburgs want to sell the Soviets the license for the "Copy construction of an automobile of the Passat class" for a quarter of a billion marks.

With the aid of VW technology the Soviets want to get their completely obsolete passenger car production really going again. If they accept Schmuecker's offer, a Soviet Passat could be rolling from the assembly lines in 2 to 3 years and replace the antiquated Moskvich model.

Hardly had the license offer of the Wolfsburg board of directors arrived in Moscow when new interested parties came to see Schmuecker from the East bloc. The car builders of the Czechoslovak Skoda plant would like to build a copy of the sprightly and economical Rabbit motor. According to the people in Prague, the proven VW four-cylinder engine would drive Skoda cars.

In this case also, Schmuecker's board made a quick decision: Skoda can acquire the rights to reproduce it for 150 million marks.

The specialists in Moscow and Prague will have to manage on their own with the building instructions that Volkswagen is turning over to them. They have to do the whole production planning right up to building the assembly lines

and exercising quality control on their own. "For all that," Schmuecker let it be known to his partners in the negotiation, he unfortunately has "no technical management reserves" available.

VW-head Schmuecker also had to slightly dampen Bonn's hopes that the licensing agreements might revive declining East bloc business. In order "to ensure the position of the company," he wrote at the end of May to the state secretary for industry, Dieter von Wuerzen, his management is completely occupied with taking advantage of the sales boom in the United States by building a second assembly plant and an engine plant.

Because Americans are increasingly switching to the more economical Volkswagen, VW cannot deliver anywhere near as many cars in the United States as are demanded. For Schmuecker, therefore, the expansion of capacity in North America has priority for the moment.

So the Eastern Europeans have to be content for now with the licensing agreements. But, said a VW finance manager last week, "For them that would already be service enough."

The Kremlin emissaries had not been able to count on such concessions before Schmuecker came into office. The conservative VW generals Nordhoff, Lotz, and Leiding replied to their repeated requests to be able to copy the record Beetle model with brusque refusals.

The Soviets found listeners in Turin. The Italian Fiat company permitted them at the end of the 1960's to build a copy of their Type 124.

But if the East bloc car builders can now take over a proven VW model under license, they will have considerably reduced their technical retardation by at least a decade.

For the Moskvich and Volga still offered for sale correspond to the technical level of the 1960's.

The pressure for the old jaloppies is so great in the socialist states, nevertheless, that the state automobile combines usually have to keep their customers waiting for years.

Soviet economic planners have already raised car production by 43 percent to 1.3 million in the past 5 years.

As late as the mid-1960's passenger cars were built in the Soviet Union almost exclusively for the army and agriculture. In contrast, last year more than 1.3 million Ladas, Moskviches, and Volgas were produced.

The most popular Soviet-built model is the Fiat-copy Lada. Since 1970 5 million cars have rolled out of the halls of the Togliatti plant.

Not every Lada remains in the country, however. Every fifth car is sold in the West at rock-bottom prices.

The export business with the Fiat-licensed model, which brought in the much desired foreign exchange, pleased the Soviets so much that they wanted to do similar business with VW. The Soviet emissaries stubbornly pressed the Wolfsburg management to permit the future export of the Passat built in the Soviet Union.

And the Wolfsburgs do not seem averse to this. Schmuecker and his board of directors decided to "meet the Russians halfway."

The VW manager quickly dismissed the assumption that the competition from the east might some day be a burden to them. Before the Soviet Passat is in mass production, calculate Schmuecker and his men, a new model will have been coming off the assembly line in Wolfsburg for a long time.

6108

CSO: 3103

LACK OF COAL MINERS CAUSES CONCERN

Bonn DIE WELT in German 26 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by Peter Weigert in Bochum: "'Immediate Employment'--But No German Miner Is Willing To Work Underground"]

[Text] In many mines in the Ruhr area, foreigners comprise one-fourth of the personnel. At the end of 1978, 25,700 foreigners were employed in coal mines. Most of the came from Turkey, South Korea and Yugoslavia.

The coal-miner from Anatolia is replacing coal-miner Anton: In 17 years, the number of miners has decreased by two-thirds. In 1960, 297,000 miners were working underground; in 1970, 183,000; and at the end of 1977, only 102,000. Most foreign miners come from Turkey.

There is a lack of several thousand miners in the coal mines of the Ruhr. "The labor market is devoid of workers interested in underground work," states the latest issue of the magazine of the IG Bergbau und Energie. An instant enquiry at 11 large mining facilities reveals a not very reassuring picture.

"Five Indians and one Ghanaian have been hired during the past weeks," they said at the "Westerholt" mine in Herten. "We could hire hundreds of miners immediately--but where can we find them? You cannot find any on the labor market." Of the 2,800 men working underground, 600 are foreigners. The "Ewald" pit in Herten has a daily planned output of 14,000 tons of coal. "The present personnel is inadequate to fulfill this objective," states the analysis of the IG Bergbau. "One hundred Koreans who are now working at the 'Ewald' pit will have returned to Asia by 1980." Three hundred miners are needed: "Immediate employment."

"Before the end of the year, we could hire a total of 300 additional miners," announces also the "Consolidation" mine in Gelsenkirchen, a town where the unemployment rate was 7 percent last month, i.e. well over Federal and Land averages. "There are always 450 youths in training," they say at the "Con-

solidation" mine: "But the percentage of dropouts, especially among second-generation miners, is around 30 to 50 percent."

"Of 10 workers coming from the labor market into mining, 2 will remain," is the information provided by the "Haud Aden" mine in Bergkamen. "We could immediately hire 100 workers in their productive years to work underground--although we have just taken over some 160 miners from the closed 'Waltrop' mine. Five hundred Turkish miners fill the gap in the 25- to 30-year old group." Should exploitation of additional coal seams in what is called the North Field start at the beginning of 1983, the personnel situation will become still worse.

In Dortmund-Eving, at the "Minister Stein" mine, 9,000 tons of coal are produced daily. "This strains us to the utmost," they say. Increasing the output would mean hiring 100 experienced miners just to set up a new "section" underground. Since 1970 only, the central pit unit "Hugo" in Gelsenkirchen has hired 2,388 miners from neighboring mines which have closed down, the IG Bergbau enquiry states. "Hugo" would like to hire immediately another 250 to 300 native miners, but cannot find anybody. Already 37 percent of the underground personnel is made up of Turkish miners.

"Priority to coal--that sounds good. Gasoline from coal--that sounds still better," writes EINHEIT, the magazine of the IG Bergbau. "But the experience obtained at the head of the gallery does not sound that good." The magazine then summarizes the results of its instant enquiry:

--At 11 of the mines covered by the enquiry, a few thousand miners are needed immediately. More will be needed in 1980 and later.

--Very few workers are interested in underground work. "Over 20 years of coal-mining crises have shaken confidence in the security of mining jobs."

--Of the few newly "trained" newcomers to the mine, 50-80 percent leave after a short time.

--Many who are not yet fully trained remain only a short time after passing their examination. "The mining industry trains many youths--often only for the benefit of the rest of the economy."

--Because of early retirement, the age average is lower, but there are not enough miners in the 20-35 year old group.

"The demand for coal is going to increase. The probability of finding enough miners is going to decrease," concludes the magazine of the IG Bergbau. "The recruitment of personnel has already become problem number one. It is just that many outsiders have not yet noticed it. Before you can produce gasoline from coal, you must extract coal--for that you need a lot of equipment and hard-working men. At the head of a gallery, on the coal front, we know that."

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CSO: 3103

FINNISH PRIME MINISTER KOIVISTO PROFILED

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 13 Jul 79 pp 58-63

[Article by Juhani Aromaki: "Mauno Koivisto Returns from the Cool Sepulcher to the Sweaty Workday: We'll See Whether the Others Can Get Used to My Ways"]

[Text] Mauno Koivisto had a chance to firm up his political profile. He was invited to take over and he was ready; he consented to becoming prime minister without any objection.

But what is the imprint of bank director Mauno Koivisto's political performance, about which much has been claimed but little is known?

Shortly before the elections, Chairman Kalevi Sorsa suggested that he would designate Mauno Koivisto as the party's candidate for prime minister in the great television dialogue. Throughout the fall, the matter had already been discussed with other members of the party.

In Koivisto's opinion, this gave rise to considerable confusion. He felt that the statement should not have been made. Aside from Koivisto, Kalevi Sorsa also mentioned the names, Keijo Liinamaa and Pirkko Tyolajarvi.

"If that is how the party feels and the president asks me to form a government and I say that I disagree, I altogether lose my voice in the matter.

"Such a request cannot be ignored. If it were, people would say that it is easy to give advice hiding behind the Bank of Finland but, when one ought to enter the arena oneself, then that's what happens," the prime minister said.

Kalevi Sorsa's suggestion stirred things up inside the SDP [Social Democratic Party] too. It was viewed as expanding the tactical image the party had created. The party nevertheless decided to grant Maun [Koivisto] "a probationary period and time enough to acquire competence."

An attempt has been made to silence discussion on Finland's next president, but the leaders of every party have to think about future candidates and

their own party strategies. Discussion is still active.

In Social Democratic circles it is even felt that a party chairman could not be elected to be Finland's next president. According to this view, election of a party leader would cause the other parties to argue that biases were involved inasmuch as one party would have too much power in comparison with the others.

Kalevi Sorsa himself has said in public that in the next presidential elections it will be the SDP's turn. Some might now ask whether Kalevi Sorsa gave up his candidacy in favor of Mauno Koivisto.

No one believes this. This is merely Finland's first government and Mauno Koivisto happens to have become its prime minister.

What kind of man is Mauno Koivisto? What is his political profile? What has he to say about the claims that have been made about him?

"I think that, where criticism of people's motivations is concerned, we may assume that everything is always involved at the same time. There are public issues, external complications, factors known to the individual concerned and those he is unaware of, such that the whole discussion as to this one or that one is somewhat pointless."

When we look at the map of Northern Europe, we can understand why, in J.K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen's times, foreign policy and good neighbor relations were top priorities. This is also true of the future.

In Finland, in terms of foreign policy, after the president, candidates can best be trained for two positions, that of prime minister and that of foreign affairs minister. For over 10 years, Mauno Koivisto's viewpoint has been that of a bank director, an economist.

Apparently, the prime minister can also have his opinions on foreign policy. Koivisto immediately used the situation to his advantage just before Midsummer Day when he replied to Johannes Virolainen's analysis of the formation of the new government. Since the prime minister had agreed with the president that he would not talk of affairs, rather of making them public, he invited the HELSINGIN SANOMAT to the spot.

Although we know that Koivisto has read many memoirs of Soviet generals in the original and thoroughly familiarized himself with Soviet foreign policy, among others, he is regarded as lacking that oft referred to mystical "demonstration of competence in foreign policy."

What does Mauno Koivisto himself think this term means?

"This is primarily a domestic expression. Most often, people assume posts of political leadership without any demonstration of ability. Exceptions

to this are the socialist countries where the system works differently. Generally an opposition leader is elected who has not had an opportunity to demonstrate anything other than his ability to obtain more national support than the government in office. And that serves as a starting point."

But does Koivisto lack proof of his competence in foreign policy matters?

"What do they really mean by that? What kinds of proof can people generally offer... hm? It is hard to comment on this when one has no idea of what is behind it.

"This is to a large extent a so-called academic question. Perhaps some think that in Finland those kinds of crisis situations having to do with the government's foreign relations regularly arise for which one has to offer some proof of one's competence.

"Such situations arise very irregularly — and hopefully we will not have to deal with difficult foreign policy questions very often," Prime Minister Koivisto said.

"When economic integration radically developed in Europe and Finland too had to adopt a stance, under the circumstances situations naturally arose in which those who wield political power had to take stands on very difficult situations. The attainment of the EEC agreement was a very difficult process for us, one that took generations.

"Then we have to go back a bit. Of course, from the economic standpoint Finland's admission to the EFTA was a more significant decision than the EEC agreement. I remember having said that the EEC decision would not be a major decision if we continued to follow the policy of primary importance set by the Finland-EFTA. It would have been a major decision if that decision had been a negative one. Then we would have departed from the free-trade policy. The success of our EEC initiative was merely a natural continuation of the policy we had been following up to that point.

"I am fully convinced that Finland obtained an agreement that on the whole was as good a one as could be expected. And we would have gotten an even better one if we had reached more domestic agreement."

Why could we in Finland not agree with one another more?

"The interests of the clothing industry are not always quite the same as those of the textile industry."

Koivisto was still contemplating what, in terms of foreign policy, important and difficult decisions are to be found in recent Finnish history.

"If we go back even further, we really have to go as far back as the YYA [expansion unknown] agreement," he said.

The prime minister's summer vacation has just begun. The pressure has for the moment eased up and perhaps for that very reason this meandering analysis of a single question, demonstrations of foreign policy ability, got to be so far-reaching in the courtyard of his summer home in Inkoo.

When Soviet tanks were rolling over Prague streets in August 1968, Mauno Koivisto was prime minister. The occupation of Czechoslovakia came as a shock in Finland too, upsetting people and setting tongues to wagging.

Many remember an evening celebration of Romania's national festival in Helsinki that took place at the same time. The Soviet representative was left alone that evening. Finnish Peoples Democrats and Communists loudly shouted "caterpillar-track communists."

"When I saw the SEDL [Finnish Peoples Democratic League] Party Committee statement, I took a deep breath and asked whether they had really approved all of that.

"It certainly was a savage indictment. Of course, in the heat of the moment anything can be said. At that time abroad, Eriki Raatikainen too expressed unpremeditated thoughts which he apparently later regretted."

Koivisto was careful in his choice of expression. He made a statement on television in which he deplored any action that might threaten world peace. As an example, he cited the United States' role in the Vietnamese war.

"The Swedish ambassador at that time was disturbed that the Soviet Union held Swedish reaction in such low esteem and said that Finland too took a critical view of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. I replied that the matter could, of course, be viewed that way, but that we were not harping on it," Koivisto said.

"Of course, when an issue is new, like the Chinese attack on Vietnam, we assume radical positions. It is a different matter if we return to the same question again when there have been no new developments. Then there is a change in the kind of statement one issues."

Mauno Koivisto spoke to his party at a party committee meeting in March 1971. Then too he felt that "the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact nations was above all a security policy action which was given an ideological explanation and then later referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine."

"This term was invented out of whole cloth in the West. It was not the case that the Brezhnev Doctrine existed before the Prague situation and that it was applied to that situation. On the basis of everything we know about the Soviet Union's motives and ways of making decisions, this was not the way it was.

"The Soviet Union was in a situation in which it had to take a firm stand. This stand was explained the way it was and these explanations were later referred to as the Brezhnev Doctrine. I am convinced that this is the way it happened," Koivisto said.

He recalled discussions held in the SDP as to whether the Brezhnev Doctrine would also affect Finland:

"A Soviet representative recently said on Galbraith's television program, 'A Time of Uncertainty,' that the occupation of Czechoslovakia did not in any way represent the general principles of Soviet policy."

During the war, Mauno Koivisto belonged to the youngest age group that was sent to the front. He was in some of the toughest fighting, on the Isthmus of Maaselka with many a time many a man's rifle on his back.

"The war had such an effect on me that, after it was over, every other activity seemed to me rather insignificant in comparison... it was such a big and shocking experience that everything I have undertaken since then has been like selling buttons.

"So, what more can I say?"

Koivisto has been interested in the reasons why we fought. He has analyzed the causes and consequences of the war, read the memoirs of many Soviet marshals.

"They have very little to say about Finland. And if they do speak about Finland at all, they contain less information than can be gotten out of ordinary histories. Thus politically there is not much to be learned from them.

"There is a story about some fellow who had done some research on how the war was conducted in Finland. He was surprised at how well we managed despite the fact that decision making was so badly handled. Then it dawned on him that there were generals on the other side too."

According to Koivisto, we began to get an "uncompromising picture" of war-time Finland when the German archives were made public in the United States.

"In his book, Peter Crosby says: 'If Russian planes had not bombed Finnish territory on the morning of the 26 June 1941, that same afternoon German planes would have taken off from Finnish airfields. It was at the last minute that Finland got the provocation it needed.'

"The driftwood management of the situation was sinking but the inordinately lengthy discussions went on as though the arrival of German equipment by the ton had not in the meantime been made public. From the Finnish point of view, there is not much room for explanations.

"In Finland the people who were responsible had assumed their position before war broke out and that was that Finland would take part in the war.

"The leaders operated within extremely narrow limits. Although we know a lot now, after the fact, that we did not know then, it is hard now too to clearly point out the alternatives, the lines of action."

According to Koivisto, Platonov's book, of which those parts that deal with Finland have been published under the title, "Battles on the Finnish Front," is generally unknown in the West.

"From these we learn that the northern flank of the Leningrad Army Group did not successfully carry out those assignments which headquarters had given it. It requested reinforcements, which it did not receive in sufficient number. Then military operations were ended and peace was made.

"Generally in the West there is a feeling that, for some unexplained reason, the Soviet Union permitted Finland to go on existing as it was and that this was a plot regarding which free peoples must be very careful not to incorrectly interpret the situation.

"When we consider Finland's situation in the fall of 1944, it was both militarily and politically pitiful. When we have spoken of this Finnification, we have totally neglected the question as to how much this friendly neighbor policy has weakened Finland's position. We are only given to understand that Finland had held some sort of stronger position which it knowingly allowed to be weakened.

"If the Finnish leaders then in power wanted this or that, at that time no other policy was thinkable than one which answered the question: To what extent would we be successful in gradually overcoming domestic and economic difficulties and developing a new kind of relationship of trust with the Soviet Union?" Koivisto said.

"Those who speak of Finnification give us to understand that here, as far as Finland is concerned, this somehow doubtfully proceeded and that there were some better alternatives."

During Mauno Koivisto's term as prime minister, there were tough Nordek [expansion unknown] negotiations which failed. An attempt was made to turn this failure into a Waterloo for Mauno Koivisto. He himself is of a different opinion:

"I am convinced that the decision we made after the 1970 elections — unsigned — was particularly in the interests of the other Nordic countries. If we had signed, I believe that Denmark would not now be a member of the EEC and we would have decided in their favor.

"I can say that I handled the negotiations creditably under difficult circumstances and the end result was for the best for the Nordic countries, including Finland," Koivisto believes.

His present appointment as prime minister is also regarded as being indicative of the fact that the Nordek negotiations have left no blot on Koivisto's record. He is still one of those rare top-rank politicians who have "politically survived." You know, many have already been run into the ground.

"Now in our world there is a big difference between the Nordek period and that of the prime minister. Even if I had fallen from power, I do not understand why that would have ruined my political future. People fall from power throughout the world all the time," Koivisto said.

"I acted with particular caution in the Nordek affair. I made less progress than those in power in the government might have supposed. I added my own caution to that of the government. I tried to keep us from ever again getting into any situation where our decisions would have to be based on alternatives."

On the basis of the letters published by President Urho Kekkonen on the one hand and the material to date published by Mauno Koivisto on the other, we may conclude that the president was prepared to go farther and take bigger risks than Mauno Koivisto.

On May Day 1965, Mauno Koivisto made a speech in Tampere, some of which is still familiar today:

"Prime Minister Virolainen says that our party is incapable of participating in the assumption of responsibility in the government because we do not enjoy the full confidence of the Soviet Union.

"We have no reason to suppose that our party enjoys such confidence in any way less than one or another of the other parties which, full of carbon monoxide, participates in the government and practices reactionary politics.

"Or is Prime Minister Virolainen's statement to be interpreted as meaning that the middle class parties now in the government enjoy the full confidence of the Soviet Union?"

Even now there is dispute over interpretations of Speaker Virolainen's foreign policy. Virolainen's finger now points to the Conservative Party.

Can you understand Virolainen's arguments?

"I cannot understand them. What he suggested in that famous interview was factually wrong. Of course, it also contained correct statements, but they too were in contradiction with some administration decisions.

"The Conservative Party did not join the government because the left did not want to collaborate with it. Because of the left, no foreign policy arguments were presented. The prevailing attitude is that in more or less all areas the Conservative Party is farther removed from us than the Center Party is and represents difficultly reconcilable positions.

"I have not adopted this attitude but I too believe that obviously in many areas it is easier for the left to reach agreement with the Center Party than with the Conservative Party," the prime minister feels.

"Under no circumstances should you get the idea from this that the Conservative Party could not participate in the government. The leftist parties have done nothing more than to point out that they do not feel it likely that they could reach agreement on issues with the Conservative Party such that cooperation in the government might be developed.

"It is somehow a bit incredible that the Conservative Party took part in Virolainen's own 1964-1966 government and that Conservative Party representatives have since then participated in many other administrations staffed with ministers chosen by a nonpartisan president. Sometimes these are referred to as presidential administrations, which is not a bad choice of expression," Koivisto noted.

How would you evaluate the Conservative Party and its "evidence of competence in foreign policy"?

"We should not avoid using big words, nor am I referring only to the Conservative Party. This is one of those problems concerning our relations with the East which one never dreams of.

"Since we are so low-keyed in talking about things, we think that certainly now at least a little of what we think should be clear. In the Soviet Union they think that, if you have something to say, you should say it loudly and clearly," Koivisto said.

"I remember a Soviet war film. At one point the soldiers are getting ready to cross the Dnieper. The political commissar gives orders to those assigned to political tasks: 'Don't deny yourselves the use of big words.'

"When big words are appropriate, they should be used."

The people are fascinated by Napoleon's thought that every private has a marshal's baton in his pack. Mauno Koivisto worked in the port of Turku and earned his doctorate without attending school so much as one day.

He attended night school, completed secondary school, plugged through his studies from one subject to another and became a university student at age 26. This is a success story that appeals to the mob.

The people obviously are attracted to Maun's image of fairness and Koivisto himself also chooses it. The people should not be underestimated, as they are by many professional politicians.

Koivisto has been blessed with charisma. As a tall man, he stands above the crowd. The people also notice that he is basically a modest man, a safe, conservative bank director. This can be seen in the clothes he wears as well as in his ideas.

UUSI SUOMI is demonstrating that it thinks that the fact that Mauno Koivisto is a socialist is news. As a boy, Mauno Koivisto's political foundation was early molded by carpenter Juho Koivisto, a small tenant farmer from Loimaa.

He chose the Social Democrats who, in his opinion, are concerned for "matters affecting people this side" [of the grave].

In May 1965 in Turku, Koivisto proposed:

"First of all, we must under no circumstances discriminate against the Communists because in the end the superiority of the Agrarian League, which represents a fifth of the population, is based on them.

"Let us not say we can let the Communists participate in the government because the Social Democrats are against the idea. And even if the Agrarian League were willing, the Communists wouldn't dare to do so without us. A fifth of the nation is thus shoved to one side.

"We cannot let the Social Democrats participate because they discriminate against the Communists and are suspect in terms of their views on foreign policy. Half of the nation is thus shoved to one side.

"The Conservative Party is kept in line by threatening it with an amnesty for the Social Democrats and replacement of the Conservative Party with the SDP.

"Smaller parties are kept in line with rewards and threats. That is how one-fifth of the population governs four-fifths of it.

"If we ourselves cut the Communists off from the possibility of joining our partners in the government, we will be at the mercy of the Agrarian League, whether there is a left-wing majority in Parliament or not.

"This country's democratic system will by no means be weakened; rather just the opposite, it will be strengthened if we quite voluntarily display confidence in our extreme left wing and invite it to cooperate in the management of our common affairs as the liberal middle class did with regard to us toward the end of the 1930's, when doing so certainly did not result in its defeat."

This quotation demonstrates that against the background of the notion of cooperation there was much more than orthodox ideology.

A little later, in November 1965, cooperation with the left and allowing the SKDL to share in government responsibilities were discussed at a Paasikivi Society meeting. Then too, Mauno Koivisto advocated cooperation with the Communists. He had already presented his real reasons in Turku in the spring.

The mantle of the right-wing Social Democrats has been placed on Mauno Koivisto's shoulders. A basically conservative tendency is seen in his policy, the components of which are, for example, opposition to public sector growth, economizing and avoidance of indebtedness in any form.

These traditional middle class virtues having to do with good housekeeping are regarded as being closely associated with Mauno Koivisto. This too is viewed as explaining his great popularity among businessmen.

Those who know him best say that it is wrong to maintain that Koivisto is a right-wing Social Democrat. Many of his decisions prove otherwise.

"Of course, there hasn't been anything to brag about as far as my left leaning is concerned for a long time now," Koivisto himself says.

"But this may be due to a lot of reasons. One natural and relatively good one is the fact that, when you do this kind of work year in year out, your strength of character is weakened. Of necessity, the departure for achieving all good things, to say nothing of the bad ones, is always a negative one. There is no money; therefore, we shouldn't do it.

"I feel that there is nothing surprising about this. There has been a distribution of labor in this society in terms of which this part of the job has fallen to me. Of course, between times I would prefer to attend to cultural affairs and other optimistic kinds of work directed toward the future. And I would prefer to leave it to others to see how far we can go with our resources," Koivisto noted.

Mauno Koivisto has gotten it in the neck from the extreme left because of his stabilization policy. He was one of the motive forces in the preparations for the First Linenmaa Plan.

And the more often the oil-producing countries hold meetings and raise the price of oil, the better those times seem to him. The trad-union movement too looks at them with longing: it had begun to collect membership dues from employers, membership was on the increase, a solidary wage policy was being implemented and inflation remained within reasonable bounds.

Today, Koivisto modestly asserts:

"It was peculiar that the government was especially successful in everything it undertook."

Koivisto's tightly controlled housekeeping reminds many people of Vaino Tanner and his economic policy.

"Deciding on all issues, he very successfully managed the economy, both the business economy, as director of Elanto [a large Finnish cooperative enterprise], and the government economy.

"The ideas he had then represented new, optimistic ones as to what the society can and ought to do. He was very successful.

"I do not believe that this is disputed. Criticisms have been raised as to whether Tanner was the right man to deal with the Russians. It is very possible that neither the situation nor Tanner's person nor his way of expressing himself helped our relations with the Soviet Union. But that is quite a different matter from his economic capability," Koivisto said.

Economic experts are interested in politicians with whom they can talk about things in their own language, since under normal circumstances they have to harp on things for a year only to realize that their messages still have not gotten through.

Koivisto's cynicism with regard to the constant growth of the government economy has, however, served as a brake. It is generally claimed that this somewhat narrow position stifles new, creative ideas.

"Matters are being and can be handled in many different ways. The only thing I wanted to put a stop to was the fact that initiatives are launched without any idea as to how they are to be funded.

"Perhaps it is imagined that the overall investment level will also be raised if the economy is a so-called broad one and that we will be able to launch initiatives which we could not otherwise launch.

"This simply means that, if voluntary saving is not enough and if we are not prepared to heavily tax our citizens, then we have to get into debt abroad, which has happened. This gives rise to inflation which in the end sets in motion saving, a prerequisite to the investments that materialize. And this is what we have gone through too."

Things went very well for Mauno Koivisto as head of the Bank of Finland. His predecessors there: Waris, von Fieandt and Sakari Tuomioja as well as Risto Ryti, were also successful in their time.

Although the role of guardian of the mark is a responsible job, in the well air-conditioned confines of the Bank of Finland it is hard — at least seemingly so — not to succeed.

Koivisto certainly misses the bank's resilient atmosphere "where with just a few symbols one knows what is meant and the matter can be taken care of." In daily political life, everything is much more casual and understanding one another is often an imprecise matter.

"We'll see how things work out, whether I'll have to get used to the ways of the others or whether they will get used to mine. And whether long-drawn-out battles will be required or whether we can manage with less of that.

"There is nothing to brag about in the government's initial phase. I just missed getting into a really rugged fight over the revaluation issue but I did not want to provoke a government crisis," the prime minister said.

Does it look like the Centrists are double-dealing with Mauno Koivisto?

"I haven't noticed this to be so...

"They have enough problems of their own. I have not gotten the impression that there is bad will. Of course, it would be preferable — if they find it hard to take some sort of a stand — for them not to have gone into so much apparent discussion of the issues."

In industrial circles as well as among the leading politicians, Koivisto is considered to be slow, if anything, in coming to decisions. They say that Koivisto makes a thorough analysis of the situation but, when the time comes to draw his conclusions, we can sit back and wait.

Those most familiar with Koivisto's way of thinking hasten to note that Koivisto's actions should be judged on the basis of the end result.

Many also regard Koivisto as a somewhat uncommunicative, distant, self-pitying, truly Finnish man whose egocentrism is sometimes annoying.

He is a political thinker, a philosopher, whom it would be impossible to imagine, for example, as a blustering opposition leader. He has a great desire to withdraw into the solitude of his Inkoo woods.

"Wandering about there, alone in the woods, one often gets good ideas," he himself said.

He is not very sociable, although he does like good company.

Koivisto has become milder-mannered than before, when he would suddenly take offense at a word.

It is typical of him to want to be his own boss. His agenda is never so full that he has no time to walk down to the marketplace and do his thinking on the way.

He has a firm group of sympathizers but no regular staff of small politicians. He goes his own way.

He has a lot of party support but, despite this, he cannot, unlike an ordinary prime minister, ask whether the party enjoys his confidence.

Koivisto wants them to get in touch with him. It is harder for him to do that, but not even Mauno Koivisto can win out by waiting.

Although during his government congratulatory call in Tamminiemi he said that Rafael Paasio had invited him first and then Kalevi Sorsa, the truth is there is another side to the story. Koivisto was anxious to go earlier and was even then ready to go at once, with no objections, as soon as he received an invitation.

"He is prepared to lead the bunch." Those who see things that way are apparently right. He settled the matter typically for him: alone with himself.

"I haven't noticed that it is hard for me to make decisions. When I think about how I feel about making decisions, I try to keep an open mind for as long as possible...

"And then, when the time for decision has come, we close our minds and make the decision, and generally we do not look back. I usually like humble people who regret their decisions. I have at times quoted from the Bible: 'He who holds the plow handle fast and looks back is not worthy.'

"Once the decision is made and we begin to implement it, there has to be a particularly significant reason for examining it again.

"I have tried to adhere to one principle, even though this does not always quite work. If a decision has to be made and everything is ready, I set the whole thing aside for a day.

"Generally important points come to mind. Your thinking has gotten into such a rut; but when you work at something else, be it only gardening, you realize that you nearly forgot those points," Koivisto said.

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PROGRESS OF ANTI-KEKKONEN OPPOSITION PARTIES SURVEYED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Aug 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Time of Visitation Has Begun"]

[Text] Over the weekend two party congresses broke the recent political silence in a rather surprising way. Meetings were held by the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] and the SKYP [Finnish Peoples Unification Party], which came into existence 7 years ago from the same substances as a result of personal conflicts. Eventhough both of these parties are, in general, struggling for the same supporters, their stories differ from each other in many ways.

In spite of its solemn name -- Finnish Peoples Unification Party -- the SKYP, which has been living in its own shadow, has not had anything to say. Contrary to expectations, it has not been able to obtain the confidence of voters, but has only divided the votes of the rural population. The SKYP saw its best days at the time of its creation and in the Diet elections of 1975, in which it received 1.6 percent of the votes and one Diet Member. This individual subsequently went over to the Center Party.

The SMP's story, on the other hand, is known for its origins from the Agrarian League/Center Party, in which Veikko Vennamo, who had had a falling out, in 1959 established a small peasant party, the forerunner of the present Finnish Rural Party. He founded it in order to "assemble the democratic forces of the peasantry, free workers, and real small entrepreneurs" and to prevent "the disruptive work directed by the old parties and the incitement against one another."

From the very beginning the SMP has been controlled by the chairman and became a party that has revolved around his name and his charisma. In the initial years its success was weak. In the elections of 1966 it obtained only 24,000 votes and one Diet member, but in the protest elections of 1970 it received more than 250,000 votes and 18 Diet members. In the last elections the result was 133,000 and seven representatives.

Even during times of success the SMP was not able to achieve its political goals. It has built its practical program on incitement and a struggle

directed against other parties. It did not seek cooperation and the result has not been an assemblage of forces. There has been no evidence of a change in this policy.

The change of personnel in the party's leadership was prepared with such secrecy that it was a great surprise even to representatives to the party congress. This transfer of power within one family is in this day and age unusual and interesting. Whether it will also contain a revision of the party's inability to cooperate remains to be seen. In this sense the SMP's time of visitation for the purpose of demonstrating political pressure has begun.

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RURAL PARTY LEADERSHIP PASSES FROM VEIKKO TO PEKKA VENNAMO

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Aug 79 p 7

[Article by Janne Virkkunen: "Ecstatic Farewell to 'A Messiah, Iron Leader, Hero of Work'"]

[Text] On Saturday in Pori Veikko Vennamo turned over the leadership of the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] to his son, Pekka Vennamo, 34, accompanied by overflowing speeches of praise from his constituency.

The selection of the new SMP chairman raised sentiments in the conference hall of the Riihiketo School and even caused such a devotional atmosphere that Vennamo himself considered it best to cut off the praise by stating that he is not yet dead. I intend to continue to function in the SMP, assured father-Vennamo.

The most important issue on the opening day of the SMP's 20th anniversary meeting was the selection of a party leadership, which was colored by the fact that Veikko Vennamo, to the surprise of party member, voluntarily resigned from the leadership position he himself created.

The chairmanship election lasted a full hour and during that time Pekka Vennamo obtained unanimous support as chairman. However, Ville Kuusisaari from Lapua expressed the desire that father's hand would guide the new chairman, thus, compressing the hopes of those present.

On Saturday father-Veikko was a more important figure than Pekka in that in the discussion he was called a messiah, an iron leader, a hero of work, and so on.

Many representatives made long statements on how difficult it is to speak now that the chairman is resigning and it seems as if one is paralyzed or a bomb has fallen and that one cannot stop the tears from coming to one's eyes.

Pekka Vennamo's accession to the leadership of the SMP came up in Pori already on Saturday when Veikko Vennamo announced irrevocably at the preparations committee that he will not continue as party chairman. Vennamo even went on to reinforce his statement of resignation at the conference hall.

When father-Vennamo announced his refusal, Party Secretary Urpo Leppanen proposed in the committee that Pekka Vennamo be nominated as chairman. The preparations committee reached a unanimous decision just as the party congress did.

Young Leader Will Keep Old Line

Pekka Vennamo, who has been elected as chairman of the SMP, is a 34-year old former technical university student and presently a fulltime politician. He is now also Finland's youngest party leader.

Pekka Vennamo is serving his second term in the Diet. He was elected a member of the Diet by more than 10,000 votes in the March elections from the southern election district of Turku. Before this, Vennamo was in the Diet in the years 1972-75.

After being elected as chairman, Pekka Vennamo stated that the party's basic line will remain as before even though the political language used may change.

He made the assurance that the SMP intends to continue to state things as they are. Under the son-Vennamo's leadership the SMP intends to cooperate with any party with which cooperation can be accomplished. "But we will not obligate the party to other parties." The new chairman considers that increasing political strength from the current seven Diet Members is a more important party goal. "Political strength must be obtained so that the SMP will be given greater attention than heretofore."

Pekka Vennamo is not disturbed by the fact that he inherited the chairmanship from his father. The fact that a father and son can be in the same party only demonstrates the ideological strength of the SMP, he stated.

Pekka Vennamo does not intend to just follow in his father's foot steps and under his leadership, perhaps, the SMP will even acquire a more flexible attitude. The new chairman does not personally have anything against the fact that Finland's foreign policy line is called the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line in the SMP. Father-Vennamo spoke highly of the Paasikivi line.

However, the son-Vennamo added that foreign policy must not be bound to any one individual. Pekka Vennamo did not consider the presidential question to be timely. "We will support Dr. Urho Kekkonen until the end of this term," he stated.

Rest of Leadership Was Left Without Nearly Anything To Say

The transition of the chairmanship from father to son drew all of the attention of the SMP congress on Saturday. After that, Veikko Vennamo, who has directed the party for 20 years, was elected as the party's first honorary chairman, who will have the right to participate in the meetings of party organs as a representative with an authority to speak.

In this way, Veikko Vennamo will continue to remain in touch with events at the leadership level of the SMP, even though he has transferred the heavy job of chairmanship to his son.

The rest of the party leadership remains as before. First vice chairman will continue to be held by Diet Member Eino Poutiainen, 62, who was secretary of the SMP in the years 1960-69, then fell into disfavor, and returned as vice chairman in 1975. The last time Poutiainen served as a Diet Member was in the years 1970-72.

Aune Rutonen, 49, of Oulu will continue as second vice chairman and Diet Member Urpo Leppanen, 35, remains as party secretary.

Vennamo Promised a New Rise

In his salutation speech Veikko Vennamo promised a new rise, which in his opinion already began in the presidential elections of 1978. The fact that the present Diet faction is no longer from the backwoods, but is composed of strong SMP members and workers who have endured all the phases of the party creates the conditions for this rise in Vennamo's opinion.

In the same speech Vennamo announced there is to be a change of generations in the SMP. "Our party veterans have weathered many storms, but even they are not able to refute the laws of nature," stated Vennamo.

In his speech Vennamo demanded a change of direction in economic policy and gave a lesson in his own exceptional use of language. In it were continually reiterated the words spirit, honesty, strong-willed, decadence, Phariseism, and other words closely associated with Vennamoism.

Vennamo also gave a short characterization of other parties and he began with the Christians. "A struggling and truly energetic Christianity is lacking from this party, in which even timeless values are more or less as signboards from behind which an offensive Phariseism and the pursuit of one's own interests peak."

According to Vennamo the fate of the gentleman-class, the Constitutionals, has demonstrated that contempt and scorn for other social classes is withering away.

Vennamo considered the Conservative Party to be an air bubble, which is barren and ineffective in the Diet. Among those in the party's Diet faction he found many who are only pursuing their own interests.

In Vennamo's opinion the Social Democrats and Communists are carrying out a cold ideology of enforced socialism from the omnipotence of society, in which society becomes richer at the expense of the people and the ruling clique lives the sweet life.

According to the SMP leader the fruit-producing plant of the Center Party has died and been buried and the only thing remaining is the outward shell with those pursuing power. The Center Party has also played a terrible role in desolating rural areas as well as destroying family- and small farms, stated Vennamo.

Vennamo blames the congelment of the political situation on Urho Kekkonen's long-term presidency and pointed out that "in accordance with the laws of nature our country is in such a situation that unexpected presidential elections can occur at any time". We must always be prepared for such a possibility, stated Vennamo and urged his people to become involved in the municipal election campaign in October of next year.

SMP Intends To Pay Its Debts

The SMP, which has five new Diet Members and and additional monetary support of more than 800,000 markkas, intends to put its house in order first and only then set about expanding and strengthening its work in the field.

Veikko Vennamo, who resigned from the party chairmanship in Pori on Saturday, stated that already after the elections the party administration of the SMP decided first to pay back party debts before expanding economic support out in the field.

It became clear from the speeches of party leaders that at this time the party is only indebted to the Pientalopoika Corporation, which publishes the SMP newspaper SUOMEN UUTISET. Last spring Veikko Vennamo was reelected chairman of the board of directors of Pientalarpoika. The majority of the corporation's shares is, however, under the control of the party, stated Party Secretary Urpo Leppanen.

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CONSERVATIVES' INTEREST IN PRESIDENTIAL DISCUSSION ANALYZED

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 8 Jul 79 p 2

[Commentary by Martti Haikio: "Presidential Discussion and the Conservative Party"]

In recent weeks the presidential discussion has acquired traits which reveal the initiation of a discussion of a seemingly forbidden subject. In a democracy it would, indeed, be strange if there were no public discussions of the nature and the holder of the country's most important political office.

The opinion poll conducted by UUSI SUOMI on what is to be expected from a president has made the deliberations of a constitutional reform timely.

Chief Editor Jyrki Haikonen (UUSI SUOMI, 1 July) emphasized that contradiction which seems to prevail between what citizens expect of a president, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the plans aimed at weakening the power of the president. Activism, an ability to rise above political parties and to resolve difficult problems, is expected of a president.

Against this background one can ask what is the meaning of the strengthening of the prime minister's staff on the part of certain new helpers. The president's office continues to remain small and his ability to pay wages to assistants is considerably weaker than that of the prime minister. Is there an attempt to transfer power from the president to the prime minister and this through the kitchen?

Naming of a Successor

Another interesting point of view has been brought to the presidential discussion by Prof. Paavo Kestari in his article "The President's Position" (KANAVA 5/79). In Kestari's opinion Urho Kekkonen's presidential term does not significantly differ from the earliest period of the 60-year history of the presidential institution as far as the forms of the use of power or intensity are concerned.

Kastari also forcefully refutes any attempts to change the constitution as far as the office of the president is concerned. In his opinion "the constitution democratically interpreted in the spirit of President Kekkonen permits a flexible accommodation to the demands of greatly changing situations."

On the other hand, Kastari sees foreign policy rising to an even more important position. In his opinion "President Kekkonen's role as a guarantor of the continuation of the vitally important Paasikivi-Kekkonen foreign policy line is one of the more influential factors in understanding the exceptional position of power of the president."

Since the president is thus "a guarantor" of foreign policy -- whether it fits into the constitution or not -- his own stand regarding the question of a successor is a key factor. Should Mauno Koivisto's accession to prime minister and the foreign policy criticism of Johannes Virolainen be seen in this light?

Conservative Party Question

Another important question during Urho Kekkonen's presidential term, national reconciliation, has meant the approval of Finnish Communists as full partners in our political system also at the government level. This has meant a hard-line aspiration to have the same or a similar type government base even after very different election results. This has also meant the granting of nonparliamentary privileges to Communists in government policy.

When one talks about a soft landing with respect to parliamentary democracy, in which election results reflect the composition of a government and its program, one must frequently ask the question of the Conservative Party's suitability for government, especially in connection with Chairman Virolainen's statement. The longer discrimination against the Conservative Party continues in the formation of government, the greater this question will become. We are already near the limits in which faith in parliamentarianism and democracy is dependent on the acceptance of the Conservative Party in the government.

This "Conservative Party question" affects the presidential question in two different ways. On the one hand, the current ruling parties must weigh whether they can exclude the Conservative Party from the election of the next president also just as they have excluded it from other exercises of power.

For the Conservative Party itself this question is seen as an attitude towards the current president and other presidential candidates. The Conservative Party for its part is approaching the limits in which it must pose the social democratic question of 1937: which of the current presidential candidates will be able to bring an end to the party's isolation and accept it as a full partner in government.

From the point of view of actual or imagined presidential candidates the continuing "presidential game" can be annoying and even detrimental, as Ahti Karjalainen stated in the June issue of SUOMEN KIVAILEHTI. It would, however, be reasonable to expect that we would elect someone to the office of president whose stand regarding the above questions is not known.

In a democracy it is possible to openly pose the most essential questions which more often than not are evaluations of personalities -- to the pleasure or displeasure of the persons concerned.

What did President Kekkonen do this spring to take the Conservative Party into the government? With whose mouth is Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen speaking -- President Kekkonen's or Chairman Virolainen's -- in condemning nearly all of the Conservative Party into permanent isolation? What did Mauno Koivisto do and what is he doing to include one million voters, who are now isolated, into our Finnish democracy? In what way did Kalevi Sorsa take the results of our national elections into consideration in forming the government?

According to UUSI SUOMI's study our people are awaiting a forceful, active president who will, indeed, work to reunite all the people.

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ASSESSMENT OF 'POST-UNION OF LEFT' COMMUNISM

Role of Intellectuals

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 July 79 pp 1,4

[Article: "Marchais Forgives His Intellectuals on Condition That They Do Not Remain on the Fringes "]

[Text] Marchais wants to bury the hatchet with his intellectual critics and remove the reservations which the workers, sometimes likening them to the "ruling class," have about them.

Even if the criticisms, notably by Jean Elleinstein and Louis Althusser, made of the way the party was being led and the mistakes it made with regard to the union of the left have not shaken the columns of the temple it none the less remains that such attacks have led numerous active members to raise questions.

The tone has changed. Next September Elleinstein and Althusser will be able to participate in the "discussion forums which will mark the anniversary of L'HUMANITE whereas last year they had not been allowed to speak. Moreover, the Communist Party daily and FRANCE NOUVELLE (organ of the central committee) will publish discussion forums, which they have heretofore refused to do.

But these overtures are subject to reservations: "The intellectuals' role must not be limited to aiding the working class" the communist daily says. "What characterizes the unity of the party is the unity of all its members." Communist intellectuals are workers just like the others "with equal rights and duties." Theirs is the responsibility to explain the party line and to do research, but let them not commit the sin of deviation. And let them not remain on the fringes. This is the price of their being accepted by the other social categories of the Communist Party.

Two years after the break-up of the union of the left how does the Communist Party stand? For their part where do its former partners, notably the Socialist Party, stand." Annie Kriegel starts to answer these questions today.

What place must intellectuals take in the political and ideological battle waged by the Communist Party? That is what the Communist Party is asking its active members to reflect upon during vacation time in order to be prepared for broad discussions upon returning. Involved is the first working phase in drawing up a resolution to be submitted to the central committee in February 1980 and which will establish in some way the status of the communist intellectual.

As he had promised first of all at a meeting of intellectuals in Vitry and then at the 23rd Congress in Saint-Ouen, Georges Marchais wants to show that "there no longer exist several categories of communists." The overtures made during the most recent sessions, the feelers by the hardline group has put an end to a revolt which, since the legislative elections, has pitted intellectuals and leadership against each other. Even better: the philosopher, Louis Althusser, and the historian Jean Elleinstein, to mention only these two leaders of ranks of critics, and who had been banned for several months, have been returned to the fold. With honors. And next September the gates to the anniversary of L'HUMANITE will be opened wide for them to participate in forums. A year ago they were not allowed to speak there....

Since the congress the communist machinery has set out to reconsider the role, the place, and the contribution of intellectuals. At the last central committee meeting this procedure was refined, the bounds of the thoughts to be presented to the active members well defined in order to avoid any deviationism.

Thus it was decided to open discussion forums in the two principal circulating organs of the party, L'HUMANITE and FRANCE NOUVELLE, to establish a new research center by merging the CERM (Center for Marxist Study and Research) and the Maurice Thorez Institute, and to consider a new weekly publication specifically intended for intellectuals. A'l seemed to go well up to that "call to order" in yesterday morning's L'HUMANITE.

The author of the article, Rene Leguen, justifies his intervention by the silence of the information media with respect to "analysis" and "the deep meaning" of that last central committee meeting. If he is to be believed the "bourgeois" press, radio, and television have not informed communists well enough to enable them to see the leadership's step "as a gradual and continuous response to the lessons which the political bureau has learned about the nature of our activity." As a matter of fact, it is above all a matter of setting bounds upon the debates which are widening within the cells and which can sometimes be likened to class conflicts.

His "call to order" for internal consumption is simple: there are not two categories of communists. "We must weigh the efforts to be made in order to conform our activity to this concept of an avant-garde party consisting of workers, employees, peasants, and intellectuals in all their diversity. In fact, the tendency to regard intellectuals within the party as allies most often results from the place they occupy in society, and also, from the

immediate needs of the party's activity. Such a step has a mitigating effect by limiting the role of intellectuals to aiding the working class.... What characterizes the unity of the party is the unity of all its members with equal rights and duties based upon fundamental objectives which they define together and for which they struggle all together."

"Workerism" is not in fact dead within the Communist Party, where the militants fail to understand that white collar employees, "of a class which collaborates with employers" can assume responsibilities within the "workers' party."

The opening to all the social strata decided at the 23rd Congress, the eviction of the hardliners and of Roland Leroy, and the accession to the central committee of management employees and intellectuals (there are now almost as many of them as of workers) have made these militants bitter. From that arises the statements and warnings of L'HUMANITE that the debate over the place of intellectuals not be, for some, the occasion for definitive rejection of a social category which they associate with employers.

PCF: Self-Preservation, Identity

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Jul 79 pp 1,4

[Article by Annie Kriegel: "Two Years After the Left Has Bugged Down--The Communist Party Within Itself"]

[Text] There is no more spontaneous generation in politics than in nature. The cycle which began in the autumn of 1977 with the break-up of the union of the left has continued upon its path precisely as programmed in the scenario established by the initial rupture. The only modifications which ad hoc initiatives have made in it have, on the communist side, rather attenuated, and on the socialist side, rather strengthened the virtualities.

The French Communist Party (PCF) has in fact, as expected, become much more devoted to itself. But it must be recognized that the party has done what it could to take in hand what events have offered outside of itself (Lorraine, and European elections) and it has there played its part with respectable results.

Likewise in what has mobilized it to begin with--the pains it has taken within the scope of preparation and staging the 23rd Congress and of the aftermath--it has succeeded in not throwing overboard (waste of which would have been ridiculous) the modernization acquired under the label of Eurocommunism.

This is still further confirmed by the fact that this year Marchais spent his vacation in Yugoslavia, thus demonstrating that one may very suggestively divide the history of the PCF into periods by means of a single variable: the places where its successive secretaries-general have since 1920 successively spent their annual vacations.

The PCF has above all succeeded in preserving the concept it has of itself and which is expressed through its own composition and policy: the concept of a party where the nucleus of workers is ready to be increased by elements coming from all the middle classes, particularly intellectuals.

It is time that this two-fold success has been made more brilliant because of errors in judgment to which its decisions and its difficulties had previously given rise.

It is thus that the increased scope assumed by the withdrawal from the secretariat of Roland Leroy (who has retained his functions in the supreme policy decision making body--the Political Bureau--as well as in the direction of the central organs-- L'HUMANITE and L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE) has enabled Georges Marchais to accentuate his "Eurocommunist" profile. Likewise--and here one is confronted with difficulty in obtaining daily information, which is not expected to be neatly precise in detail but properly balanced on the whole--the recounting from day to day, in the non-communist leftist press, of the prolix moods of a certain number of intellectuals, all fully in accordance with the facts as it may be, has led to enormous over-estimation of the uneasiness actually affecting such intellectuals, and above all, of their capability of making others share it.

The classical process of self-purgation brought about by every change in strategy has been mistaken for an exceptional process of shaking the political unity and organization of the PCF. The most astute of the critics are not deceived: they have, in good time and without shame, returned to the fold, Marchais holding the door open for them with a large and fond gesture.

After these pseudo-liberal manifestations the PCF could, at its leisure, devote itself to its true hard line: to retain, in order to install them upon the central committee and in positions of responsibility, only those intellectuals from the old generation of the most Stalinist years of the cold war (Francette Lazard, Jacques Milhau, Mayaurec, and so on), to give highest priority, at the international level, to the interests of the socialist camp obedient to the Soviet Union, certainly at the cost of terrible distortions (Vietnamese refugees) but to the benefit of an isolation which fascinates the aspirants to a revolutionary absolute; and last, at the national level, to assign the highest priority to demolishing the Socialist Party, a condition for passing on, later, to the second stage of the strategic cycle underway.

Just as Lenin loudly proclaimed that capitalists could be counted upon to aid in the destruction of capitalism, the French Communist Party can count upon socialists to aid in demolishing the Socialist Party.

Contradictions Within Socialist Party

Paris LE FIGARO in French 25 Jul 79 pp 1,4

[Article by Annie Kriegel: "Two Years After the Left Has Bogged Down--Contradictions Within the Socialist Party"]

[Text] The propensity of the Socialist Party (PS) toward self-destruction behavior, related to the disruptive intensity of its internal currents, has enabled those well acquainted with socialist affairs to advance, in spite of appearances, as early as March 1978, a prognosis of great reservations as to the ability of the PS to make the communists pay the price for the break-up of the union of the left and as to its ability above all to continue, for its own benefit, to widen and increase its audiences in spite of the fact it is again without any new prospect of acceding to power.*

But, all the same, this time the socialists have outdone themselves. With amazing masterliness they have, in a few months, succeeding in verifying the correctness of the most pessimistic prognoses.

This is not, however, for lack of warning from their electorate that they were riding for a fall. There are available at least three public opinion polls,** all confirming to what extent the socialist rank and file no longer see their own wishes in the projects and positions of the present majority at the head of the party.

In fact there is something astounding in the fact that Francois Mitterrand, after courageously rejecting (at the same time renouncing accession to power) the kind of union of the left which the communists sought to impose upon him, has chosen to associate himself, at Metz, with its only faction within the Socialist Party which is, in principle and in doctrine, in favor of that communist version of union.

One can in a way understand the kind of devastating pain, in the face of so much inconsistency, felt by the friends of Mauroy and Rocard, even if they had been wrong not to avoid the inducements which made them appear ready to launch a war of succession, which moreover, they could not win in the near future.

Mired in this old-guard socialism consisting of a basis of a low concentration of Marxism-Leninism into which the think-tank masters of a CERES [Center for (Socialist) Studies, Research, and Education] have stirred a conserve of superannuated devotions the Socialist Party is weakened in body and soul

*See LE FIGARO, 24 July: "The Communist Party Within Itself...."

**See Louis Harris France Poll, MAINTENANT, No 2; Safras Poll, NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 9 April 1979; Louis Harris France Poll, LE MATIN-DIMANCHE, 20 May 1979.

by failure to grasp reality. It was seen on the occasion of this European electoral campaign where it nevertheless held exceptional trump cards. It is seen in its refusal to play any role at all at Strasbourg for fear of being on the wrong side of the battle against the "multinationals."

One of its own, Deloro, had to refuse the chairmanship of the European socialist group at the very moment when a member of the majority, in the person of Simone Veil, became president of the Assembly.

The crowning irony: the Italian Communist Party would go part of the way with the German Social Democrats but the French Socialist Party has eyes only for the PCF which wants nothing to do with either one or the other.

Under such conditions what can those who have been thrust aside from the PS leadership do? Let the Mitterrand-Chevinement experiment develop at the risk that at its conclusion the PS will have lost the good part of its vigor, which is already being seen in the failure to recruit new members and the voluntary dormant state of many active members? To fight against it, at the risk of being held equally responsible for the stigma of degeneration, or worse, to accelerate a process of division which has already started because of the preponderance of the views of living held in general over those which are common to the whole party.

Further, to projected opposition to the old guard must be more explicit, and in the absence of neosocialism it must at least be something other than a socialism, which, out of panicky fear of blending into Social Democracy, takes delight in the childish act of an anarchistic socialism of a mongrel mixture of ecology, "councilism," and "charismaticism."

Can the majority rejoice at such a situation on the left? Yes and no. Yes: it is not entirely unpleasant, whatever one may say, to have to govern without either short term or long term political calculations. No: it is a pity in facing up to an economic crisis of such unusual complexity not to be able to count upon the goods, the beacons, and the measures which political struggles provide. No, further: lacking the ability to express itself in institutionalized forms, the opposition would not for all that, disappear; there is the danger of its being disposed to violent forms of expression.

CGT-CFDT Labor Unions

Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 Jul 79 pp 1,4

Article by Annie Kriegel: "Two Years After the Left Has Bugged Down--CGT-CFDT: Stagnation of Ideas"]

[Text] To the unionized left, which has not suffered a direct hit from the strategic failure which the political left has suffered in better shape? It is doubtful, as is shown by the two usual indicators bearing upon the power of the social movement and the number of members of national unions.

The social movement insofar as it can be statistically perceived through the number of disputes (evaluated in days lost by virtue of strikes) has not been sustained. From 500,120 days* lost in 1976 the number declined to 366,600 in 1977 and 220,000 in 1978. The decline in 1978 was the result of a small decrease in the number of days lost because of local disputes but, in contrast, of a large decrease in the number of days lost because of general strike orders issuing from the confederation which, after March 1978, the CFDT renounced. The figures for the first 3 months of 1979 are going in the same direction: only one large local dispute, that in the iron and steel industry; only a single "day of job action"--the march on Paris of 23 March.

The number of members is also declining. In the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor], following the good years of 1975 and 1976 (plus 5 percent and plus 1 percent, respectively) 1977 was a flat year and 1978 registered a decline (minus 2.5 percent). For the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] the sagging has been continuous since 1975 but was greatly accentuated in 1978 (estimated at between minus 10 and minus 20 percent).

The languishment of the unionized left may certainly be attributed in part to the employment situation: the fear of unemployment has always dramatically checked the workers' combativity. But the unions' difficulties indeed go beyond that: they result from a two-fold delay; a delay in comprehending the corollaries, for the unions, of entering for a long time a period of little or no economic growth; and a delay in defining a new union strategy after the strategy based upon the political left's accession to power caved in.

The first delay, still accentuated by the pastoral moralizing of the post-1968 years on "Zero growth" have been translated into a kind of inability to formulate proposals as advantageous to those whose jobs are threatened as to those who are at ease on that point. The watchword of a 36-hour workweek, which when barely launched achieved great success in all leftist publications and decision-making bodies, on the other hand hardly penetrated the masses of salaried employees. The memory of how the 40-hour week, unanimously hailed as a major social victory, had in 1936 upset the recovery of the French economy today seems clearer than it has been for a long time.

But above all the feeling that, in its present weakened state, the worker movement would not be able to impose "full financial compensation"--36 hours worked and paid for 40--has cooled enthusiasm. Likewise the theme of employee-management, seductive when management was comparatively easy, has lost much of its attraction when there is involved the matter of administering lay-offs.

At Manufrance the communists wanted to consider only a "capitalistic" solution (and not even of capitalism solely "rationalized") and today the CFDT itself is encouraging its members at Beauvais not to accept a venture into employee-management. In short, the diversity of situations by region, branch, and business as a function of nature and extent of the "redeployment" involved

*[obviously the author means "man-days"]

because of the crisis operates in such a way that negotiations over the redistribution of those who are possibly economically surplus can only be conducted at the enterprise level. This explains why employers have been able, with the support of supervisory employees, to have a positive policy with respect to structure of the workday even before the unions came around to it.

The second delay was not overcome--far from it--by the confederation congresses--the 40th of the CGT at Grenoble in November 1978, and the 6th of the CFDT at Brest in May 1979. The main concern of the CGT Congress was to extricate itself from the behavior, more political than union related, displayed by the central directorate before March 1978, particularly in embracing as its own not only the joint program but also its communist interpretation. Whence comes the emphasis on "the overtures." As a matter of fact change did not go very far since the proportion of communists elected to the executive commission has further increased (63 out of 93, or 67 in 1978 compared with 61 in 1975). The only step taken seems to be related to an effort to revive unionization of engineers, managerial personnel, and technicians within the scope of the CGT--as was manifested last June at the 7th Congress of the UGICT [General Union of Engineers, Administrative Personnel, and Technicians] at Lyon--with the idea of capitalizing on restlessness which appeared somewhat earlier at the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel] Congress.

As for the CFDT Congress, which, it had been announced, would be the most important since the one that in 1970 embraced the "employee-management democratic socialism" project, it was so indecisive that one cannot detect what it has settled. Edmond Maire advanced the idea of "recentering" (or, as is said in order to avoid having the CFDT accused of some collusion, whatever that may be, with some center or centrism, whatever that may be--a "reframing") from which it can be understood that he is aiming at extricating the CFDT from its prior subordination to the political left, and within the political left, from the revolutionary wing.

But Edmond Maire obtained endorsement of his report of activities by such a slim majority (57 percent, compared with 66 percent in 1976) that, faced with internal opposition haunted by the fear of reform, he had to increase the number of circumvolutions around the concept of "rupture" (with the "logic of capitalism" or with "the capitalist system" itself?--of "social" nature or of "political and social" nature?). And his formula "join May 1968 and March 1978," that is, two defeats, is hardly appropriate for sparking dynamic discussion.

At the same, relations between the CGT and CFDT are suffering from the same stagnation as that into which relations between the Communist and Socialist Parties have fallen. With a difference: unity in union activity has not become, like the union of the left, mere begging the question; it renews an obligatory practice, even though there are conflicts. On the other hand, there is a resemblance: it is at the European level where union discussion is now going to be concentrated--in connection with the request by the CGT

to join the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) where the Italian CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] has already joined the 31 member organizations representing 40 million workers in 18 countries of Western Europe.

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CSO: 3100

BACKGROUND, BELIEFS OF PFN DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 29-30 Jul 79 p 5

[Article by Alain Rollat: "The PFN and the 'New Right'"]

[Text] Only one political party until now has openly stated its affiliation with the "new right" trend of thought, although it does not fully embrace the ideas supported by the GRECE [Research and Study Group on European Civilization] and the NOUVELLE ECOLE review, and popularized by the FIGARO MAGAZINE. That organization is the extreme rightist PFN [New Forces Party], the French branch of the European rightist movement. PFN leaders also assert their claim to authorship of the designation "new right" dating from the constitution of their party in November 1974.

In an article published in March 1975 by its newspaper INITIATIVE NATIONALE, Mr. Pascal Gauchon, who was at that time the party's secretary general, denounced the "sheeplike" attitude of the "old right" and called for the organization of a "new right." During the same month, the PFN organized a "forum with the new right" in the Olivier-de-Serres tower in Paris, in which many members of GRECE, as well as many sympathetic writers including Louis Pauwels, took part. Today, Mr. Gauchon, tenured professor of history and member of the party's political bureau, says: "We are of the same political family and we hold the same intellectual views."

A cursory reading of the ideological pamphlet published by the PFN in 1974 and reprinted without change in 1978 (collective work titled "Postulates for a New Nation") suffices to note very close agreement between this party's views and those presently being debated as belonging to the "new right." One finds the same concern for modernism and the same ideological themes, based on the same scientific argumentation, and the same scientific and philosophical citations (Konrad Lorenz, Robert Ardrey, Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, etc.). The PFN stresses in the preface to its pamphlet the need to "redefine" the "right": "Never as today have the most recent scientific facts, as much in the field of chemistry as in those of biology, psychology, medicine, urbanism (...), demonstrated the importance of the concepts of order, action, and hierarchy in the organizational process of life--the concepts which we specifically claim as the bases of our society. To redefine ourselves is therefore to realize that the sciences of inert or living matter--ecology, biology--those of man

seen as an individual--psychology--and in his social environment--sociology, economics, polemology, ethnology, archeology, etc--actually constitute a coherent whole, and that they provide an explanation of the world and of life which demolishes the obscurantist babblings of our adversaries."

The work then presents "ideological bases" which are familiar to the GRECE, to the "New School" and to the other circles claiming to be the "new right":

The Same Themes

The same anti-egalitarian theme: "It is very clear to us that men are neither free nor equal. Nor has it ever been possible to earnestly defend the thesis that they are. From a physical viewpoint, it is absurd (...). From a logical viewpoint (...), freedom and equality are irreconcilable (...). The least concern for practicality precludes acceptance as fact the principles of freedom and equality (...). The recompensation of individuals based on a theoretical arithmetic equality (...) must be replaced by one based on a geometric equality: each in accordance with his action, in accordance with his work (...)."

The same elitist theme: "Two principles--keystones in our philosophy--emerge from the above: hierarchy and responsibility (...). Hierarchy, the true equality, classifies individuals according to their capabilities for the task to be accomplished (...). Our new society restores our principles of order, selection and hierarchy to their places of honor (...). The concept of hierarchy stems directly from the fact of inequality. Lorenz proved it to be indispensable to the organization of every society. Every group has its alphas which correspond to the elite in human society."

The same scientific themes: "The modern school of ethology (the science of social behavior) pulverizes the premises of the Rousseauistic Utopia from which the liberal as well as the Marxist ideologies emerged (...)." With reference to Australopithecidae: "Our ancestor is (...) a carnivore, a beast of prey. This fact confers unexpected up-to-dateness on Spengler's concept, which identifies among humans a "beast of prey" mentality that finds expression through the hero archetype, as distinguishable from a "herbivore mentality" of the masses (...)."

The same ethological themes: "Heroic values are (...) fundamental facts of our psychology. They are the cultural formulation of vital necessities (...). To respond to the new challenge with which evolution confronts us we must transform ourselves. Nothing less. And we cannot transform ourselves without pain, inasmuch as we are both the material and sculptor. It is at our own substance that we must chip away with hammer and chisel to fashion a new human being."

It is therefore not surprising that the PFN finds "positive" the research undertaken in these various fields by the GRECE and their popularization by NOUVELLE ECOLE and FIGARO MAGAZINE, through the same theoreticians. "The great merit of the GRECE is that of having propagated new theories, and especially the Anglo-Saxon scientific contribution to them, in France," says Mr Gerard Saize, journalist and member of the party's national board of directors.

"Formerly, the expression 'leftist intellectual' was a pleonasm. The current debate shows that there exist today also rightist intellectuals who are not ashamed to say they are rightists. We have in common with the GRECE and NOUVELLE ECOLE the same beliefs and the same enemies: the left and the 'old right.'"

The PFN leaders also take up as their own the protests voiced by the cultural backers of the "new right" against accusations of neo-Nazism and racism: "The GRECE is being misrepresented," declares Mr Gauchon. "like us, the GRECE is anti-authoritarian, and the concept of differences must not be likened to racism."

Some Divergences

Ideologically speaking, the identity of views between one and the other is almost complete, but not totally so. Certain divergences exist, which are sharp enough to preclude the PFN from claiming to be the political arm, the secular arm, of the cultural "new right," a role, moreover, which it does not ascribe to any organization.

The first of these divergences presents dogmatic characteristics: The PFN advocates the primacy of political action--its own reason for being--over cultural action, whereas for the GRECE and NOUVELLE ECOLE the cultural determines the political; metapolitics holds sway over politics.

Though their intellectual viewpoints are identical, their approaches differ: "We see the issues from identical viewpoints, but we operate on different terrains," says Mr Gauchon. "They explore the domain of the desirable; we, that of the possible. They take part in the debates on ideology; we operate close to the ground, to everyday life."

The PFN's political pragmatism, which sometimes translates into a certain opportunism--for example, the alliance with Mr Chirac in the 1977 municipal elections, the appeal to Mr Malaud following the 10 June European elections--explain in large part a second divergence in the domain of religious ideas. Whereas the views expressed by the GRECE and NOUVELLE ECOLE tend to relativize the Judeo-Christian contribution to the spiritual heritage of Western civilization, while reviving the pagan roots of the Celtic and Germanic cultures, the PFN is content to stress "the contribution of the church as an institution" while remaining vague as to the rest. This prudence on the latter's part is dictated by the desire to enlarge its following among extreme rightists and to therefore not alienate the Christian electorate. The PFN, for the same reason, holds less clear-cut positions in regard to abortion than those held by NOUVELLE ECOLE. In 1974, it especially condemned the draft law supported by Mrs Simone Veil.

Lastly, a third divergence: In the economic domain the PFN, an advocate of planning, supports dirigistic methods closer to the concepts of the LPR [Rally for the Republic] than to those of the "new economists."

Is it not the ultimate aim of both, however, to create the same type of society? The disagreements on manner--the mode of action--cannot undo the agreements on the basic issue, that is, the objective to be attained. Is not the bond that unites the PFN militants to the GRECE theoreticians--the ideological base--stronger than the strategic options that tend to separate them? The PFN for its part does not deny that this is so.

To underline the psychological and historic reasons for this overriding identity of views, Mr Gauchon says, "We are part of the same generation." It is that postwar extreme-rightist generation which, during the 1960's, entered politics in the form of two tendencies whose orientations were already then distinct and complementary: on the one hand, the frenzied activism of OCCIDENT, whose first militants were numerous PFN members, and, on the other, the organized, more conventional, political action effort conducted around the EUROPE-ACTION review whose contributors included the principal founders of the GRECE and NOUVELLE ECOLE, and particularly Alain de Benoist, who wrote under the pseudonym of Fabrice Laroche.

After 1968 these two tendencies evolved inversely. Having concluded that it was impossible to conduct an effective activity on the political terrain monopolized by the major organizations, the EUROPE-ACTION group converted to metapolitics, while among the members of OCCIDENT, later ORDRE NOUVELLE, more and more militants opted for the constitution of a true "modern, respectable and effective" party as the sole remaining alternative, in their view, for an extreme right that had been reduced to marginalization.

The first of these groups found itself in GRECE and NOUVELLE ECOLE before it had had a chance to express itself through the pages of FIGARO MAGAZINE. The second took part in the creation of the PFN and took control of it. Those who had joined GRECE were compelled by the latter to choose between militancy and cultural action. Some chose GRECE, other chose the PFN. Among the latter, for example, was Mr Yves Van Ghele, member of the party's national board of directors, who took a major part in the drawing up of the ideological pamphlet.

Thus it is that no organic tie exists between the two organizations and that no member of the PFN's political bureau belongs to the association of Alain de Benoist and his friends. The fact remains, however, that relations among the different members of the "family" are excellent and that exchanges of views are frequent within the research units and the circles sponsored by the GRECE, in Paris as well as the provinces, where militants, theoreticians and researchers meet without distinction.

The two "new right" movements also have in their respective approaches another point in common: both have known how to acquire springboards for the popularization of their views. Alain de Benoist and his friends have found in Louis Pauwels the ideal moderate and in FIGARO MAGAZINE a good supporter. Mr Pascal Gauchon, Mr Alain Robert and the other PFN leaders have found in Mr Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour a powerful spokesman.

The object of both is to occupy the terrain. The PFN hopes to reap a twofold profit from the current debate in its rivalry with the National Front, which is led by Mr Jean-Marie Le Pen, for leadership of the non-monarchist extreme right: firstly, to use the ideological efforts of the "new right" theoreticians to bolster its own anticommunist and antiliberal stands, and secondly, to appear to the rightist electorate as the most suitable basic structure on which to build a "modern nationalism"--a matter of political marketing, in a way.

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CSO: 3100

PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER BAILLOT INTERVIEWED

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Apr-Jun 79 pp 18-19

[Interview of Louis Baillot, Central Committee member in charge of the Defense Commission for the French Communist Party]

[Text] [Question] The French Communist Party has recently proposed a bill called "Democratic Status for Soldiers and Navy Men," which includes, notably, institution in the regiments and aboard ships of permanent consultative commissions with multiple roles. Don't you fear that people will accuse you of attempting to create Soviets among the ranks?

[Answer] As stated in the bill's title, proposed by the communist group, it is concerned with the "democratic status of soldiers and navy men." Consequently, it is reasonable to conceive of a series of arrangements, democratic in character, allowing soldiers and navy men to perform their military service as major citizens with a guarantee of human rights. Decent living conditions, contacts with past professional life, equality in the right to assume responsibilities, freedom of opinion, information and expression are guaranteed. Structures allowing soldiers and navy men to participate in the life of their units are only an extension of what already exists, with the sole addition of an election by peers of representatives for the purpose of dealing with authorities, instead of having such representatives designated by the authorities.

Who can take offense at such an measures but those who have an outmoded, autocratic and rigid conception of the armed forces.

The democratic reform of the military service that we proposed would allow the French Armed Forces to be efficient and to play its role completely, while insuring better discipline based on the reasoned consent of all interested parties.

[Question] Early this year, Georges Marchais, general secretary of the Communist Party, denounced the "policy of French integration with European defense and arms production." Can you state the French Communist Party's position on this subject, giving concrete examples?

[Answer] Precise facts are not lacking confirming that it is in fact through arm production that the policy of European integration in the military field is realized.

This is notably the case with the existence of several committees or groups concerned with armaments, of which France is a member. The CNAO [Conference of National Directors for Armaments] and the GIEP [Independent European Group for Programs] play an increasingly important role. As stated in OTAN-DOCUMENTATION published in 1976 in Brussels:

"The CNAO works in close collaboration with NATO's military authorities in order to identify the most urgent needs, while the economic aspects of collaboration are being studied." The GIEP or the Club of Rome allows France to cooperate with NATO countries, including the US, without the help of the Eurogroup whose ties to NATO are too obvious. Finally, it is useless to recall that the manufacture of French-German tanks, to replace the AMX 30, creates many worries, notably among arsenal personnel.

[Question] Since the beginning of the year France was connected to the NATOWIDE network of political communications among NATO countries. It is also believed that France agreed to participate, along with the nine NATO members, in an agreement allowing access to the U.S. "Navstar" system for satellite navigation. Is this in your opinion a definite sign of France's return to the integrated military organization?

[Answer] The connection of France to NATOWIDE and its access to the Navstar system are two more factors characterizing the tightening of ties between France and NATO.

The government tries to minimize NATOWIDE by presenting it as a plain subscription to an information source, the management of which would be handled exclusively by France.

But information concerning political and strategic world problems have a content oriented by their source itself--NATO. They belong to a strategy purely for the sake of the US. From this fact stems the danger of allowing France's positions to be determined. Conditioning of French authorities by manipulated information can have the worst consequences for French politics.

General de Gaulle did not take France out of NATO in 1966 so that France could return to NATO through NATOWIDE, among other routes.

[Question] Recently you said that with 3 percent of the GNP it would be possible to organize a sensible defense. Are you proposing a new distribution of funds among personnel and materials in order to obtain a better output from the armed forces' budget?

[Answer] The reference to approximately 3 percent of the GNP chosen as a base for calculating the national defense budget is commonly accepted. For instance, Boulin, then budget minister, said at a IHDEN expansion unknown conference that since the end of Napoleon's wars, except during wartimes and exceptional crises, the defense budget has always been around 3 percent of the GNP.

Let us add that in the communist political and economic conception, the military budget output would be much better, because excess profits, waste and cumulative jobs would be terminated, notably through a narrow connection between civilian and military production. Nationalization of the entire armament industry and full utilization of industrial capacity from arsenals and state manufacturies would be essential elements of the policy in the military field.

The distribution of expenses between personnel and armaments is a very delicate subject. Only the Ministry of Defense has all elements for an exact appreciation. The members of Parliament do not have real means of control and consequently of judgment. It is even more difficult for members of the opposition.

[Question] Do you believe that conclusion soon of the SALT II negotiations could present, as feared by some, a threat to Europe?

[Answer] No, on the contrary. We estimate that the conclusion of SALT II negotiations will mark a real progress in the difficult path of disarmament and will also be beneficial to Europe.

[Question] The USSR appears to wish Great Britain's and France's presence at the opening of SALT III. The president of France affirmed that France would not participate because its dissuasion forces were not "negotiable." What is the position of the Communist Party on this subject?

[Answer] The USSR wants France to participate in SALT III because, after the Ottawa Agreement of 1974, Giscard d'Estaing included the French nuclear forces with the Atlantic nuclear equipment, which at the time represented a very important and serious new element in France's official strategy.

Under these circumstances, the absence of France at SALT III will automatically lead the US to deal with French nuclear armament because of the Ottawa Agreement.

Consequently, it is preferable that France attend negotiations in order to defend its position, which is to contribute to disarmament without jeopardizing the defenses that are absolutely necessary to its independence and sovereignty.

[Question] Do you think that technological innovations such as the cruise missile or the neutron bomb which General Mery believes "could be integrated with our deterrent concept," are actually capable of significantly increasing the credibility of our defenses?

[Answer] We have expressed without ambiguity our desire to maintain weapons or, to be more precise, to maintain the operational aptitude of nuclear weapons (which includes their maintenance as well as continued scientific and technical progress) at the quantitative level established by the country's needs for independence and security.

But we are opposed to France's participation in any kind of nuclear armament race, in which the neutron bomb is a definite element.

Moreover, the neutron bomb is not a weapon intended to act as a nuclear deterrent. It is a battlefield weapon being presented as a defensive weapon, when its offensive character cannot be denied by any specialist.

[Question] Nuclear weapons are becoming more and more precise and now allow "surgical" hits. The US and the USSR seem to be moving toward a strategy that largely suppresses the terror aspect of nuclear weapons and makes war "possible" once more. Considering this development, is the French Communist Party still in favor of the French strategy for absolute deterrence?

[Answer] Developments that necessarily have repercussions for strategy are occurring in the usage of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to evaluate constantly their nature and consequences. This is the goal of a responsible party such as the French Communist Party.

[Question] In your opinion, what could be the consequences of the universal ballot election for the European Assembly in Strasbourg?

[Answer] It is certain that pressure will be great to have the Strasbourg European Assembly powers expanded, so as to advance along the road of supranationality and European political integration.

These pressures will be international. But they will also come from France. The UDF list include federalists and integrationists, just as on the Socialist Party's list.

Consequently, a strong contingent of European communist deputies will help to denounce any drift toward supranationalism and to inform French public opinion in order to make it react against this movement and to bring the French Parliament to oppose all relinquishing of sovereignty.

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CSO: 3100

THREE QUESTIONS ASKED ON DEFENSE BUDGET

Paris STRATEGIE ET DEFENSE in French Apr-Jun 79 p 11

[Text] Let us first recall some essential figures.

The Defense Ministry budget will represent 77.1 billion FF this year; 43.7 billion will go for ordinary expenses, 33.3 billion for capital expenses, program authorizations in the latter category will rise to 42.8 billion.

The overall increase in military spending will be 13.9 percent; increases for ordinary expenses will be 11.7 percent; increases for credits on payment for capital expenses will be 17 percent; and increases for program authorizations will be 24.6 percent.

The distribution of the budget is as follows: 21.3 billion for the army, 19.4 billion for the communal section, 15.7 billion for the air force, 13 billion for the navy, and 9.7 billion for the gendarmerie. Let us pause here.

Reports from the Finance Committee provide a more detailed study of the budget presented to the Parliament for approval. They provide answers to three questions which seem essential:

Is the Defense Ministry budget in accordance with the law concerning military programs, passed in June 1976?

Is it in accordance with the world situation?

Is it in accordance with our economy?

The 1976 law concerning military programs was conceived, discussed and passed after a request from the Parliament (and, notably, from the UDR group, which was worried at not having defined mid-term defense objectives).

It included two principles; a progressive increase of budgetary means and the complementary development of nuclear and conventional armaments. It also included various financial and physical objectives, which were contained in a report appended to the law.

The 1979 budget generally respects both principles. This justifies my sense of approbation.

It is a fact that military spending has increased each year, since it represented 3.43 percent of the total market GNP in 1976; 3.57 percent in 1977; 3.64 percent in 1978, and will represent 3.67 percent this year.

The decision to build the sixth SNLE [Missile launching Nuclear Submarine] with government loans, in favor of nuclear power, shows that nuclear armaments are not now suffering from efforts to have conventional armaments "catch-up," an underlying theme of the 1976 law.

This process of "catching-up" is apparently real, since conventional armament programs seem generally to be respected.

However, it is necessary to remain vigilant. The law said that the Defense Ministry budget would rise from 17 percent to 20 percent of the state budget by 1982. The opposite is in fact occurring. The Defense Ministry budget represented 17.4 percent of the total budget in 1977 and 16.9 percent in 1978. It will be 16.7 percent in 1979.

8924
CSO: 3100

FRANCE EMPHASIZING OWN ATOMIC ENERGY NEEDS

Bonn DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 3 Aug 79 p 7

[Article by Klaus Huwe: "The Row About Atomic Energy"]

[Text] Paris, July--In an interpellation addressed to the French government in January, Michel Debre spoke about an "outrageous presumptuousness" on the part of the European Court of Justice, about an "intolerable exceeding of its powers," and about a "blow deliberately aimed directly against the independence of France." What had happened?

The European Court of Justice, upon being appealed to by the Belgian government to clarify the question of the legal binding force of a decision made by the Vienna Atomic Energy Agency, had confirmed that the Euratom Agreement was as valid as ever, with all its restrictions on the national jurisdictions of the European nations in the nuclear sector. It is uncertain whether or not the Belgians--who have always been partisans of supranationality--actually wanted to deal a blow to the French with this appeal to the European Court of Justice. What matters is only the effect which the ruling of the European jurists produced. In France, this effect consisted in a loud uproar among the Gaullists and in a growing pressure on the government--which in any case is accused of being lax with respect to national affairs.

This bit of previous history must be known in order to understand the attempt which France has now ventured upon in Brussels to adapt the Euratom Agreement to reality. Because what is at issue is not a revising in the narrower sense of the texts which were ratified in 1957--instead, the memorandum submitted to France's eight fellow members is supposed to serve the purpose of bringing the words of the agreement into line with a practice which has been followed for 20 years now.

Theoretically, the Euratom Agreement grants a monopoly to a European supply agency on the concluding of delivery contracts for uranium and fissionable material. Also, the uranium deposits of the member nations of the European Community [EC] are subject to a right of purchase option on the part of this authority. Yet since 1957 these stipulations have

never in practice been applied. Since the days of de Gaulle, they have seemed to the French to be incompatible with their national independence and above all with the requirements of French nuclear armaments.

Not Quite Legal

All the EC members would probably have made the best of the prevailing practice if the Belgians had not provoked last year the ruling of the European Court of Justice, which was bound to uphold the formal words of the texts. All those who see supranational conspirators within the neighboring nations at work here and who feel their anxieties are being confirmed by the initial experiences with the new European Parliament saw red on learning of the ruling of the Court of Justice. The French government showed a reaction less allergic than that of the traditional Gaullist Michel Debre. But it too has let it be known that it has no intention of letting its independence be curtailed in the nuclear sector.

At the European Council in March, President Giscard d'Estaing sounded out the opinions of his European fellow members, and although he could not detect any enthusiasm for a formal revision of the Euratom Agreement he nevertheless hoped for an understanding of the needs of France, which as a military nuclear power is in a different situation from the other EC nations, apart from Great Britain.

To the French, what is essential is to find a compromise formula which upholds the practice actually followed up to now and which ensures to France, independently of Brussels, access to fissionable material--something which is indispensable to its position as a nuclear power and to its ambitious program of building nuclear power plants. France is not insisting on that drawn-out procedure which is necessary for a modification of the agreement. Paris would even content itself with a binding interpretation, especially since the Federal Republic of Germany--as Helmut Schmidt has made clear to the French president--is little inclined to set a precedent for the changing of the Treaties of Rome.

In fact, France is able to point to the fact that the instruments provided for in the Euratom Agreement have never functioned. Along with France, other countries as well have sought to supply on their own initiative their nuclear facilities with fissionable material. Strictly speaking, both the Eurodif uranium enrichment plant at Tricastin in France and also the competing project which is being realized by other Europeans in England have come into being extra-legally, to say nothing of the reprocessing plant at The Hague. No one can deny that the institutional framework which was mapped out more than two decades ago for European nuclear policy is no longer abreast with the times.

The bait which the French have tossed out in order to make the adjusting of the texts to the real situation more palatable to their fellow EC members consists in the proposal to replace the theory of dirigistic controls by a jointly agreed-on liberal practice. The option will remain open to those countries which want it to avail themselves of the Community's institutions for their uranium supplies. But the independent road to procuring their supplies is to be open as before to the others. The right to intervene enjoyed by the Euratom authorities is to be superseded by a market-supervising function which will also serve to transmit information to all parties.

Plutonium for Bombs

It is not difficult to see that France nevertheless naturally has an eye on the military aspect of the problem. In France, the military and civilian uses of nuclear power are closely intertwined. The plutonium necessary for the making of the first French atomic bombs was produced in the atomic power plants of the "electricite de france." Following the ruling of the European Court of Justice, France would by no means like to risk being exposed to pressures some day which could threaten its independence as a military nuclear power.

The French government is hoping for the cooperation of its fellow EC members, for two reasons: First of all, it is convinced that its neighbors recognize the value to the security of West Europe of this independent French nuclear might. Secondly, it believes that its partners are interested in a liberal framework for the nuclear components of that joint energy policy which, at least in theory, is being sought by everyone.

12114

CSO: 3103

FRENCH AIMS REGARDING EURATOM AGREEMENT DISCUSSED

Cologne RHEINISCHER MERKUR in German 3 Aug 79 p 23

[Article by Hermann Bohle: "Sought: A Nuclear Policy For the European Community"]

[Text] The Gaullist opponents of the--positive--policy on Europe of the French President Giscard d'Estaing have wanted to get out of the agreement on the "European Atomic Energy Community" (Euratom) ever since the mid-1960's, because this agreement was supposedly tying the hands of France's military nuclear forces. The first man at the Elysee of Paris, as a "leading matador" of the European Community of the Nine in setting up an independent, extensive power supply system based on nuclear fission, is now taking the bull by the horns in this area also.

In the Brussels European Community [EC] Council of Foreign Ministers, France demanded at its last session before it recessed that the Euratom Agreement be adjusted in such a way as to ensure to the entire EC a supply of nuclear fuels at favorable terms--on the basis of principles of the greatest possible liberality. That is surprising, coming from this traditionally dirigistic neighbor.

Law Directive-Issuing Rights

In the memorandum of the French foreign ministry, the talk is frequently about the "joint procurement policy" for nuclear fuels. In the abstract, this policy has existed for a long time: The Euratom Agreement, together with the treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC) which entered into force in 1958, prescribes in Chapter VI a "supply agency" (which has now been in existence for 21 years). This agency has the exclusive right to purchase for all nine EC countries natural uranium or enriched uranium ("special fissionable material") from outside the Community. All nuclear fuels developed within the EC must be made available to the agency. This "agency" is financially autonomous. In case the amount of available nuclear fuels is not sufficient, the agency can apportion them to the EC consumers, which according to the agreement must all be treated equally.

What we have here is a pure monopoly. It is under the direct control of the Brussels EC Commission--not of the nine governments, who in this area possess few rights with respect to issuing directives. Only the European Parliament--which can overturn the EC Commission--would have powers to take action if abuses existed.

The French are saying that 21 years ago the purpose of this "agency" had been clear: The peaceful use of nuclear fission was still only in the initial stage. Thus the point was to give the same starting chances to all of the EC nations--six in number at that time. But, they say, now the utilization of nuclear power is in the middle of the phase of galloping industrial exploitation--at all events in France, where by 1985 around half of its electric power generation is to come from nuclear fission.

Therefore the ~~opportunities~~ of fuels for Europe's EC nuclear industry should come to an end, in the opinion of Paris. The principle laid down in the Euratom Agreement of "equal access" for all industrial consumers to the available fuel supply must, it is said, be replaced by the principle of "non-discrimination"--so that for one thing every enterprise could profit from full freedom of action commercially if it happened to be able to procure natural uranium or special fissionable material at more favorable terms than its competitors could.

"In Bonn they will surely be quite happy about so much liberality," says a Brussels expert. In view of the disputes in Germany itself about the rhyme and reason of peaceful nuclear fission, the impression in Brussels as well as in Paris is that it could not be unwelcome "to those on the Rhine" if initiatives for the liberalization of the EC nuclear fuel market ("elimination of the dirigistic provisions in Chapter VI of the Euratom Agreement" reads the Paris memorandum) came from the Seine, of all places.

It is known in Brussels that even now German industrialists are hurrying to Paris, because it is pretty certain that special fissionable material will be obtainable there in the coming decade: France is a world leader in the commercial "reprocessing" of fuel elements--an area from which the Germans are backing off, perhaps under pressure from nuclear energy opponents--and France is also at work on the largest uranium enrichment plant in Europe, the responsibility for which is borne by the multinational company "Eurodif," in which the French hold a majority of shares.

Deliveries Via Paris

Whereby experts in Brussels thus see a reason for the French Euratom initiative: Paris by no means considers itself any longer--as it did in 1958--to be exclusively a fuel customer. On the contrary, France--which has uranium deposits at home and in African partner nations--is

rapidly becoming a fuel producer. Just as the French regard themselves as the breadbasket of West Europe, so they want to be also the preferential supplier of the EC with respect to nuclear fuel. They are proceeding on the assumption here that the opposition to a provisional and circumspect utilization of nuclear power will gradually fade away-- everywhere in Europe--with rising oil prices and scarcer oil supplies. Otherwise, a falling standard of living and a decrease in revenues for social measures would in point of fact be unavoidable consequences.

At the present time, all EC purchasers of nuclear fuels and natural uranium must theoretically conduct such transactions via the Brussels agency. In practice, the "simplified procedure" substantially prevails. According to this, fuel-purchasing contracts made within the EC and with foreign suppliers--above all in the United States, in Canada, Australia, and South Africa--can enter into effect only after being counter-signed by the director general of the supply agency, the German Dr. Baldern Mennicken. Some 59 contracts for natural uranium deliveries were approved by him last year. If such contracts contain provisions which are incompatible with the Euratom Agreement (such as any discrimination against other European consumers), then "Brussels" requires a renegotiation.

Waiting on Washington

For a long time now, the French nuclear policy makers have not liked the fact that the European Community can interfere in their own supply policy. This interference is especially troubling to them because-- differently than in Great Britain--French fuel policy does not make a clear distinction between peaceful and military applications. Euratom has force only for the peaceful use of nuclear fission. Back in 1976, Paris had already succeeded in getting it accepted that all nuclear fuel material which could also only be "suited" to employment in French nuclear armament plants was outside the reach of the Community. To the extent that, in the wake of American-Soviet settlements on the limiting of intercontinental nuclear weapons (SALT II), the uncertainties about U.S. nuclear-weapons protection of Europe grow and France feels called on to do more for the nuclear protection of its own country and the intervening territories--namely, of Germany--those in Paris will want full freedom of action.

It must be remembered that from 9 April to 13 September of last year, the United States temporarily stopped 23 deliveries to Europe of source materials for fuel-element manufacturing. Ever since the sharpened U.S. legislation on the prevention of the transmission of fissionable materials which are suited to the making of atomic bombs, the EC has been subject to the same restrictions as India. In the case of highly enriched uranium, where the EC depends completely on the United States, by the end of December of last year some 22 applications for exports to Europe were still pending. Often this requires waiting for longer than a year.

Better Terms

This uncertainty as to rights, so says Paris, presents these countries with the opportunity to achieve more independence through a "joint supply policy." At the same time however, one hears in Brussels that the danger thus threatens of a monopolizing in French hands of a portion of the fuel supplies. On the other hand, as a nuclear power France could perhaps procure nuclear fuels worldwide on better terms--also to the advantage of the EC (it is said)--if all discrimination and competitive distortions within the Community were to cease.

Therefore, the EC concludes, first of all there should be a debate on precisely what it is that the French and the other Europeans want. Then it would be possible, if necessary, to talk about the adjusting of the Euratom Agreement. On 18 September the first general discussion of the foreign ministers on the EC Council is to take place.

From England, obstacles are already being raised: The EC, which must come to a unanimous decision on this subject, will cooperate with the French on nuclear policy reform, it is said, only if Paris agrees to a renovation of the joint agricultural policy--that is, to reductions in the prices it establishes.

12114

CSO: 3103

FRENCH OFFICER'S BOOK CRITICIZES NATO'S WEAKNESSES

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 2 Aug 79 p 4

[Review by member of the editorial staff Christian Potyka, "Guy Doly's Gloomy War Vision"]

[Text] Lieutenant-Colonel Guy Doly, deputy commander of an infantry battalion in Belfort, began a 4-week American vacation the day before yesterday. One may well wonder with what opinion of the United States the French officer will return to Europe. For this member of the general staff gave a thoroughly critical evaluation of America as a protective power and of the operational capability of NATO in his latest and so far most spectacular publication. Doly composes a scenario in which the Americans do not meet the demands of their role as a protective power. First they induce the Warsaw Pact, by a weakening military commitment, to launch a tank attack on neutral Europe, and then they give no thought to helping their allies with nuclear weapons.

According to Doly all this could happen some time in the 1980's during the Whitsundtide [seventh Sunday after Easter] holiday. The Frenchman has written a kind of military science fiction novel, which, he says, is "sans fiction," that is, not exactly pure invention. After the NATO Generals Close and Hackett, this is the third well-informed author to have expressed substantial to dramatic doubts of Western defense capability in Central Europe. Connoisseurs regard Doly's "La Sixieme Colonne" [The Sixth Column] as literarily the best of the three books. The fictional report of the collapse of Central Europe and the surrender of France is hair-raising to read, judges a German general staff officer.

But even Doly's comrades have problems with the book. In its theses on a lliance politics, for example, it is by far not so discriminating as the scope of the author's own thoughts as a whole. Up to now Doly had proven himself to be a committed European with interesting ideas on a European military component. Even his view of America was in no way as negative as in his spectacular novel. Of course some complexity has had to yield to the succinctness of the tale. Doly is not subject to opportunistic hankering for sensation. He is supposed to be a serious man, who is of course suffering

under a "gloomy vision" (his own words): the underestimation of Eastern armaments and intentions in the West.

The officer also looks with concern at the internal French situation in a crisis. He regards the underground potential and the subservience to Moscow of the FCP [French Communist Party] as frightening. It is the job of the French to judge this. But up to now there has been very little public reaction from our neighbor to this book, which appeared in February (20,000 copies stocked). Even the "leftists" did not want to get excited about it. On the other hand the military chiller seems to find a stronger echo in the press of the FRG.

Officially the German Ministry of Defense has not yet taken a position. Only Lieutenant-General Altenburg (at present at NATO in Brussels) contradicted the Frenchman in a reader's letter to DIE WELT, which had taken the novel very seriously. According to him, Doly is not sufficiently informed about the strategic planning of NATO. In addition he incorrectly assesses the defense capability of the Western troops and the U.S. commitment. This of course cannot be the last word on the book.

6108

CSO: 3103

AVEROF INSPECTS TORPEDO BOATS, HELICOPTERS

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 7 Aug 79 p 9

[Text] It was announced on Saturday that towards the middle of October the launching will be held of the first of the six torpedo boats of the "Combatant 3" type, being built at the Skaramanga Shipyards for the requirements of the Greek Navy.

The launching and delivery of the remaining five will be effected at three-month intervals.

The Minister of National Defence, Mr Averof, who visited the Skaramanga Shipyards on Saturday, was briefed on the progress made for the completion of the remaining five units, as well as the construction of two patrol boats being built at the same yards at the expense of a Greek-American donor, Eugene Panagopoulos.

The Minister made the following statement:

"The Greek private industrial sector is now in position to produce anything. The vessels in course of construction at these yards constitute excellent examples of intricate and difficult shipbuilding. They are being prepared in record time and their quality is excellent. I feel pride and emotion at these achievements."

Mr Averof then went to the Greek Navy Helicopter Group and inspected helicopters to be used for anti-submarine warfare. They are equipped with the most up-to-date electronic devices for spotting submarines as well as for attacking with torpedoes. The helicopters can also attack surface targets, and for this purpose are equipped with air-to-ground missiles.

CSO: 4920

OLYMPIC AIRWAYS 10-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 28 Jul 79 p 4

[Text] Olympic Airways, the Greek National Airline, has announced that a ten-year development plan has been drafted by the Government, to be completed by 1989.

Investment in the airline by 1984 is expected to reach over 1 billion dollars. The development plan includes the following measures:

1. Gradual replacement of Boeing 720's with YS-IIA's and Boeing 707's.
2. The use of Airbus A-300 aircraft on European flights and certain domestic flights.
3. Use of Boeing 737's for domestic purposes and on certain flights abroad.
4. The company will decide on what aircraft to use for long distance flights.

O.A. has also declared that it will start flying to Canada and Australia and will expand flights to countries such as Japan.

By 1984, O.A. expects to offer passengers twice as many flights as they do today.

The Olympic Airways program was presented by Company Management to Government Officials. Present were Messrs Konstantine Mitsotakis, Minister of Coordination; Alexander Papadongonas, Minister of Communications; Athanasios Canellopoulos, Minister of Finance; George Panayotopoulos, Minister of Commerce; Deputy Minister of Coordination, John Palaiocrassas, Secretary General of Coordination; George Pappas and other officials.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

MINISTRY BUILDING BOMBING--A home-made bomb exploded yesterday at 1:30 pm in a Syngrou Avenue building which houses a section of the Ministry of Education. According to police reports the bomb had been placed near the heating oil reservoir of the building but the only serious damage was the breaking of the front plate glass door of the building. An organization calling itself the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA) phoned several newspapers last night claiming responsibility for the explosion. The same organization has recently claimed responsibility for other bomb blasts in Athens, including some at public buildings. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 28 Jul 79 p 4]

TOURIST INCREASE REPORTED--The first half of 1979 shows a substantial increase in the number of tourists compared to the same period last year. According to a statement issued by Mr Lambrias, Secretary General of the Greek National Tourist Organization (EOT), 2,252,255 foreign tourists came to Greece from January to June of this year as opposed to last year's 1,899,439. Americans topped the list of tourists at 248,125 this year followed by the British, 212,837, German 209,001, Yugoslavs 158,310, French 127,203, Swedes 94,365, Italians 92,564, Dutch 62,776, Swiss 59,694, Austrians 59,080, Australians 57,846, Danish 57,243. These figures represent an increase of 18.6 percent on last year's statistics. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 4 Aug 79 p 4]

KAVALA INDUSTRIAL ZONE INAUGURATION--The Kavala industrial zone, which is expected to become a magnet for the development of the entire Kavala Prefecture, was inaugurated on Thursday in the presence of Minister for Northern Greece Nicholas Martis and Commerce Minister George Panayotopoulos. When all the infrastructural work is completed, the zone will have 130-170 industrial and handicraft units, employing 6,000 to 8,000 workers. The Kavala industrial zone, which is organized by the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank (ETBA), covers an area of 520 acres, and 150 million drs. have already been spent for its creation out of a total budget of 600 million drs. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 5-6 Aug 79 p 9]

BIRTH, DEATH, MARRIAGE STATISTICS--Greeks are reproducing, but slowly, a Government Statistics report announced recently. Specifically, births registered a 2% increase in 1978 (146,156) compared to 1977 (143,294), as opposed to a comparison with 1976, when a slight decrease can be recorded (0.6%), 146,172. Deaths in 1978 reached 81,842, i.e. a decrease of 1.3% compared to 1977 and a slight increase (0.5%) compared to 1976. Marriages conducted in 1978 (82,895) showed a decrease of 2.7% compared to 1977. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 27 Jul 79 p 7]

URANIUM FOUND IN SERRES--Industry and Energy Minister Evert revealed in a TV interview Friday that a vein of uranium has been discovered in Vrondou, Serres. This is in addition to the uranium discovered in Drama. Meanwhile, the director of the Public Oil Corporation, Mr Zachos, has announced that drillings for oil are taking place in the Ionian Seas and will be completed by the end of 1979. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 29-30 Jul 79 p 4]

ROCKET LAUNCHERS UNDER CONSTRUCTION--The first rocket launcher made in Greece (Competent 3 type) will be handed over to the Greek Navy in 1980, it was announced yesterday. The launchers are being constructed at Skaramanga Shipyards and one rocket launcher every three months as of this October will be passed onto the Navy for defensive purposes. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 7 Aug 79 p 4]

CSO: 4920

INFLATION, UNCERTAIN FISHING OUTLOOK WORRY ICELANDERS

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 Jul 79 p 6

[Commentary by Thor Viksveen]

[Text] When the main goal of a government's economic policy is to bring inflation down to around 35 percent, it illustrates better than anything else the kind of problems it is grappling with. This is what faces the three-party government (Social Democrats, left-wing Socialists and Liberals) that now governs Iceland's more than 200,000 inhabitants. At this point in 1979 there are few indications that the goal will be attained. Prices are expected to rise about 40 percent or more. If the increase is that small (1), it will mean progress over last year, when the rate hit 51 percent. No other OECD country suffers from such a runaway inflation.

The rise in prices is, of course, the most difficult problem in an economic situation that is not too bright for Iceland in other respects either. Increasing oil prices are the major reason. In addition, Iceland, more than most other countries, is entirely dependent on imports of goods needed to keep the system going. Thus, the country is at the mercy of price rises that it has no say about.

However, the country cannot lay all the blame with the outside world. The coalition government that was established last year after long months of negotiations has not quite shown the necessary willpower to pull together in difficult times. There are at least as many proposed solutions to problems as there are parties in the coalition government.

Government Situation

When the coalition government, consisting of the People's Alliance, the Progressive Party and the Social Democratic Party, was formed in August of last year, neither friend nor foe expected it to last. Even though it has a secure parliamentary base in the Althing (40 of 60 seats), it reflects such disparate viewpoints as to solutions for Iceland's problems

that when it was formed most people expected that it would surely fall apart within a few months. So far, however, they have avoided calling new elections even though there were many crises looming last year. The conservative Independence Party, which is in the opposition in Parliament with its 20 seats, has had an easy time of it, as they say, because it has not had to play opposition politics. The party has calmly been able to state that the best opposition to the government's policies comes from the government parties themselves.

The fact that they are scraping along despite coalition problems stems from the three parties' agreement that a breakup and new elections would probably not lay the groundwork for a more stable government. It is, however, an open question whether this argument is a good enough reason to stick together through thick and thin until the end of their term in 1982.

The Prime Minister

In an interview with ARBEIDERBLADET in Reykjavik, Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson, from the Progressive Party, said that people could only hope that the coalition lasts until the next regularly scheduled elections.

"There have been various conflicts within the coalition so far. We hope that we can continue together, but nothing can be said for sure. There are no immediate risks of a breakup, however," the prime minister said. He clearly does not have much hope that the alliance he leads will last.

He does not speak kindly of the coalition when he says:

"It is especially damaging to unity when the members of the government come out with their own stands before an internal agreement is reached in the government and before the issues have been discussed thoroughly there. There is strong competition among the parties, primarily between the Social Democrats and the left-wing Socialists. I would have desired more harmony in the coalition, but perhaps we will learn something from the experiences that we are undergoing now. Things might get gradually better as we get used to internal cooperation," Johannesson told ARBEIDERBLADET.

The Economy

The explanation of the coalition's problems is the fundamentally different proposals for solutions advanced by the three parties. The People's Alliance, which includes both left-wing Socialists and doctrinaire Communists, obviously favors a steady drift towards a completely different approach to the economic crisis than the Progressive Party, a liberal, middle-class party that believes that the workings of the free market can do much of the job.

The Icelanders have established a system whereby price and wage increases are coordinated. Most people concede that adjusting wages to price increases is the main cause of the problems. There is no hope, however, for a joint understanding that the system must be done away with, because they have different political groups with major special interests to attend to. Wage negotiations involving various occupational groups are pursued almost constantly, almost always a group at the brink of or in the midst of a conflict. Labor organizations represent many different wage interests under their auspices, and it is difficult for the groups to coordinate in order to score joint gains vis-a-vis employers. Kleppe packages are completely unknown. The talks entail collective bargaining between employers and the workers, and state involvement in the form that we know it does not exist.

Oil

The government felt that it had some control over economic developments a few months ago, but the enormous oil price increases have shattered that feeling. Iceland has an oil supply pact with the Russians under which it has to pay the price that prevails on the spot market. As we know, prices on this market have recorded an explosive rise over the last few months. Negotiations towards a new agreement between Iceland and the Soviet Union start in September; Iceland hopes to have the terms changed at that time. The unfavorable oil pact with the Russians is the backdrop against which the Icelandic Government will be turning to Norway in connection with a long-term oil supply agreement.

One positive feature in an otherwise pessimistic economic outlook is that Iceland does not suffer from unemployment. There is also uncertainty regarding the future in this field as well. Fishing and all related industries are the country's economic lifeblood: 65 percent of Iceland's total exports consist of fish and fish products. Reports of smaller catches, heavy taxation, tighter regulations, in short, fewer fish, are becoming more and more common. The ocean does not have unlimited resources for harvest. The more a country has based its existence on fishing, the more uncertain its future is.

Industry

Iceland has now begun the slow process towards industrialization because it realizes that fishing cannot in the future feed everyone or provide as many jobs as it has. A large iron alloy plant went on line last spring. An aluminum plant is already in operation. Iceland possesses a resource that is becoming increasingly valuable in the Western World: energy. A considerable amount of untapped hydroelectric and geothermal power means that Iceland is sitting on a trump card. The question is, how will it play the card.

Prime Minister Johannesson expressed the prevailing opinion in Iceland when he told ARBEIDERBLADET:

"We have to give our sectors a better footing to stand on. We can no longer rely solely on fishing to save us. We have energy resources that are inexpensive to harness in comparison to other resources in the Western World. We must try to use them, but we have to remain alert and not proceed too fast. We are a small nation that cannot withstand sudden changes. We will therefore proceed slowly. There are diverse views in Icelandic society on the use of hydroelectric power as a means of establishing industry. In particular, there has been opposition to foreign companies controlling the projects. One of the preconditions that we have set in connection with future industrial ventures is that Iceland have a controlling interest in stock and capital," Prime Minister Johannesson said.

8743

CSO: 3108

ICELANDIC ALLOYS OPENS NEW PLANT NEAR REYKJAVIK

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Jun 79 p 21

[Article by Grete de Lange]

[Text] Grundartangi, 26 June—Icelandic Alloys, Iceland's first iron alloy plant and one of the country's leading industrial projects, was officially opened on Thursday, as Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson laid the cornerstone, in keeping with Icelandic tradition. He thereby also marked the completion of the largest cooperation project so far between Norway and Iceland. The Icelandic Government holds 55 percent of the interest in the plant, and Elken-Spigerverket has 45 percent.

Icelandic Alloys will be producing ferrosilicon, which is used in the production of steel. The plant contains a smelting oven with an annual capacity of 25,000 tons. In late 1980 oven number two will come on line, and production capacity will double. Elken-Spigerverket will provide the ovens and be responsible for marketing and output. Combined investment was budgeted at about 500 million kroner. Actual total investment will be somewhat lower, about 420 million. The project will be financed, among other mechanisms, by a 200 million kroner loan from the Nordic Investment Bank, and A/S Eksportfinans has advanced a 125 million kroner loan. When the second oven begins operations, the plant will have 170 employees.

Elken-Spigerverket administrative director Karl Lorek told AFTENPOSTEN that the market has been slack for iron alloys but that the 1974 level has been reached again. The company forecasts higher prices in the future. Lorek hopes that the group can discuss the possibility of a third oven in Iceland. At that point the plant would be economically interesting to the company.

The plant location was based on local environmental evaluations. It has been built in an area just a couple of hours drive from Reykjavik and 17 kilometers from Akranes, which has 4,500 inhabitants. Fishing is the main occupation in the area, but there is also industry in the form of shipyards and a small cement plant. The site was chosen in order to

promote industry outside the Reykjavik area, but the capital is close enough to provide access to the expertise that a major industry depends on in many respects.

Many comprehensive studies were conducted before the plant was built in order to secure the best possible environmental conditions, both inside and outside the factory. It includes a large purification unit of the same variety as the one in the Norwegian ferrosilicon plant. This provides for a clean environment around the plant, which is something that both the Icelanders and the Elken-Spigerverket group have greatly emphasized.

8743

CSO: 3108

TEXT OF PCI CENTRAL COMMITTEE DOCUMENT ON VIETNAM REFUGEES

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 5 Jul 79 p 16

[Article: "Central Committee Document on Vietnam Refugees: the Lives of Thousands of Human Beings Must Be Saved"]

[Text] The Italian government must respect its obligations to help and cooperate. The EEC's decision worsens the situation. Initiative taken by the PCI members of parliament.

At yesterday's meeting, the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission approved the following document.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the PCI wish to express the feelings of the Italian people at the plight of the refugees in Southeast Asia; they emphasize the necessity for immediate aid to save the lives of thousands and thousands of human beings and, what is more, to assure them a future. The refugees' plight has its origins in the tragic events that have taken place in Indochina, which was for decades subjected to colonial domination, aggression, invasions, and destruction. Whole generations have been forced to live in a state of permanent war, suffering, and underdevelopment. This drama is the direct consequence of the crimes and attacks of imperialism, particularly the terrible war waged by the United States; it is due to the terrible damage done by the use of weapons of mass destruction and the years of occupation of the southern part of the country with its attendant corruption and fearful economic distortions. The liberation could not and cannot solve in a short time, of course, the great difficulties of the situation.

In bringing aid to the refugees, initiatives should be taken outside of any instrumentality and all partisan campaigns. The problem should be addressed in accordance with the countries directly involved, with international action coordinated by the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, which the Vietnamese government has already declared itself ready to work with. The European Economic Community's decision to transfer to the refugees the food quota intended for Vietnam is denounced as an act tending to worsen the situation of martyred Vietnam and to give the aid an oppositionist character.

It is undeniable that the plight of the refugees is one aspect of the more vast and general problem of reconstruction in the countries of the Indochinese peninsula. Besides adequate policies adopted by the governments of the countries involved, other countries should cooperate by acquitting themselves of the obligations incurred in causing such vast destruction, foremost among these countries being the United States. The Italian government should also comply with the obligation to supply aid and financial, technical and economic cooperation agreed to but not yet granted to the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

PCI members of parliament have already urged the Italian government to meet the problem of the refugees and to take appropriate, concrete action. The PCI affirms its willingness to continue the work of solidarity with the countries of Indochina. This willingness was expressed during the war in the vast mobilization of the Italian people, by the workers and youth. The PCI declares it will work together with other democratic forces so that Italy will play its part in the urgent job of rescue and aid.

This job should not be one of mere charity or assistance. It should be undertaken by governments and international organizations with the immediate aim of assuring the physical survival of men, women, and children; its aim should then be to permit them to return to their countries of origin, if they so desire and if possible, or else to settle them in other countries of their choice.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the PCI enjoin communist groups in the Italian and European parliaments to work under the direction of the government in Rome and the EEC institutions, and to follow and control their initiatives.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the PCI emphasize that other terrible tragedies are taking place in other parts of the world. There remains unresolved the problem of the Palestinian people, who have been expelled from their own land. And there began this week the drama of the people of Nicaragua, who were forced to flee from the massacres provoked by a brutal dictatorship. Full and concrete humanitarian missions of solidarity should be developed for these people who are struggling for their independence and identity.

Consistent with the noble internationalist traditions of the popular and working masses of our country, Italian communists pledge themselves to extend and intensify their support for the just struggles of these peoples and to supply, in their confrontation, the necessary material and human solidarity. The tragedies of which they are victims show today, more than ever, that it is imperative to launch a great mass movement for peace, for detente, for disarmament, and for a new international economic order: this is the basis for liberating, everywhere in the world, those who live in backwardness, poverty, and hunger; it is the basis for free and autonomous development in every country, and for the right to life of every nation.

PvdA CONSIDERS CONTACTS WITH PLO

Conditions Stipulated

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 9 Aug 79 p 3

[Article by our diplomatic editor]

[Text] The Hague, 9 August--The PvdA [Labor Party] is not averse to contacts with the PLO. However formal recognition of the PLO is excluded, as long as it does not accept Israel's right to exist. As soon as the latter happens, Israel must also be ready to begin a dialogue with the PLO.

Those are the most important points of a draft report that former minister, Doctor of Laws, Max van der Stoel drew up, as chairman of the PvdA working group, after a month of fruitless discussion. He hopes to get a sizable majority of the committee to support this proposal, which is a final attempt at a compromise, at the last meeting of the working group in 2 weeks.

According to Van der Stoel, there has never been a question, as was reported here and there, of the PLO formally inviting the PvdA to send a delegation to its headquarters in Beirut. "When I spoke yesterday with committee member, Relus ter Beek, even he appeared to know nothing about such an invitation. Jan Pronk (who at the beginning of this year would have conveyed such an invitation--editor) on his visit to the Middle East only spoke with the second or third man in command at the PLO headquarters," according to Van der Stoel.

Van der Stoel, who only wishes to speak in a personal capacity and not as work group chairman, considers it important that contacts take place repeatedly. In so doing, people in the Netherlands can acquaint themselves more definitely with the Palestinian point of view, while, on the other hand, the Netherlands' position can be explained to the PLO.

According to the PvdA member of parliament, a solution for the Middle East problem must be based on the following three principles: recognition of Palestinian rights and forming a state, recognition of Israel behind secure and acknowledged borders and evacuation of occupied areas.

Settlements

The draft report of about 16 pages again contains a sharp condemnation of the Begin cabinet's settlement policy. It did not go any further into the situation in southern Lebanon and the position of Major Haddad and his Christian Militia, in view of the fluidity of the situation. Asked for an assessment on the Camp David agreements, Van der Stoel expressed his personal opinion that this depends completely on the follow-up: "that which they now are concerned about, the fulfillment of the agreements regarding the West Bank, can turn out quite differently: from inadequate to satisfactory.

A small minority of the working group, about 3 of the 16 members, would have preferred a more far-reaching statement about the Palestinian problem. However, according to chairman Van der Stoel, the discussion about the contents is now concluded.

He hopes to reconcile the differences of opinion, to a considerable extent, with the draft now on the table. The report is being handed over to the party executive committee at the end of the month. It will make it public afterwards.

Pronk Favors Political Contact

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 11 Aug 79 p Z 2

[Article by An Solomonson: "Pronk and the Palestinians"]

[Text] A difference of opinion has arisen in the PvdA about the PLO as a legitimate negotiation partner. Jan Pronk, member of parliament, who accepted an invitation of the Palestinians at the beginning of this year, looked favorably on political contact with Yasser Arafat's organization.

A draft report which is now circulating in the PvdA appears to partially endorse this view. Pronk explains his point of view below.

The Middle East problem--there is nothing else imaginable which keeps minds in the PvdA so divided. Even a draft report of Max van der Stoel, formulated very cautiously and drawn up in a month long discussion in a working group specially appointed for this purpose, does not appear to be able to reach a consensus. There is always a faction which claims it goes too far or not far enough.

The hottest issue in this heated debate is without doubt the relationship to the PLO. The descriptions range from a gang of killers to an equal and legitimate negotiation partner. The latter view is endorsed, among other things, by Jan Pronk member of the Second Chamber, former minister of development aid, also not unknown in other fields as a pioneer or an impractical obstructionist, depending on your liking and political outlook.

At the beginning of 1979, after having looked around for a week in Beirut and southern Lebanon as a guest of the PLO, Pronk came back with a PLO invitation to the PvdA to send a delegation. At least, he asserted that.

Max van der Stoel and Relus ter Beek declared besides last week that they did not know anything about an invitation. How is that now?

A sunburned Jan Pronk, it appears, a new Pronk indeed, is really going to take his seat. He expresses himself quietly, cautiously, sometimes hesitatingly and is definitely in first rate condition after a sunny summer with his family. "That must be a misunderstanding of Van der Stoel, unless you want to think of an invitation very formally. I have spoken privately in Beirut--it is true, on a personal basis--with Abu-Jihad the second in command in the PLO about the various opportunities for making contacts. We agreed that the best option would be to send a PvdA orientation mission to Beirut. After my return, I conveyed that invitation to the party executive committee and said that I would deliver the answer to the PLO. In addition, I suggested sending to Lebanon a mission not of the party executive committee, but of the Middle East working group. This appeared to be a good solution to me, in a difficult situation. If you are preparing a position, it is best to speak first with all parties involved. However, I never have heard anything more about it."

The party executive committee (both the old as well as the new) obviously found doing nothing the better solution in a difficult

situation. But now a report finally lies on the table, even if it is a draft report, which advises making contacts with the PLO.

Pronk: "I have not seen that report. I am advocating political contacts and that is somewhat different from informal or special contacts. Political contacts are contacts with someone whom you recognize as a negotiation partner and with whom you establish a longer term relationship. Their purpose is not only to solve special problems such as journalists or soldiers picked up, but to achieve a regular exchange of political ideas. You then recognize the other as a political agent, a political operative in a definite field. I consider anything less unsatisfactory."

Conditions

He is absolutely unconcerned whether such contacts do not then imply a recognition of the PLO. He says he does not know what political recognition of the PLO is. Recognition is a matter for governments or for international organizations. How can you recognize a movement? For the Netherlands also has never recognized FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front].

In this line of thinking Jan Pronk believes that no conditions with the PLO are suitable. If you recognize anyone, can you set conditions, not if you are going to speak with an actual political partner. "That discussion in the Netherlands is interested much too much in conditions. I do not think it is a good idea politically to ask the PLO to eliminate the passage in its charter about the annihilation of the state of Israel and to recognize Israel."

He mentions three arguments and the earlier dark fire gradually blazes up in his eyes again:

- 1) It must be abundantly clear to everyone that the PLO has gone through a political evolution since the middle of the sixties. Its representatives have indicated repeatedly that they prefer political measures to military and that the objectionable passage in its charter actually is a dead letter, although that still has not been formalized.

- 2) Such a formalization is desirable, but must be the result and not the condition beforehand, for it is the essence around which the negotiations will revolve.

- 3) The PLO may then be the national movement of the Palestinian people, but as in every country, there are also different political movements with varying degrees of extremism. Pronk says it

is abundantly clear that the main stream prefers a political decision. If you now ask them to officially eliminate that passage from the charter, then that involves a dispute in the PLO. You are asking it, fundamentally, to eliminate itself. But that cannot be the aim.

But what about the terrorist actions then? Must it not be a basic condition for every conversation that the PLO finally stops them?

Pronk: Of course, but that is true for both parties, also for Israel with its reprisal measures in southern Lebanon. I would prefer to see an armistice in the framework of a UN approach before the negotiation period.

"The Netherlands must look out. What appears here as a breakthrough, has been rendered out of date long ago in other countries. If we in the Netherlands and the PvdA do not succeed in finding as open as possible a formulation and if we again try to remain noncommittal, then we are well on the way to being a not very credible party to the discussion.

"It is also not at all up to the PvdA or the Netherlands to make such conditions. Such a position must be formulated in the framework of the EPS [European Political Cooperation]. Naturally there are limits which may not be overstepped. The Security Council's Resolution 242 is such a limit."

Isolation

Consequently all that is diametrically opposed by Den Uyl, who sharply criticized the meeting in Vienna between Brandt, Kreisky and Arafat, because it was not made a condition that Simon Peres should be consulted about it, that the PLO recognize Israel and renounce terrorist activities.

"In fact, I have not a single reservation about that summit meeting. Its significance is probably somewhat overestimated. For that matter, the Socialist International requested it. As regards Peres, he was informed by Brandt. And finally: Is it not very important that this sort of contact take place between men who must make far-reaching decisions? After Camp David I was very afraid that this would lead to the isolation of the Palestinians. If they feel themselves shunted to the sidelines, then they can no longer keep their violent factions under control at all.

Pronk does not want to accept the idea that Arafat, it is true, rejects military solutions orally, but connives at terrorist atrocities. He says groups and individual PLO members received disciplinary punishment often enough, if they did not observe the rules. "Naturally terrorist actions still take place in Israel under PLO sponsorship. I also do not share the Palestinian argument that in them only military targets are attacked. But making the renunciation of terrorism a condition for contacts--that does not recognize the fact that a war is taking place. That condition always only serves as an excuse for the Netherlands to take no position and do nothing."

Self-Interest

But precisely a man like Pronk does not want to deny that public opinion in the Netherlands regarding the Palestinians has changed recently at breakneck speed?

"Yes certainly, but that is happening especially since we have participated in UNIPIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon]. Consequently I have never understood why the Palestinian Committee opposed Dutch participation in UNIPIL so strongly. That does not exactly indicate insight into the effects which this involvement is going to have."

And the energy crisis?

People have become afraid of the cold and the darkness. That probably will also play a role? Pronk with a resolute gesture: "The energy crisis does not play any role at all in my view. I also do not wish to have it play any role. It is a mistake to alter your point of view because of self-interest or fear."

Fortunately, there we have him again, our own old Pronk, the moralist, the seer. He is "the unrealistic politician," the man for whom it only matters how the world should be and not how it, by chance, now is.

8490
CSO: 3105

NORSK FRONT SEEKS REGISTRATION AS NEW NATIONAL PEOPLE'S PARTY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 28 Jul 79 p 3

[Commentary by Per-Arne Bjerke]

[Text] "We are not willing to drag that lugubrious burden along any longer!" That is what Erik Bluecher said yesterday at a press conference when he announced that the Norwegian Front is being discontinued and the National People's Party is being founded. The "lugubrious burden" this leader was referring to consisted, among others, of the Norsk Front members who were implicated in the bombing affair. Bluecher admitted that the attack on 1 May had been an encumbrance, and that was one of the main reasons why the national leadership had felt itself to be under an obligation to take "this drastic and deplorable step" of dissolving the organization. But now, generally speaking, it is only the name that distinguishes the new party from the Norsk Front. Erik Bluecher continues as chairman and other central individuals belonging to the national leadership are remaining in their positions. All former members of the Norsk Front who want to join the new party have to apply for membership, however. By that means, Bluecher gets a chance to get rid of what he describes as "absolutely irresponsible" elements. As with the Norsk Front, an attempt will be made to register the National People's Party as a party, and Bluecher expects to succeed in obtaining the required signatures. The press conference yesterday was held in the SAS [Scandinavian Airlines System] Hotel, and it was the leader himself who summoned the newspapers and broadcasting stations by telephone half an hour ahead of time. For the occasion, Bluecher had taken the name of Thygesen to conceal his identity as the person who had rented the meeting place. With him at the press conference, Bluecher had the former trolley-line worker Georg Farre, who is probably the future secretary general of the National People's Party. Also present was the bodyguard Geir Ernst, wearing a T-shirt and with the muscles of a boxer. Ernst has been designated to lead the youth organization of the new party.

In a proclamation in the newspaper ATTAKK, the leader denies that his party is a Nazi party. On the next page, the party's program is crammed full of Nazilike and racist ideas. Erik Bluecher admits that many of his sympathizers, to be sure, had been in the National Unification before or during the war.

"But it doesn't matter what people did previously if only they are in agreement with our 25-point program. We have former members of all parties with us," the leader asserts.

SVALBARD GOVERNOR SAYS MEDIA OVERDRAMATIZE PROBLEMS WITH SOVIETS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 31 Jul 79 p 16

[Interview with Governor Jan Grondahl of Svalbard, by Niels Fredrik Dahl; date and place not given]

[Text] The general holiday is also over for our governor on Svalbard. Jan Grondahl headed for Svalbard yesterday evening with the rest of his family. The governor is concerned about the increased tourism to Svalbard, and he thinks that the press has a talent for overdramatizing the relations between Norway and the Soviet Union in the mining community.

Governor Grondahl hopes that his return to Svalbard will be somewhat quieter than the last time he returned from a holiday. Four hours after he landed, he was on his way to Hopen and a Russian airplane crashed, an accident which was to bring Svalbard and Grondahl onto the first pages of the newspapers for a long time to come.

[Grondahl] But there is nothing to indicate that I am going to have any special problems soon. I am a little bit concerned about the big increase in tourism to Svalbard, but, in general, the situation must be described as quiet.

[Question] Have special restrictions on tourist traffic to Svalbard been demanded?

[Answer] No, special restrictions have not been demanded. It is the authorities' policy to permit tourism on Svalbard, but on a limited and controlled level.

[Question] At one time you expressed a desire to get branch offices set up in the two Russian mining communities on Svalbard. Does it look as if that will be put into effect?

[Answer] Nothing more has happened in regard to that question. In order to establish such offices, there must be a need for it in the Russian settlements and there must be a desire on our part that they be set up. The establishment of branch offices is not of current interest politically at present.

[Question] Is it hard to enforce Norwegian sovereignty vis-a-vis the Soviet Union on Svalbard?

Overdramatization?

[Answer] One certainly cannot conceal the fact that Norway and the Soviet Union have different interpretations of individual problem areas, but I must add that relations between Norway and the Soviet Union on Svalbard are extremely normal. It seems to me that the press and the other mass media have a tendency to overdramatize the situation. It is not nearly as strained, by a long sight, as the newspapers sometimes succeed in suggesting.

[Question] You also touched on that previously. Do you find it difficult to cooperate with the press on questions concerning Svalbard?

[Answer] No. I feel that I have good relations with the press, and I hope that they also have good relations with me.

[Question] It is beginning to be quite some time since Svalbard was last in the center of the political picture. Do you prefer for things to be quiet in regard to Svalbard in that respect?

[Answer] Yes, naturally we want to regard Svalbard as a low-tension area. But of course there are always problems of political importance here which we have to take into account.

[Question] In conclusion, after a four-week summer vacation in East Norway, is it not a little unpleasant to have to return to cold, windswept Svalbard?

[Answer] No, I actually am glad to come home now. It will be fine to get back on the job again.

Jan Grondahl will continue to constitute the prolongation of the government's arm on Svalbard until 1981. Then he will take over as chief of police in Havar.

9266

CSO: 3108

PRODUCTION TO START AT ELDFISK OILFIELD

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Jul 79 p 15

[Article by Hans Chr. Erlandsen: "Eldfisk--Big Oilfield Now Begins Production"]

[Text] Eldfisk, Jul--One of the largest of all of Norway's oilfields will shortly be put into production. Eldfisk, as the field is called, is half as big as Ekofisk but bigger than the Frigg gas field. Starting production in an oilfield is a tremendous and demanding process. A team of experts in the specific task of getting ready for the first oil arrives well in advance to lend a hand. Valves, couplings, instruments, fire-fighting equipment, etc., are tested--yes, they even drive "pigs" through pipelines and sniff for gas.

No chances are taken before production begins. Everything must be functioning and be in order before oil and gas are let loose. Consideration for the safety of the personnel and of the billions which have been invested make it certain that no shortcuts will be taken.

A platform where oil is produced has areas which are hot. That means that, because of the danger of fires or explosions, the use of fire, welding tools or any tools which can make sparks is prohibited. Smoking is also prohibited. One can only perform welding in "hot" areas with special permission.

Prohibition of Smoking

"We have had a no-smoking rule for a long time already," supervisor Iars Jahnsen told AFTENPOSTEN. "The fellows react favorably to that because they know there is no danger before we go into production, but we have to accustom ourselves to thinking about such things. Therefore we all introduced the system--but with permission to perform welding, etc.--so that the personnel could become accustomed to it. Smoking is allowed in places where excess pressure has been taken care of, so that no gas can filter in." Hunting for gas is an important part of the start-up. In one part after another of the installation, rather small amounts of gas are pumped in. Then they go around with a piece of apparatus for measuring which sucks in a mouthful of air which then is checked for a possible gas content. If a leak is detected, it is

stopped up immediately. First the "sniffing" is performed with gas at a low pressure in the system. Gradually the pressure is increased, and the hunt for leaks is continued.

A little demonstration of how little gas is released by a cigarette lighter convinces one that the measuring apparatus does not require large leaks in order to react. The people who are to work on the Eldfisk platforms after the field goes into production have already been on the spot for several years.

"We needed time to familiarize ourselves with the systems as they were being installed," Jahnsen told us. He has his place on the FTP--the terminal platform where the installation for the separation of oil and gas is located. "It is important to be acquainted with the specialists who install the apparatus. You learn things from them which the directions for use will never give you."

"On the team of experts for starting up, there are processing people, engineers, maintenance personnel, electricians, technicians of various kinds and also experts on measuring systems, among others," says the man in charge of the southern part of the Ekofisk area, Superintendent Leroy Bingham.

The Norwegian authorities, in particular, are interested in having the amounts of oil and gas which are produced measured as accurately as possible. Some people in the oil industry even call that part of the production system the "cutting gang."

"These starting-up experts take over the systems and check them before they are made ready for production," says Bingham.

The pipelines between the Eldfisk platforms and the main installation in the Ekofisk center must be emptied of water, cleaned and dried before oil and gas are introduced in small amounts for the final tests. For cleaning the pipelines, a thing which is called a "pig" in technical language is used. It is sent into the installation and brushes or scrapes it clean, and some versions of the "pig" are filled with measuring equipment which can check the thickness of the pipeline, for instance. The "pigs" can look like gigantic spools, or spindles, made of rubber, or they can be spheres covered with bristles.

Only Taxes and the Value-Added Tax Are Larger Sources of Income Than Ekofisk

The installation the personnel on Eldfisk are going to operate during the coming years is not a small one. The field will have a top capacity of 310,000 barrels of oil per day. That is more than Statfjord A. In addition, there are 16.5 million Nm³ of gas (corresponding to 130,000 barrels of oil). The entire Ekofisk area will provide the government with about 6 billion kroner in taxes and royalties this year. Only the value-added tax and the income from taxes constitute larger sources of income.

What is called the Ekofisk area for the sake of simplicity actually consists of a long series of oilfields: Cod, Tor, Albuskjell, Vest-Ekofisk, Eldfisk, Edda and Ekofisk itself. When Eldfisk goes into production now, all the fields except Edda will be producing oil and gas. Gradually, as drilling is completed on all producing wells, the Ekofisk area will reach its top oil production of 660,000 barrels per day in the third quarter of 1981, while gas production will reach its peak at the same time with an amount corresponding to approximately 500,000 barrels of oil (70 million Nm³). Eldfisk was discovered in December 1972. The field is located south of Ekofisk. The foundations for the three platforms in the field were put down in 1976.

According to the Oil Directorate, 113 million tons of oil equivalent, or almost 870 million barrels, can be recovered from Eldfisk. However, the Oil Directorate points out that the amount of recoverable oil can perhaps be doubled by forcing water and/or gas down into the field to help bring up the oil. Only increasing total production from Eldfisk by 1 percent will provide energy corresponding to approximately one year's total consumption in Norway.

Phillips Petroleum does not want to reveal how much it has cost to develop Eldfisk, but the entire Ekofisk area is calculated at approximately 30 billion kroner. That includes the pipelines running ashore from the oilfields but not the installations on land in Emden and Teeside.

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CSO: 3108

SHIPPING ASSOCIATION CHIEF DISCUSSES INDUSTRY'S PROBLEMS, FUTURE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Jul 79 p 2

[Article by Niels Werring, Jr., president of the Norwegian Shipping Association: "Not Laid Up Any Longer"]

[Text] As everybody knows, predicting the future is a very difficult art. Often it is hard enough to be able to predict the present correctly--that is, to interpret what is happening right at the present moment correctly. And the big question at present in the world of shipping which everybody would like to get a reliable answer to is the question as to whether we can now see the end of the crisis coming, as to whether the good, sound market we first obtained for dry bulk cargo ships, and then for the smaller and medium-sized tankers, has finally also arrived now for the largest ships of all--the super-tankers--and whether the chronic disparity between supply and demand in international transportation by sea which has lasted 5 years is over. There are a great many things which indicate that the end of the crisis is actually coming. Not in the sense that the various sectors of the industry will have no problems from now on or that we will not always be experiencing setbacks. But even the parts of the industry which were hit the hardest are now out of what many felt was a state which could be called chronic--a state of surplus tonnage, prices which resulted in losses and ships having no value. International shipping is underway again, to tell the truth. This situation has not come about of its own accord. It is the result of 5 years of active and very hard adaptation by the shipping industry itself after business was suddenly upset in 1974 in a veritable setback of the world's economy and something close to a collapse in the tanker market as a result of the raising of the price of crude oil by the oil-exporting countries to a price several times larger than it had been.

Practically speaking, all contracting for big tonnage came to a halt immediately, and that situation has continued all over the world until now (even though political authorities in most of the shipbuilding countries did their utmost to subsidize new contracts for their surplus tonnage). At very great expense to the shipping companies which were affected, contracts for 60 million deadweight tons which had been entered into were canceled on a worldwide basis, or were converted to other and smaller types of ships. Norwegian shipping companies (which had ordered relatively less tonnage in the years

immediately preceding the crisis than had been customary in the 1950's and 1960's) canceled contracts which had been concluded for a total of 11 million tons.

At the same time, older, and, little by little, newer tonnage was scrapped to an extent never before known. A total of 70 million deadweight tons were scrapped during those years in preference to lying idle at anchor.

Combined with a steady, new growth in world trade (after a single year with a decrease in 1975), these efforts produced an adjustment in the demand for transportation which moved a great deal faster than almost anyone could have imagined when the crisis first began. In that regard, it is useful to observe that that adjustment took place much more quickly in the shipping industry, whose development invariably is determined by market forces, than in shipbuilding, where political decisions to maintain a certain capacity--almost regardless of actual needs--play a much larger role. In Norway, furthermore, we can state, today, that the shipping industry is the only one which got through that period without any support from the national treasury--that is, from the taxpayers--in the form of grants or subsidies. That is all the more noteworthy since the Norwegian shipping industry, as a whole, operates in an international market; consequently, it has to encounter competition from countries with much lower cost levels and many fewer publicly-determined loads to carry than is the case in Norway. But that dissimilarity--in relation to competitors abroad and to other businesses here at home--has also had an influence. Last year there was a net decrease of a total of 149 ships from the Norwegian merchant fleet. This year, up to the present, there has been a net decrease of 54 ships. During a period marked by increasing unemployment in Norwegian society, we can see that about 8,000 good jobs have been lost here in the shipping industry.

There are two main reasons for that unfortunate development in regard to the size of the fleet. One is the fact that, precisely during the critical period, the Norwegian cost level underwent dramatically unfavorable development by comparison with other countries as a result of the mistakes that were made under the so-called counter-to-business-conditions policy. The other main reason for the big sales of ships is the fact that Norwegian shipping companies, in contrast with those of other countries, did not have any opportunity to own and operate ships under foreign flags but were often confronted with a choice between a Norwegian cost level resulting in losses and the selling of ships at an unfavorable period of time, also resulting in losses. There can hardly be any doubt that the strict registration policy has been the cause of a great deal of damage not only to the shipping companies affected by it but also to the Norwegian economy as a whole.

It seems clear that we now can turn our attention from the question of "how can we surmount the crisis in shipping?" to "how can we best prepare ourselves for a market with new possibilities?" Without changes--that is, improvements--in the working conditions for the shipping industry which are decided up here at home, there is a danger that the Norwegian shipping industry, after coming

through the most dramatic crisis in a generation, will live to see itself lose its footing after the worst is already over.

When we speak of the work of bringing wage developments under control, we mean that the parties involved in economic life and the authorities, jointly, must perceive the need for an entirely different sort of control in that area than has been seen for a number of years. Strict restraint must be practiced for a considerable period of time before the disparity with respect to the wage levels of other countries has been straightened out. The same discipline must be made to apply to demands for expensive reforms where the practice over the years has been for the bills to be presented for an economic life of such a nature that the economic means required to pay for it are lacking.

Then the Norwegian shipping companies must get the same opportunities as their competitors to set aside reserves and raise new capital with which they are willing to take risks. There is a need for extensive reforms in the area of taxation, and it is absolutely illogical for wage freezes to be coupled together with a "no" to efforts to stimulate the development of capital. Indeed, consideration for jobs actually demands that one should say "yes" to economizing and the development of capital first, in the same breath as one says "no" to wage increases not covered by increased production.

Most shipping companies these days are meeting the new challenges and, as times goes by, the new needs for capital investment with less economic fortitude than is desirable. Therefore, there is a very great need for efforts to stimulate the development of capital. It is also of decisive importance for the efforts to be of a general nature and that they should apply to everybody equally. There is probably reason to expect that, in the years to come, Norwegian shipping will be concentrated in a smaller number of shipping companies, but in ones which are larger than we have been used to. But no public authority will be able to have any reasonable foundation for stating which shipping companies have a future and which do not. Only the market itself can settle that.

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PRESIDENTIALIST PARTY: NEW POSSIBILITIES ARISE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 28 Jul 79 pp 1R-3R

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "Eanes' Final Presidentialist Attempt?"]

[Text] While many observers expected the government which Maria de Lurdes will finish establishing to represent, to some extent, the abandonment of the idea, so often mentioned, involving the advent of a new political group close to Belem, some new information has come to light showing that the president of the republic, Gen Ramalho Eanes, may still consider such a group both possible and desirable, regarding it, furthermore, as compatible with the government of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, and possibly even facilitated by the latter's action.

In fact, at informal bilateral meetings which he has held during the past 2 weeks with politicians who are not affiliated with any of the existing parties, the president of the republic overtly defended the formation of a new party; and some of those with whom he talked even interpreted the president's position as representing a "sounding" with regard to such a hypothesis.

Another Attempt at Agglutination

These informal meetings would appear to represent the same goal which was the underlying reason for sending a personal observer of the president of the republic himself (specifically, Defense Minister Loureiro dos Santos) to a meeting in Rio Maior, at which an attempt was made to agglutinate the reformers with the ASDI [Independent Social Democratic Association] and with other personages who are independent of parties, such as members of the Civic Electoral Committee.

In this attempt, one of the leading promoters of the initiative was the secretary general of the CAP [Portuguese Farmers Association], Jose Manuel Casqueiro, who at the time was very close to Belem, and one of the strongest defenders of President Ramalho Eanes, because of his uprightness.

Similarly, in the talks and at the dinners held recently at the personal initiative of the president of the republic, there has been an obvious intention

of including the same political gamut, in other words, reformers, dissident Social Democrats from the PSD [Social Democratic Party], other independents and prominent figures from among the "social partners" who have been considered as associated with Belem for a long time.

Hence, on the one hand, the president may be trying to eliminate the stalemate which occurred after the failure of the meetings in Rio Maior and Leiria, and also to "mollify" the signs of hostility which many of the most loyal "Eanists" of the past began showing toward the appointment of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo.

Insofar as the first point is concerned, substantial strategic differences already divide the sectors invited to Rio Maior into at least two distinct lines:

The line represented by a part of the ASDI which set forth "counter-clockwise" for the creation of a party which would be capable of running in the forthcoming intercalary elections;

The line reflecting the confluence of a minority sector from the ASDI with the reformers and other independent personages, which has, specifically, not accepted the over-dependence on the PS [Socialist Party] associated with the first line.

In general, among the former there are many individuals such as Magalhaes Mota, Cunha Leal and Vilhena de Carvalho. The latter group includes Rui Machete, Mario Pinto, Ferreira Junior, Antonio Barreto and Medeiros Ferreira.

Outside of these two lines there are personages such as Sousa Franco and Barbosa de Melo: the former closer to the first line, and the latter closer to the second line cited.

Such a great political division in a necessarily limited area, wherein no political machine has as yet been mounted, could not benefit President Eanes.

Perhaps that is why the president considers it especially important to "nurture" the dynamics of the ASDI sector which is preparing to launch the new party, on the one hand; and, on the other, to maintain a political and/or personal relationship with the reformers and the independent Social Democrats who are displeased with the ASDI experiment.

Explaining the Pintasilgo Government

Strangely enough, it is the latter whom the president must attract most, because they have proven to be less willing to "swallow" either the choice of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo or the president's position excluding the expedient of a referendum.

Medeiros Ferreira's article on this subject last week was quite clearcut regarding the start of a break with Belem.

At the informal meetings that he has held on this subject, Eanes has been clear about one thing: the need for the advent of a new party. He was also clear about advocating the idea that this new party would have nothing to lose from the experience of Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo's government; quite the contrary. With regard to the referendum, he was more cautious, confining himself to the statement that he has never rejected the hypothesis of a referendum; something which, though literally true, is extremely questionable from the standpoint of logic.

But what Eanes seems to want most is to believe in the potential that the president of the republic has to regain political prestige and maneuvering room, and to accrue dividends from the crises in the existing political parties.

The government now being formed would, therefore, represent another attempt (the third, to be exact) at starting a process of overall political readjustment.

It all began with the Nobre da Costa government, continuing for a year. It all continued with the Mota Pinto government, a few months later.

In Eanes' view, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo is a possible third step in the process of growing presidential affirmation, simultaneously with elections which will make little change in the prevailing party system and will allow for the launching of a new political party.

Political Insight or Naivete?

In the opinion of many observers, Eanes has achieved virtually everything that he wants: the silent and hence trusting support of the armed forces, the crisis in the party system, the reinforcement of his leadership power, and the creation of an empty political space for a new party reality. Only he has not found an Adolfo Suarez capable of mobilizing a political partisan majority to meet his needs and desires.

So, Nobre da Costa proved to be a first attempt, apparently the one with the greatest potential of all; but, by the same token, the one which could cause the most rivalry between the two politicians.

Theoretically, Mota Pinto would be a more docile prime minister than Nobre da Costa. Experience showed that this assumption was not so indisputable as that; since he often assigned his inherent responsibility to Daniel Proenca de Carvalho, who was certainly the minister with the greatest influence on the conduct of the prime minister.

For reasons of affinity of ideas, friendship and even personal loyalty, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo may have appeared to be the ideal solution for serving as a catalyst in a presidentialist "elan," which failed on other occasions. A woman in a country wherein the female electorate carries decisive weight; a Catholic activist in a country which is traditionally regarded as Catholic; not alined with the political parties, and hardly a believer in parliamentarianism. She is capable of gathering around her a veritable throng of idealistic politicians and technicians, congregated on the basis of a criterion which often has less to do with their current political status than with the militant camaraderie of the past.

In short, this profile of a prime minister seems to afford Eanes more opportunities for exerting all his presidential weight, when it is clear that the elements of the Portuguese political situation not only have not changed, but have not even deteriorated as a result of the intercalary elections.

However, in order to be able to play his strong "hand" in January or February 1980, President Eanes should not become overly isolated.

In time, and with an understanding of the profound significance of the government that will arrive then, all the leading parties will initiate hostilities against Belem: the PS for some reasons; the PSD and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] for others. Only the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] will be circumspect in this regard.

Then Eanes will have to go over the heads of the parties to make direct, immediate contact with the Portuguese people, necessarily demanding a new "political class" to be promoted.

He must, therefore, maintain close ties with the most widely diversified independent political sectors in an ecumenism that is not Gaullist only because the orientation, charisma, capacity and determination are different. In addition to the fact that, for example, there is no record of De Gaulle's having ever named Malraux his prime minister.

A sector of the ASDI regards the president's affiliation as always welcome. Without him, the promotion of the new party would always be far more difficult. But this is the sector which is perhaps most insignificant, in terms of popular impact, among those in the area included in the president's ties.

Conversely, an Antonio Barreto has for a long time made no secret of his dissociation from Belem. In what was considered an indirect response to the president's contact, a Medeiros Ferreira stated to a weekly paper the day before yesterday that he had not renounced the referendum. For the very first time, a Jose Manuel Casqueiro established his diametrical opposition to the president of the republic, in solidarity with the CAP's leadership organs.

Obviously, a presidential stake in a new political party and in the profitability of the action of the Pintasilgo government in that direction is not impossible.

But, in the view of many other observers, it would be an indication of naivete rather than political insight to ignore the fact that not many of the "presidentialists" of the past have now proven willing to become alined with the president.

At the beginning of the third "round" of the battles between Eanes and the parties, the bets on Eanes' chances for victory will never have been so small.

Many people are of the opinion that the country's ills lie in the fact that the parties have not reached an understanding. In other words, they feel that, if the parties reached an understanding, "we would live like God and the angels."

In a recent message, the president of the republic himself expressed regret that an agreement was impossible between the two major Portuguese parties: the PS and the PSD; an agreement which appeared to be all the more possible so long as there were extensive areas of contact between the respective programs.

I think that stating the issue in this way is putting it exactly upside down. In fact, what determines a party: the program or the political activity? Furthermore, what prompts people to back one party or another: a program (which the overwhelming majority have never seen), or what the leaders of the party, particularly the personage who "gives the image" to the party, say, or the positions which the party assumes each day?

Therefore, a party is what it says from day to day, and does from day to day; and not a pile of written sheets. This is for a rather simple, definite reason: because a well prepared program can be made by a single individual, working alone, but an isolated person will never manage to win hundreds of thousands, or even millions of votes.

To this extent, the political activity of a party, or the statements of its leaders, can by no means be "condemnable," nor can it be claimed that they have "betrayed" those who trusted in them. Condemnable for what reason? The only competent judge of the public statements of politicians is the electorate, which will continue to give them its votes, or not, in subsequent elections. Take heed: the public statements of politicians normally reflect the tendencies of large sectors of the electorate; because when this does not happen, when a politician makes the mistake of disregarding the political tendency of his constituents at any given time, and repeatedly makes statements which are not in keeping with their aspirations, his future is doomed.

This is the difference between the ordinary man and the politician: the ordinary man says what he thinks; the politician says what he has to say (on the basis of one strategy or another, or in accordance with the current tendencies of his constituents).

Using the occasion to say, for example, what he thinks about an agreement between the PS and the PSD may be a well intentioned position, but it would never be a realistic one.

The PS and PSD are the two major Portuguese parties precisely because of their political activity, and not because of their program, or anything else. The PS and PSD are the two major Portuguese parties precisely because they are on different sides: the PS on the left, and the PSD on the right. The PS and PSD are the two major Portuguese parties precisely because they are in confrontation, they are battling one another and they are attacking one another.

Because, if the PS and PSD were to make a long-standing agreement, if they became good friends, if they stopped confronting one another, if they combined their voices to back the same government, if they published photos of Dr Sa Carneiro and Dr Mario Soares smiling disarmingly at one another, the PS and PSD would soon cease to have a majority. Moreover, it should be noted that the importance of the PSD at the present time stems largely from the fact that it has always been an opposition party. Once the PSD becomes the government, once we stop hearing Dr Sa Carneiro's battering, radical language bellowing against everything that a government is doing, once we start hearing Dr Sa Carneiro backing the policies (not necessarily always popular or brilliant) of an executive branch, the importance which the PSD now enjoys will have undergone a considerable upset.

However, there are other matters to be taken into account. What concerns us here, and may be concluded from what has been written, is that, unlike what some people claim, not only are the parties divided, but the electorate is also. And, since the electorate is divided, the population is divided.

This means, therefore, that there is no use attempting party agreements for the sake of establishing a majority, because even if the party leaders were to succumb to the folly of establishing such an agreement, the future would prove its strictly arithmetic nature. Within a short time, and once the political activity of the participating parties was changed by virtue of such an agreement, the electorate would inevitably move in the direction of the parties whose political activity responded to its desires at that time, destroying the majority which had been achieved so laboriously.

Hence, an agreement of that nature would have a merely ostensive content, since it would be devoid of any (real) social content. The fact is that the population is divided; and, since this is so, all the attempts to establish a will of the majority "through political initiatives" are deceptive. Meanwhile, the question arises: then how will it be possible to govern the country?

Salazar and Eanes

How did Salazar govern the country for 40 years? one might ask. With the police, would be the reply. Only the reply, although true, is nevertheless incomplete. As we know, Salazar was born in a Beira village, and was the son of a foreman. Therefore, he did not have any power at birth. The power which he had at the end of his life was built by himself, starting from scratch. How?

First, of course, as a result of his own qualities; and, starting at a certain point, also through the support which he managed to obtain for himself thanks to those qualities.

Moreover, at the beginning of his governmental career, Salazar not only lacked the support of the political police, but also had their hostility. Then what backing did he have? First of all, that of the Church. In fact, although he had left the priesthood after attending the seminary, Salazar managed to win the sympathy and support of the Catholic Church (at a time when the institution was unquestionably the most influential one ever known during the era), to the point where the Church "went along" with him.

However, Salazar's secret was one of not being anyone's "man." The Church went along with him, but under various circumstances he made a point of keeping a relative distance from the Church. Thus, Salazar became a genuine arbiter in Portuguese society; a position which was to guarantee him a long stay in power.

If, on the other hand, Salazar had become beholden to any of the forces which backed him (or did not attack him), he would have had a brief political career.

We were discussing the support for Salazar. After the Church, there came several groups and forces: the rural and urban petite bourgeoisie, for whom Salazar, insuring respect for the hierarchy, guaranteed the statute (however mediocre) on privilege which this class enjoyed (and which the unstable power of the First Republic did not guarantee it by any means, exposing the petite bourgeoisie to the danger of succumbing to the same mire in which those "disinherited from the earth" vegetate); the reactionary rural aristocracy; and the industrial and financing grande bourgeoisie, requiring support from the state, from a state capable of insuring order in the streets and peace in the factories; part of the monarchists; part of the fascists; and some others.

From the sampling, it is obvious that Salazar was not the man of any of these groups. He was clearly not the man of the monarchists; he was not the man of big capital; he was not the man of the fascists; but, not being the man of any of these groups, Salazar was everyone's man, because he benefited everyone sufficiently to have them keep him in power. Thus, with the power of others, with the combined portions of power which the various groups granted him, Salazar built a vast personal power, which enabled him to make his

own policy, when necessary, even in opposition to the wishes of some of the groups affiliated with the sector backing the regime.

What is the purpose of these observations? Am I attempting, with this chatter, to become the oracle of some would-be dictator? Nothing of the sort. The matter is a simple one: If it is impossible to establish a majority capable of supporting this regime, the only possibility of governing is to organize a strong power capable of offering the government in office a real power, and not a power devoid of internal authority. Now the organization of a strong power under the present circumstances inevitably requires the person of a man, with his ability to secure support, his acumen for acquiring strength from others and his capacity for building a personal power. And it is precisely in this respect that I mention Salazar; obviously, not to hail the excellence of his dictatorship, but to cite, as a recent example, the way to organize personal power.

Moreover, contrary to what some may think, the establishment of a personal power under the current conditions in Portugal is not a risk, but a necessity for democracy in Portugal, without which the survival of the latter would be jeopardized. If an authority that is more or less accepted by everyone, and more or less dissociated from the incessant political bickering, is not established relatively soon, democracy will be in serious danger.

Naturally, at this point in the article, and in the direction that it has taken, one name comes to mind: Ramalho Eanes.

Unlike Salazar, Eanes does not have the overt backing of the Church (although there is reason to believe that he will not have to confront its hostility, either); but, on the other hand, he may have extensive support from an institution which has also played a leading role in the history of Portugal, and on which Salazar could never count entirely: the army.

Also, whereas Ramalho Eanes is, unquestionably, less cultivated and less subtle than Salazar, like the latter he keeps a certain distance from what surrounds him, a distance that is essential in Portugal for conveying to people a certain sense of security, without which no authority can exist.

Moreover, Eanes, like Salazar, may gain strong support from the petite bourgeoisie, and from certain entrepreneurial sectors, provided he succeeds in convincing both that he is the one with the power, and that, in the last analysis, "order" depends on him.

Eanes and Juan Carlos

Thus far, Ramalho Eanes has won, if not the most difficult victory, at least an important one: that of gaining for himself a moderate amount of power, starting with absolutely nothing. The current president of the republic and army general is the son of a couple of modest means, and he was born in an obscure village in Beira Baixa.

To be sure, the conditions under which the present king of Spain, Juan Carlos, came into the world were different. Whereas Eanes, a child of the common people, rose by force in the ranks of the army's chain of command, projecting himself thereby into the state apparatus, and eventually combining in his hands the two highest positions in the civilian and military hierarchies (the presidency of the republic, and the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces) Juan Carlos de Bourbon, a child of noble parents, was born a nobleman, and was destined from the cradle to hold a position in the Spanish social hierarchy.

But, while at the time of their birth the future might have seemed quite different for both men, the vicissitudes of life gave them destinies which, although they are not equal, are at least similar.

It is not so inappropriate as it might appear to establish a parallel between Eanes and Juan Carlos; and not only because they are both tall, upright and have a facial profile with some similarities. In addition to this, Juan Carlos holds on the Spanish political scene exactly the same position that Ramalho Eanes "should," in my opinion, hold on the Portuguese political scene, for the good of Portugal's democratic future.

Possessing an authority that is generally undisputed from right to left (including the Communist Party), and from Monarchists to Republicans, King Juan Carlos is tending to become what might be termed "the symbol of the regime." Governments may change, and policies may undergo more or less major alterations, but over all this there is a countenance, a figure and a position that will remain intact: the king. Because whoever touches the king will, in fact, be touching the regime itself; and hence he will meet with active opposition from those who, though they may challenge policies, do not challenge the regime.

Hovering over the partisan struggles, not becoming involved in the ideological debates, and remaining a careful distance from politics, Juan Carlos is, however, not a hollow front. The king of Spain has a de facto power (which enabled him, for example, to the surprise of the majority, to appoint Adolfo Suarez, no less, to head the government). But Juan Carlos' power is a power to be used only at times of serious crisis, when the regime itself is in danger. It is a reserve capital which, for that very reason, no one among the forces which uphold the present regime is interested in wasting. Hence, the figure of the king will remain intact.

This would be the ideal statute for Ramalho Eanes; but, in order to aspire to it, Eanes would need someone that he has lacked thus far: an Adolfo Suarez.

Up until now, Eanes has lacked a man free from party bonds, with personal charisma, and endowed with political experience (and, in particular, shrewdness); a man who will take on the responsibilities, and who will play his own

cards, leaving the power of the president unharmed. But (and the importance of the "man" lies here), a man who will, by making use of the strength of "being in the government," and "being an authority," be capable of achieving what Suarez achieved in Spain: the formation of a majority.

The majority which appears to be impossible to establish through interpartisan alliances, that is, by allowing the political initiative to be surrendered to the parties, may possibly be achieved with the advantage, and through the action of an able man, who has behind him (and over him) the authority of a president-king (a distant president who, at the same time, holds a *de facto* power).

Therefore, it is such a man that Eanes requires. Rather than intervening more resolutely in political activity, rather than inspiring the establishment of a supporting party (repeating the tragic experience of Sidonio Pais), and rather than attempting a "presidentialization of the regime," which has no tradition in Portugal, what should matter to Ramalho Eanes is to obtain a man (or a woman, who knows?), a shrewd, able prime minister capable of promoting the establishment of a majority (whether declared or not), and, at the same time, maintaining dialog with the opposition.

Without this man (or woman), Eanes will hardly last long in the presidency of the republic. But if he should prove able to obtain him, the president may expect a peaceful extension of his stay in Belen; and the country may look forward, not now, of course, but over the medium term, to some (more than deserved) political holidays.

2909

CSO: 3101

BRIEFS

NEW ASSAULT RIFLE--The FFV [Swedish National Industries Corporation] has just presented a new assault rifle of 5.56 mm; this weapon, developed by the Swedish army (which will soon replace its individual arms) is derived from the Israeli Galil rifle, to which several modifications were made. [Text] [Paris DEFENSE INTERARMES in French Jul-Aug 79 p 9]

CSO: 3100

SWISS ARMY CONFRONTS PROBLEMS

Senn on Pz 68 Tank

Zurich WELTWOCHTE in German 11 Jul 79 pp 4, 5

[Article by Marcel H. Keiser: "Living with the Truth; Chief of Staff Hans Senn Confirms the Shortcomings of the Pz 68"]

[Text] In a circular letter to all high-ranking commanders of the army, Chief of Staff Hans Senn has confirmed the shortcomings of the Pz 68 tank. Nevertheless, there is a "good chance" that most of them can be eliminated--but it will be an expensive process.

Corps Commander Senn wants his views on the shortcomings of the Pz 68 tank, which have been the subject of complaints, to be made known "in a suitable form" to the staffs and troops serving in or with armored formations during the second half of 1979. The contents of his circular letter, which was sent out on 29 June, agree with the opinion he expressed nine days earlier at the joint meeting of the Military Committees and with which, Chief of Staff Senn stressed, Division Commander Robert Haener, the chief of ordnance of the Mechanized and Light Troops (MLT), "categorically agreed."

Since the WELTWOCHTE unleashed the storm of objections in regard to this Swiss-designed and Swiss-built tank, there has been no lack of attempts at appeasement. Thus, for example, Brigadier Herbert Wanner, the chief of staff of Field Army Corps 2 and an MLT instructor until late 1978, stated in this paper last week that the letter from Division Commander Haener which was made public was 3 1/2 months old when that happened, and consequently it was out of date to that extent. Then Wanner alleges that the shifting, or drifting, of the stabilizer and the problems with the steering have been solved, a foolproof drive mechanism is being tested and the tracks with an inadequate working life would be replaced "within the foreseeable future."

The chief of staff, on the other hand, does not want to pass such euphoric views as those on to the troops at the present time. His circular letter simply notes that "model tanks on which improvements have been made" are available to the MLT summer schools for testing. Nevertheless, there is a

"good chance that most of the shortcomings can finally be eliminated." For the time being, however, we will probably have to be satisfied with that "good chance," and no more. Senn lists the following specific shortcomings:

--Just a slight continuation of movement, "which can scarcely be observed by the operator," during the process of shifting gears from "forward" to "reverse" can result in rather serious damage to the transmission. Senn appraises such quirks as "serious impairments of mobility."

--Steering the Pz 68 of the third series (with a large turret) is, because of its excess weight of about 1.8 tons, "only possible with difficulty or not possible at all." The result of this is "a medium-sized forfeiture of mobility" and "a slight forfeiture of protection."

--At certain frequency ranges of the radio and when using high transmitting power, there can be a negative influence on turret control, and consequently there can only be transmission in the LOW range. In certain cases, and particularly on the company level, however, full transmitting power is necessary. There is a "slight loss of readiness for action" for a platoon and an "average impairment" for a company.

--The operational performance of the caterpillar track is insufficient since only approximately 50 percent of the existing tanks can provide the required number of kilometers traveled in case of mobilization. There is no impairment on the battlefield, but, on the other hand, there is "an average loss of mobility and readiness for action in displacements." The elimination of that deficiency would entail "large expenditures for repairs."

--Strong vibration results in cracks in the fuel tanks of vehicles in the first series. The tanks of the second and third series have improved tanks, "which presumably are all right." But experience with them over a period of time is still lacking. The leaky tanks are equated with "an average impairment of readiness for action." Here, too, "large expenditures for repairs" are indicated.

--All track wheels are to be replaced, successively, by an improved model. In fact, this deficiency only entails a "slight impairment of readiness for action" but it also entails "large expenditures for repairs" once again.

--The artificers with the troops can only carry out repairs on the stabilizers to a very limited extent because the units were made individually to the maximum extent possible. Hence, exchangeability of component parts cannot be guaranteed. In the judgment of the chief of staff, "there is serious impairment with undetermined possibilities for harmful effects on firepower."

--According to the existing delivery plan, the formations of the 4th Field Army Corps armed with the Pz 68 will not be completely equipped with repair parts and spare parts until approximately the end of 1979. Senn

regards this as a "serious but temporary impairment of readiness for action." The chief of staff's opinion on the effectiveness of the so-called curved-tooth coupling is diametrically opposed to that of Major Daniel Sommer, the commander of a tank battalion. Sommer stated, in the SCHWEIZERISCHE HANDELSZEITUNG, that the mechanics were able to unhinge the universal joint "in a few minutes"; "only being able to tow it 20 meters is a misrepresentation." Nevertheless, Senn stated: "The tank can only be towed a distance of 20 meters. For greater distances, the universal joints have to be uncoupled by mechanics; otherwise, the transmission will get out of commission. This work is time-consuming and can scarcely be accomplished on the battlefield." Where the trouble with the curved-tooth coupling is concerned, it is a "serious impairment of repair-making capability."

Now, as is evident from the chief of staff's circular letter, Division Commander Haener's criticism was not very precise on one specific point: the apparatus for protection against nuclear and chemical agents does not fail in all cases, but only against nerve gases. Accordingly, the vehicle remains completely fit for combat when nuclear weapons are used, but not on a battlefield contaminated with chemical agents, where "an average loss of protection, with corresponding effects on firepower and mobility must be accepted."

Opposition to New Development

On balance, says Corps Commander Senn, the shortcomings listed above would impair the Pz 68's fitness for combat "in individual areas varying from one series to another." On the other hand, we should remember that "the tank, as an entire system, is suitable for use in combat." His letter does not express any opinion on the numerous shortcomings of earlier date--that is, shortcomings involved in the overall concept and design of the tank.

While Colonel Peter Peyer of the legal branch looks for leaky places in the Federal Military Department and the Subcommittee of the Military Commission of the National Council receives his findings with animation, more and more opposition to any Swiss development of a new military tank which would replace the 300 British "Centurions" first, beginning in 1985, is forming. The refusal of the Committee for Military National Defense (KML), which, under the chairmanship of the head of the Federal Military Department, brings together the seven corps commanders and the armaments chief, is already known. But the "Tank Committee," an advisory body of the MLT chief of ordnance constituted by the Federal Council in 1970, which is presided over by Colonel Peter Kottmann (Allschwil) and includes 10 officer experts, lodged a unanimous vote of "No."

The "Armament Committee" also is now raising the stop signal, although on the strength of a majority of only one vote. In that committee, which is made up of representatives of industry, employed persons and scientists and is headed by the Hasler general director, Dr Jakob Bauer, the representatives of the trade unions, in fact, pleaded for the development of a new Swiss

tank. Consequently, the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions said, in a communique, in criticism of the action that was taken, that Swiss industry was definitely capable of producing an effective military tank "under suitable conditions."

2.5 or 4 Billion Francs?

Of course, the crux of the matter is precisely those "suitable conditions." In the first place, a Swiss-designed and Swiss-built tank produced in accordance with the extremely optimistic schedule of the private-enterprise consortium cited by Contraves would reach the Army in 1990, at the earliest, and, in the second place, the cost of a tank developed and built in this country in the future seems likely to reach gigantic proportions. According to calculations of recent date made within the government, assuming that a total of 450 tanks were obtained, the West German Leopard 2s would cost 3.8 million francs apiece if bought stripped, and with all the necessary systems (ammunition, spare parts, etc.) included they would cost 5.6 million francs apiece. Consequently, 2.5 billion francs would have had to be paid for the entire series of 450 tanks.

Considerably more money--specifically, 3.1 billion francs--would have had to have been allowed for in order to build the Leopard on licence, since the price per tank under those conditions would amount to 4.7 and 6.8 million francs, as calculated above. For a Swiss-designed and Swiss-built tank, at least 3.6 billion francs would have to be invested in the series of 450, at per-tank prices of 5.6 and 8.0 million francs, as calculated above. When the development costs are added on to that--and that is the only correct way of calculating the cost--the total cost bounces up above 4 billion francs. In contrast with all the protestations of Contraves up to the present, then, the cost of development would not be 287 million, but 550 million, francs.

Quotations from the Chief of Staff's Circular Letter of 29 June 1979

2.2 Shifting Gears

--Deficiency: Before the process of shifting gears from "forward" to "reverse" is initiated, the Pz 68 tank must be brought to an absolute standstill. Just a slight continuation of movement, which can scarcely be observed by the operator, during that manipulation can result in rather serious damage to the transmission.

--Evaluation: Serious impairment of mobility.

2.8 Curved-Tooth Coupling

--Deficiency: The tank can only be towed a distance of 20 meters. For greater distances, the universal joints must be uncoupled by mechanics; otherwise, the transmission will get out of commission. This work is time-consuming and can scarcely be accomplished on the battlefield.

--Evaluation: Serious impairment of repair-making capability.

4. Final Conclusions

The deficiencies listed in this letter impair the Pz 68's fitness for combat in individual areas which vary from one series to another. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the Pz tank, as an entire system, is suitable for use in combat.

[Signed] Corps Commander Senn
Chief of Staff

Statement by Major Daniel Sommer in Some Articles in the Press

"These people (i.e. the tank mechanics) are also able to unhinge the much-discussed universal joint in a few minutes, long before the emergency repair vehicle has arrived to tow it away. Only being able to tow it 20 meters is a misrepresentation of the situation."

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 5. Chief of Staff Hans Senn: Circular letter regarding shortcomings of the Pz 68.
2. p 5. Chief of staff's opinion and MLT chief of ordnance's list of shortcomings: Practical agreement between the two.

Swiss Army Guidelines for 1980's

Zurich WELTWOCHEN in German 11 Jul 79 p 5

[Article by Marcel H. Keiser: "Debacle Regarding the Swiss Army Guidelines for the 1980's"]

[Text] On Thursday of last week, the military delegation of the Federal Council--in addition to Mr Gnaegi, the head of the Swiss Military Department, it consists of Minister of Justice Furgler and Treasurer Chevallaz--arrived at an extremely sad conclusion: the Army guidelines for the 1980's cannot be carried out. Since, in view of the federation's critical financial situation, only 5.4 billion francs are available for the 1980-1984 investment period instead of the 6 or 7 billion called for by the general staff, the delegation has put the forces wearing field gray on a radical reducing diet.

First it deleted the British "Rapier" missile system for defense against low-flying aircraft, thereby saving at least 1.1 billion francs. According to the guidelines, three battalions were to have been provided for the anti-aircraft defense of the armored divisions. At present, no substitute is in sight, so the mechanized formations unfortunately will simply continue to be insufficiently protected against threats from the air.

Abandonment of the "Rapier" automatically also endangers the project of a Swiss-built antiaircraft tank, since the two systems--guns and missiles--were intended to supplement each other, according to the plans of the general staff. At the instigation of Buehrle/Contraves, a vehicle following the general idea of the West German "Gepard" is being tested at present. Since it does not seem to be entirely unchallenged technically, anyhow, its chances of success are now dropping off perceptibly.

Antitank defense also felt the effect of the economy drive, for the third installment of American "Dragon" missiles is being canceled. This means that the fusilier battalions are not receiving a fourth "Dragon" platoon and that, in particular, the militia formations of the Border Guard brigades will have to keep on squatting in their bunkers with their bare fists in the future, too. Since the "Nora" missile, which was developed by the Group for Armaments Service, is now "gone with the wind" and the missile tube's range is very well known to be insufficient, an extremely dangerous gap continues to yawn, as before, in a decisive area. The troops may not be able to muster a great deal of understanding for the strange way of looking at things which is customary with the higher-ups.

Since no essential elements can be broken loose from a whole which is complete in itself without catastrophic consequences, the guidelines for the 1980's are coming closer and closer to becoming nothing but waste paper. It is high time the Federal Military Department told the public how it intends to keep the tottering car on the track.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 5. British "Rapier" antiaircraft system: Gone because of lack of money.

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TOKER DISMISSES NOTION OF IRANIAN STYLE REVOLUTION

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Aug 79 p 11

[Article by Metkin Toker, "independent" senator in Ankara: "Iran Could Not Export Its 'Religious Revolution' to Turkey"]

[Text] The Turkish army putsch goes back 9 years, to the time when a four-star general with a group of young officers overthrew the government which was headed by the democratic party. President Bayar, Prime Minister Men-deres, and all the members of the cabinet were arrested. In its wake, the West expected the appearance of a great leader, a Nasir. None was found, because there was none. The West was mistaken when it supposed that every-where in the world, whether in the Near East, South America or the Far East, serious events must have the same consequences. Therefore, Western public opinion did not understand that the intervention of the army in Turkey in 1960 had a completely different ending from that of the same operation in Egypt.

Now, after what has happened in Iran, the West expects the arrival of a Khomeyni in Turkey. However, there is none, any more than there was a Turk-ish Nasir in 1960, and for a very simple reason: apart from the fact that the population of Turkey, like that of Iran, is more than 99 percent Muslim, there is no noticeable similarity between the two countries. Even though Turkey's stability is impaired at the present time, the reasons for that state of affairs have nothing to do with the evolution of the Iranian situa-tion.

Turkey's form of government is entirely different from that established by the shah. Turkey is a constitutional democracy. Free, general elections are held every year. Therefore, there is no need for a revolution to change the government. There is no supreme leader in Turkey against whom the dif-ferent social classes or political parties could unite. Nor could such groups unite under the banner of religion or for any other reason.

Although 99 percent of the Turks are Muslims, the status of the Turkish clergy is totally different from that of the Iranian clergy. Turkey is a secular state, and its laicization was the corner stone of the reforms of Ataturk. From the shah's father to Nasir, from Sukarno to Boumedienne, no revolutionary of an Islamic government has dared to laicize that state.

The Koran is not only a book of religious rules. It also orders the lives of Muslims on this earth. It is a code of laws which prescribes for crimes (cutting off the hand of a robber); it also regulates economic life, (forbids the charging of interest) and in private life, it codifies marriage, divorce, inheritance and guardianship (male heirs collect twice as much as females). Thus, the clergy has the right to impose Muslim laws and to decide what is or is not in accordance with them. These decisions are called "fatva." When Ataturk secularized the government, he suppressed these rights of the clergy. In Turkey, only the constitutional Tribunal lays down the law in that regard.

In 1930, the father of the deposed shah, the Reza Shah, visited Turkey at Ataturk's invitation. The Reza Shah contemplated the development of the country and Ataturk informed him of the new way of life and of the reforms. At that time the shah was establishing his own reform program in Iran. Upon several occasions, his son was to inform the author of this article that his father was very much impressed by his visit to Turkey--particularly by the secularization of the government and the introduction of the Latin alphabet.

An Irony of History

The Reza Shah also wanted to carry out these reforms in his own country. But his counselors dissuaded him from doing so. They urged him not to suppress the rights of the clergy--the "fatva"--a sovereign could always obtain favorable "fatvas," to provide for his needs through money or intimidation. Why then run the risk of stirring up the clergy against the shah? And converting to the Latin alphabet would cause a rift between generations. At the instigation of his father's counselors, the exiled shah decided that laicization and the reform of writing was not suitable for Iran.

It is an irony of history that it was a certain Khomeyni who caused his downfall, because Khomeyni retained his power only because the deposed shah's father had not had the courage to secularize the government.

One other fact explains the difference between the Turkish situation and the Iranian situation. In Turkey, all members of the clergy are government employees. There is a minister of ecclesiastical matters who is responsible to the cabinet. The clergymen in the villages are appointed, as are other government employees, such as teachers. An imam can perform his duties only after being nominated by the government, and it is the government which pays him. There are no mollahs, as is the case in Iran, who are supported and paid by the community. There is no clerical hierarchy in Turkey, where there are no ayatollahs or individuals of that nature. The organization of the Turkish clergy is not separate from the government but is a part of it.

At the present time, the Turkish Government is in a difficult situation. In the large cities, people are faced with violent political actions and in some parts of Anatolia there are religious confrontations between the Sunnite majority and the Alevite minority (Shi'ite groups). However, the West should not feel that these events will develop into an "Iranian situation." These battles between Turkish sects are not conducted by religious leaders, but by politicians who wish to use the Sunnites and Alevites for their personal objectives.

Anything could happen in Turkey with one exception: a political vacuum. Not only is the status of the clergy different but the foundations of the Turkish and Iranian armies have nothing in common. The Turkish Army could fill a political vacuum at any moment. It is a national army which enjoys tremendous prestige and is the only Turkish institution which is invulnerable to political maladies. It is disciplined and capable of controlling the difficult situations to which the country is subject.

The Iranian Army, which collapsed when the shah left the country, was the army of one man, the shah. It was controlled solely by him and his soldiers could only obey orders since they were incapable of giving any. When the shah banished the army could do nothing but give way. This created a vacuum and it was because of this that a man with no constitutional foundation came to power, claiming, like the rulers of ancient times that his mandate came from God. Nothing like this could happen in Turkey.

In this country the sickness of the government has an economic basis not a religious one. In Turkey religion could not move the masses. Perhaps Khomeyni could export his "religious revolution" to other Muslim states but not to Turkey. There will be no more be a Turkish Khomeyni today than there was a Turkish Nasir in 1960.

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